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INTRODUCTION
1
This report is focused on assessing the global or international competitiveness generated by 
the Partnerships for Development Program (PDP) introduced in 1989, which is an agreement 
between multinationals operating in Australia in the Information Technology (I.T.) industry 
and the Commonwealth Government so as to harness the efforts of multinationals as a 
consequence of their Offset activities by agreeing to undertake an agreed level of R&D, 
exports and local componentry of production. The aim of the program is to foster strategic 
alliances between local firms and multinationals and generally sharpen the former’s 
international competitiveness and that of the industry as a whole. The program also aims at 
making Australia an integral part of corporate global operations of the multinationals and at 
the same time develop the local industry. There is a commitment on the part of the 
government too, to stimulate infrastructure development. In this report, the concept of 
international competitiveness, globalisation, trends in globalisation, evolution of global 
industries, the theory of the multinational corporation, types of their activities, characteristics 
of the global industry, the role of government, the competition for integrated foreign direct 
investment, competition in the global IT industry, the Australian IT industry, Australia's 
competitiveness are focused upon. The PDP, is explained in detail and the results of 
questionnaires sent to multinational partners and local firms along with interview responses 
and information from secondary sources are presented in detail, followed by analysis and 
conclusions of the study. The PDP has no equivalent anywhere in the world so direct 
comparisons to assess the intemat ional competitiveness created by it are not possible. Again 
assessing the impact of one single program on the competitiveness of an industry is subject 
to the cause and effect phenomenon making it hard to pin point results. Moreover, though a 
number of parameters of measuring international competitiveness are present, data directly 
relevant to the IT industry are not readily available.
METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 2
Two chief sources of information for the project were primary published sources and through 
interviews and questionnaire information from MNC partners, government sources (mainly 
DITAC) and local firms engaged in collaborative activities with the MNCs.
The 1st set of questionnaires were addressed to MNCs eliciting information on their parent 
companies, the Australian activities, PDP commitments, achievements under the PDP, 
assistance to local companies, impediments encountered, suggestions for improvement of the 
PDP and the Australian IT industry's competitiveness and such other related issues.
The 2nd set of questionnaires sent to the local firms seeking information on their size, nature 
o f activities, involvement with MNCs, assessment of benefits o f their PDP activities, 
suggestions for improvement of the PDP and the industry as a whole.
Telephone interviews for information were held with MNC partners, local firms and various 
government authorities, both before and after sending the postal survey. In addition personal 
interviews were held with most of the MNCs.
Questionnaires were sent to all the 21 multinationals operating all over Australia and follow­
up interviews were held with all of them. The confidentiality agreement in the program, 
inhibited some respondents did not exchange objective information. However a general view 
of their participation and their attitude to the program which could not be obtained from 
questionnaires was got from interviews. The same applied to the local firms (132 of whom 
were sent questionnaires). Only local firms in NSW were chosen for the survey to enable 
easy follow up by way of interviewing, however out of the addresses given by DITAC 43 
were returned as faulty addresses reflecting poorly DITACs follow up of PDP activities & 
partners.
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IN TERN A TIO N A L CO M PETITIV EN ESS
DEFINITION, ALTERNATIVE MACRO-ECONOMIC STRATEGIES AND CHANGING 
PERCEPTIONS IN RECENT YEARS.
In the 1950s and 1960s economists paid little attention to a country’s international competitiveness. 
However with the advent of high unemployment rates in most industrial economies, economists began 
to devote an increasing amount of professional attention to the ability of national economies to compete 
successfully in international markets. In fact, one of the standard pieces of advice economists give to 
policy makers nowadays is to improve the international competitiveness of their country’s industries. 
(Hans-Peter Frohlich,. 1989, p21 ).
That is easier said than done. Economists are not particularly well equipped to deal with this issue; 
standard economic text books provide no specific theories on how to tackle the problem. Matters of 
international competitiveness belong, to a large extent, to the realm of business economics. After all, 
the competitiveness of a country is the competitiveness of its businesses. If they satisfy consumers’ 
wants at home and abroad with attractive products and at low cost, the country as a whole will be 
competitive. Hence the main determinants of international competitiveness are such factors as 
management, engineering skills, labour force efficiency, and so on. Overall economic developments 
enter the scene only indirectly. Depending on the applied macro-economic policies, policy makers can 
make make it either harder or easier for domestic companies to face up to foreign competitors. Put 
differently, while economic policy cannot transform poor domestic products into hot-selling items 
abroad, it can make a great difference to whether or not a company which is successful at home can 
also be successful internationally.
D efinitions and  concepts
Even with those limitations in mind, the topic is not easy to treat. The reason is that the concept of 
‘international competitiveness’ is rather fuzzy. A survey of the literature comes up with wide variety of 
definitions. Some of them are overly general while others focus on specific aspects. The following 
definition by Bela Belassa (1964,p26-33 ) may be regarded as something like a lowest common 
denominator:
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We say that a country has become more or less competitive if, as a result of cost-and-price 
developments or other factors, her ability to sell on foreign and domestic markets has improved or 
deteriorated.
The problem with this definition is that it is hardly operational. In other words, which criterion can be 
used to measure a country’s international competitiveness at any given point of time, or at least to 
determine whether its competitiveness has deteriorated or improved over time, or to conclude whether 
there is a need for governmental action; nor is it possible to identify alternative economic strategies to 
improve a country’s international competitiveness or to judge their relative merits. Unfortunately, there 
is no single economic indicator which is universally accepted as the best guide for policy actions.
According to Midgley, D.F.( 1990):
An internationally competitive enterprise is one which is capable of selling its goods or services in 
overseas markets and /or of defending its position in Australian markets against overseas competitors 
without the benefit of tariff protection.
According to this definition international competitiveness refers to the ability of industries in one 
country to compete with those of other countries.
The report of the President's Commission on the U.S. industrial competitiveness also has 
unsatisfactory definitions of competitiveness. Although it does argue that 'competitiveness cannot be 
defined as the ability of a nation to maintain a positive trade balance’ ( U.S. GPO, 1985, 7) , ( an 
understandable position to adopt given the current U.S. success in generating a fast rate of economic 
growth on the back of a very substantial trade deficit), and that competitiveness is also not assured or 
reflected by the ability to maintain and increase employment in the manufacturing sector; and it does 
recognise that in highly competitive economies some industries will become unviable and be replaced 
by others, it fails to suggest satisfactory alternative measures. It begins with a definition of 
competitivenes at the level of the individual firm which, though perhaps familiar to business 
strategists, would be unrecognisable to many economists. ' A firm is competitive^ the report 
suggests ( p.6 ) , rif  it can produce products or services of superior quality or lower costs than its 
domestic or international competitors . Competitiveness is then synonymous with the firm's long run 
profit performance and its ability to compensate its employees and provide superior returns to its 
owners '. The definition of competitiveness for a nation, it goes on to suggest, ' must similarly be 
tied to its ability to generate the resources required to meet its national needs.' The reports rejects the 
notion that the concept can be captured by the single process measure of changes in the terms of trade , 
arguing ( p. 31 ) there are structural determinants of competitiveness that cannot be corrected simply
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by adjusting the value of the dollar. Instead, it is suggested that competitiveness is best measured by 
four key indicators : ( 1 ) Labour productivity; ( 2 ) Real wage growth; ( 3 ) Real returns on capital 
employed in industry*, and ( 4 )  position in the world trade ( p.8).
It is often suggested that the current account balance be used as a criterion in measuring 
competitiveness. Many observers interpret such trade deficits as indicators of a loss of international 
competitiveness- at least in case the deficit is not merely due to the country’s relative business cycle 
position, but rather extends over a protracted period of time. There are, however, two serious 
objections to this view. First,even substantial and continuing current account imbalances may stem 
from quite different factors, i.e. exogenous developments. Good cases in point are the two oil price 
shocks of the 1970s. While they pushed the current account of many industrial nations into deficit, 
they are obviously unrelated to changes in international competitiveness.
Second, from a flow of funds point of view they represent a net inflow of capital from abroad. This is 
tantamount to an excess of the economy’s volume of investment over domestic saving : more 
investment opportunities may be exploited without the need to curtail domestic consumption in order 
to increase saving and it may turn out to be extremely beneficial, provided that those investment 
projects are profitable enough to cover the interest payments on the foreign debt. As a matter of fact, 
economic history demonstrates that many successful economies displayed substantial current account 
deficits over long periods of time. Switzerland has roughly balanced trade; Italy has a chronic trade 
deficit? yet,both nations enjoy a strongly risi ng national income (Michael Porter, HBR, March-April 
1990, p 84). Only thus,were they able to exploit fully their growth potential. National economies are 
no different in this respect to individual businesses. Every healthy business will borrow funds to 
finance profitable investment projects rather than to restrict investment to the amount of self finance. 
So one should be sceptical of measuring a country’s international competitiveness by merely looking 
at the state of her current account.
Another criterion which is often regarded as an indicator for international competitiveness is change in 
a country’s share of world markets or world trade. One very frequently used measure of this kind is 
the decline in a country’s share in world trade.The Aldington Report (HMSO, 1985), for example, 
shows that the UK share of world manufactures has dropped from 14.2% in 1964 to 7.9% by 1983; 
and Brown and Sheriff (1978) show that the UK share was 25.5% in 1950. The US presidential 
commission reported that the US share of world trade in manufactured goods, measured in terms of 
value, had declined for more than two decades and ‘more disturbingly’, that the US share of high 
technology exports also declined between 1960 and 1980 (US GPO 1985 , pl4). Regardless of the 
state of the current account, the argument goes, this indicator provides a reliable measure of sales 
success. That is true enough; yet at times this indicator is misleading too. An obvious example is an
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increase in the number of international competitors, such as the newly industrialised countries . The 
share of traditional producers will inevitably fall, without that signalling a genuine loss of 
competitiveness. Similarly, a country may lose market shares simply because it is not able to meet 
world wide demand due to lack of production capacity. The most serious drawback of market shares, 
however is the fact they are a mere quantity index. But when we consider a country whose industry is 
gaining additional market shares as a consequence of slashing prices, if these price cuts squeeze profit 
margins, it is clearly not justified to regard this country as more competitive than before.
An alternative would be to look at price changes over time. Like in the case of individual producer, the 
sales performance of a national economy depends, to a large extent on its ability to satisfy demand at 
low prices. One will obviously have to look at relative national price movements, adjusted for 
exchange rate variations. Another possibility is to reverse this procedure by looking at exchange rate 
movements adjusted for differences in national price level changes. This is tantamount to calculating 
‘real exchange rates’ which are published regularly by a number of national and international 
institutions. They, too are often used to evaluate changes in a country’s international competitiveness. 
If nominal exchange rate move in such a way as to compensate inflation differences, the real exchange 
rate, and hence the international competitiveness, remains unchanged. By contrast if the currency is 
devalued in real terms, the competitiveness of that country’s industry improves, and vice versa. Is a 
competitive nation one whose exchange rate makes its goods price competitive in international 
markets? Both Germany and Japan have enjoyed remarkable gains in their standard of living and 
experienced sustained periods of strong currency and rising prices (Micheál Porter, 1990, p 84). 
Again this index, can give wrong signals, namely if producers are not able to pass on cost increases 
to the consumer (e.g. due to government controls or fierce competition). The resulting loss of 
competitiveness is not reflected by real exchange rates.
Im port penetration ratios
The fraction of domestic consumption accounted for by imports can reflect changes in cost based 
competitive advantage but also shifting patterns of consumer demand, both in the home country and 
abroad. The latter is one cause of increased sales of foreign cars in the US. While import penetration 
are good indicators of competitiveness, particularly if long term trends can be established, they can be 
confounded by government policies e.g. export subsidies, corporate strategies (foregoing certain 
markets) and various other factors.
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A frequently used statistics in this debate is the rise in import penetration of manufactured goods. The 
US commission takes a similarly serious view about growing US trade deficit in manufactured goods 
(US GPO 1985, p l4 - 3 3 ) .
However, loss of share in world markets is an unsatisfactory measure of a lack of competitiveness of 
any one country’s industry for a number of reasons. Indeed Harrod (1967) described this measure as 
‘surely the most absurd ever perpetrated in diagnosis’, adding that the British share of world export 
has declined, is declining and will continue to decline, hopefully at an accelerated pace’( quoted in 
Thirwall 1982, 238)
As Thirwall says, ‘The health of the balance of payments depends on the relation between the absolute 
level of exports and imports associated with a given growth rate, not on the growth of exports relative 
to the growth of total world exports'( op. cit. 238). On this view the position of both Britain and 
USA is still healthy and much, if not all, of the reason for their declining shares in world markets can 
be explained in terms of the increasing internationalisation of world trade and relative growth rates of 
GDPs.
Britain, for example, though it has maintained a high level of exports, the effect of other countries 
becoming more international in their trade patterns (i.e. importing and exporting a higher percentage of 
their GDP) has increased the volume of world trade and hence, by simple arithmetic, reduced Britain’s 
share of it, even though the volume of Britain’s exports has kept up its historically high level (Arthur 
Francis and P.K.M. Tharakan, 1989, p9) .
A second reason for an increase in the volume of world trade has been the emergence of the newly 
industrialising countries; the effect of these new entrants will be to reduce the market share (though not 
necessarily the absolute market size) of those already trading internationally. If exports as a percentage 
of total GDP remain steady for all countries then those countries with slower growth rate will lose 
market share pro - rata with their relative growth rate. Falling share of world markets may thus be due 
merely to slow growth rather than uncompetitiveness. Some other measures of uncompetitiveness is 
needed to establish the extent to which slow growth is itself caused by a lack of competitiveness. The 
rise in import penetration of manufactured goods as an output measure of lack of competitiveness is 
equally controversial.
A fourth suggested measure of U.K and U.S uncompetitiveness is the declining percentage of 
domestic economic activity in the manufacturing sector as higher percentage of GDP has become 
devoted to services. Again many services ride on the back of manufacturing industry so that a decline
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in manufacturing feeds through into the service sector. And again a high percentage of manufacturers 
are traded internationally now (Arthur Francis and P.K.M. Tharakan, 1989, pl2).
ECONO M IC FRAM EW O RK - COM PARATIVE ADVANTAGE AS A DESCRIPTIVE 
DEVICE
Some definitions of competitiveness are rooted in economics and stress production costs and market 
prices. The discipline of economics provides a well defined if sometimes oversimplified view of 
international competitiveness, one that flows directly from the notion of comparative advantage. In a 
comparative advantage framework, competitiveness is a matter of relative prices or, ultimately costs of 
production and distribution. Simply stated if one firm's selling price in a particular location is higher 
than another's then the first firm is not competitive, all else equal. To be sure, all else may not be 
equal. However, the benefit of comparative advantage framework is that it begins with a definition of 
competitiveness that most observers can accept as reasonable. In addition, using comparative 
advantage brings to the fore aspects of competitiveness that might otherwise be ignored in formulating 
public policies.
International competitiveness is fundamentally related to the global structure of comparative advantage. 
Countries tend to export goods in which, for one reason or another, they are advantaged, and to 
import other items. The sources of a particular nation's relative advantages tend to vary widely, but 
may include such factors as fertile agricultural land, abundant labour or land capital supplies, large and 
affluent markets yielding possible scale economies, and unique technological capabilities.
In a comparative advantage context, international pricing patterns should be closely related to 
production, distribution and selling costs. These in turn, are determined by considerations such as the 
prices of raw materials, purchased components and other factors o production (labor, capital, 
equipment, etc.) together with manufacturing technologies. The available manufacturing technologies 
may give firms in some parts of the world cost advantages over producers elsewhere. Low labour 
costs have been one of the factors leading to the strong competitive positions of Asian nations as Japan 
and Taiwan in consumer electronics,where assembly processes have in the past been quite labor 
intensive (although the use of automation is now increasing).
Relative wage rate trends and the declining importance of unit labor costs :
Industries with slackening competitiveness often show relatively falling wage levels, compared to 
other domestic industries. In other cases, relatively rising wages can be the cause of difficulty, e.g. if 
unit labor costs increases faster than in other industries. High wage rates in US steel and automobile 
industries are one element in their present competitive difficulties, more important in steel because 
labor productivity in that industry has not increased as rapidly as in automobiles.
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Recent empirical evidence, however, has suggested that other factors may play an equally important 
role in explaining patterns of international trade. According to Fargerberg (1988, pp355), rapid export 
and GDP growth has tended to coincide with equally rapid growth of unit labour costs and viceversa.
Technological competition and returns to scale are being increasingly recognised as major determinants 
of international competitiveness. In a study of pooled cross section and tine series data from 15 OECD 
countries between 1966-83, Fragerberg (1988, p356) concluded that technological capacity was a far 
more important explanator of differences in the growth of GDP and market shares than cost 
competitiveness.
The shifting pattern of competitiveness between the advanced economies and the developing countries 
may also reflect declining labour requirements per unit of production. This can be attributed to the 
flexible, highly automated small batch processing manufacturing technologies which are increasingly 
being implemented in the more advanced manufacturing sectors (KPMG, 1988,pp 13-14). These 
technologies have tended to reduce the labor content of products and allowed producers to cater more 
to local market requirements. As a result, the new economies of production are seen to be moving 
away from the low cost developing countries back towards the developed countries.
Relative trends in labour productivity:
A fairly simple method for determining an industry’s ability to compete is to compete its labour 
productivity over time with that of other domestic manufacturing industries. A relative decline is 
evidence of a possible problem, as appears to be the case in sectors such as footwear and steel in the 
US industry. A country (or an industry or firm) is considered generally more competitive when it uses 
its resources more productively (i.e. the real value of what it produces is greater than that of its 
competitors given the same inputs). As Porter (1990, pp6):
the principal economic goal for a nation is to produce a high and rising standard of living for its 
citizens. The ability to do so depends not on the amorphous notion of ’competitiveness ' but on the 
productivity with which a nation's resources are employed.
m
Relative profitab ility  trends
Declining competitiveness may also appear as low relative profit levels. However it is often difficult to 
apply such measures, particularly for industries populated by diversified companies where profitability 
and competitiveness can vary dramatically for different product lines. In addition, profitability data can 
be influenced by differences in accounting conventions and tax policies. Japanese firms, for example, 
tend to report lower profits than American firms partly because higher depreciation rates are permitted. 
They may also be permitted to take advantage of tax reserves not permitted US firms .
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Static versus dynam ic com parative advantage .
It is evident that the conventional perception of the bases of international competition are under 
challenge. The comparative advantage theory explains trade between countries as predominantly 
reflecting their different factor endowments. As pointed out before in many areas this theory does 
tend to coincide with the facts. The advanced industrial nations with reservoirs of skilled labour do 
tend to export skill intensive products. Likewise, countries with an abundance of land and natural 
resources do tend to specialise in commodity exports.
There is, however, a growing recognition that in some sectors, particularly high technology 
manufacturing, comparative advantage is a dynamic concept and that the international pattern of 
comparative advantage should be looked at as a dynamic rather than static concept. It is proposed by 
the proponents of strategic trade policy that a country's comparative advantage can be changed by 
overt government intervention. The sort of government intervention envisaged is that which is aimed 
at achieving economies of scale or technological leadership in specific industries or sections of 
industry. According to Krugman (1986, p.7), during the post war period a large and conspicuous 
portion of international trade has reflected advantages due to the realisation of economies of scale and 
the exploitation of leading technological breakthroughs.
/
Technological C om petition
In knowledge intensive industries, particularly in the early stages of the product cycle, technological 
competition plays an important role. As products gain market acceptance and become capable of being 
mass produced, cost competition becomes more important. Thus, in the early stages of the 
development of the semiconductor industry the small innovative firms of Santa Clara Valley in 
California achieved market share through technological breakthroughs. As the semiconductor industry 
matured, cost competitiveness became increasingly important, thereby providing an advantage for the, 
large scale oriented Japanese semiconductor manufacturers.
Technological competition is a form of competition where firms compete in terms of innovations in 
product or process technologies either to gain market entry or a competitive edge over rivals. The 
competitive edge may be a better product or a cost advantage arising from a technological improvement 
in the manufacturing process. In the case of product technologies, useful measures are difficult to 
find, for example, a domestic industry might lead in some products but not others. How can 
competitive decline be assessed in such circumstances? One can for example count number of new 
products for number of patents. Yet counting new products or patents is known to be a highly 
imperfect indicator of technological competitiveness.
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In industries that are rapidly evolving technically, such as semiconductors, it is possible to quantify 
technology gaps by examining the timing of new product introductions- e.g. 16 bit microprocessors. 
Such indicators are inevitably very narrow, as well as being retrospective rather than current or 
prospective. In more mature industries technology gaps have little meaning. The introduction of new 
process technology for making iron or steel does not depend on technological levels so much as capital 
for investment, which in turn depends on expected levels of profitability. This brings us back, 
essentially to comparative advantage.
The importance of technological competition has been recognised by economists for sometime 
(Schumpeter, p.84). One of the more immediate impacts of globalisation has been the increase in the 
scope of potential returns to be earned from technological breakthrough. Enterprises can generalise 
this success to international markets. Technological advantage has now become a significant factor 
determining the competitive success of firms operating in global industries; small firms with command 
over specific technologies can, through the exercise of patent protection or simple first mover 
advantage, enter and compete successfully in global markets against established multinational 
companies.
Each innovation in product or process technologies brings with it a wave of new entrants into the 
global industry. Nelson (1984,p.9) acknowledges that:
In civil aircraft the advent of the successful commercial jet airliner in effect changed the basic nature of 
airline technology from the earlier piston engine based regime. The integrated circuit represented a 
sharp break from the earlier discrete transistor, which in turn had involved a revolutionary shift in 
electronic device technology from vacuum tubes. These sharp shifts in technological regimes often 
were marked by changes in nature of the predominant companies. Thus, as jets replaced piston driven 
planes, Boeing replaced Dougles as the leader in the design and production of airliners. With the 
advent of integrated circuit, the old electronic equipment producers, like General Electric and 
Westinghouse, failed to stay competitive and were replaced as technological leaders by such 
companies as Texas instruments, Mostek, and Intel.
Thus technological advantage led to competitive advantage and consequently market power. Dorfman 
(1987, p. 37) points out that technological innovations by new entrants often led to the creation of 
entirely new markets. These new entrants were often spin off companies set up by disaffected staff 
from multinational enterprises, researchers or off shoots from academic or publicly funded research 
projects.
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As a result of globalisation of many industries the rewards available to successful R&D have 
substantially increased. Accordingly, R&D has tended to take on a global perspective. The cost and 
difficulty of carrying out R&D has increased as all firms, big and small, seek global rewards. In such 
circumstances the smaller less international firms are sometimes forced to rely on collaboration, joint 
ventures and cross licensing arrangements with the dominant multinational companies in order to 
break into global markets.
Technological competition does, however, appear to play a important role in the formative stages of 
global industry. The computing and the semiconductor industries provide good examples of the 
progression of technological advantage from the small innovative firms of Santa Clara Valley, 
California to the large multinational conglomerates of Japan and the US.
There is a view that recent developments in micro electronics, genetic engineering and the other fast 
growing or high technology industries may stimulate a new wave of innovations, thereby maintaining 
the role of technological competition as a major avenue for small innovative firms to enter global 
industries.
The level of R&D investment and hence the extent of technological competition within an industry is 
determined firstly by the profit incentive and secondly by the level of competitive threat. In the latter 
case, investment in R&D represents a strategic reaction or an attempt to forestall rival firms and 
thereby to prevent them from achieving a competitive edge (Beath, Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1988, 
pp.l-2)
Technological competition can, however have a debilitating effect on the industry structure. The 
outcome can be stable or unstable oligopoly depending upon how often the technological lead within 
the industry changes and how long a technological edge is held (Beath, Katsoulacos and Ulph, 
1988,p .l) .
A more stable industry structure may occur where there are dynamic economies in R&D so that once a 
technological lead is established it will tend to be maintained (Phillips, 1971). The existence of 
dynamic economies in innovation would present a barrier to the small innovative firms. This would 
tend to perpetuate market structure which is dominated by multinational companies.
There seems little question that lagging countries can catch up by importing technology. Historically 
many of Japan's technological advances and commercial successes have been associated with such 
imports. Virtually all technologies today are rapidly diffused among industrialised nation's partly 
through licensing arrangements but partly also by the ability of the firms in the advanced countries to
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quickly duplicate technologies developed elsewhere- a result of the largely self sustaining near parity 
in many fields of technology and science that now exists. This observation is not meant to imply that 
R&D efforts are futile, only that the benefits thus gained are likely to be shortlived and that continues 
effort is necessary to maintain them. It is difficult to safeguard purely technical advantage for long, 
unless coupled with stringent patent protection, closely held trade secrets, large capital requirements, 
or other nontechnical means of production.
C ap ital goods suppliers:
Firms that produce machinery and equipment used in other manufacturing industries, also provide 
evidence of technological capability. Examples include transfer lines for making automative 
components, or lithographic equipment for fabricating integrated circuits. The products of such 
industries can be viewed both as end products of such industries can be viewed both as end products- 
whose rate of technological innovation might lead or lag that of other countries- or as process 
innovations that lower costs or improve product quality in the industries that use the equipment. In the 
latter case, technological differences between nations would appear as relative changes in the ability of 
the customer industries to compete on a cost or productivity basis. From a policy stand point, this can 
be important. The Japanese semiconductor industry develops and manufactures a considerable fraction 
of its own processing equipment, while in this country only a few of the larger vertically integrated 
firms do so.
Specialisation and  Increasing re tu rn s
The benefits of specialisation and division of labour were emphasised by Adam Smith (1776) in his 
celebrated pin making example and later economists(notably Young, 1928 and Kaldor, 1966). More 
recently, the impact of increasing returns and the specialisation and division of labour have been 
invoked to explain apparently random and haphazard variations in the pattern of trade ( Krugman, 
1988,p.7).
The theory of Smith and others that came after him emphasised the role of demand and the size of the 
market as major determinants of international competitiveness. In other words, it is only in the larger 
national or global markets that many of the improvements in processing technologies can be applied. It 
is no good buying a hammer for a single nail. The implication is that invention and innovation are 
market driven. It is not so much that revolutionary inventions are scarce but that markets have failed to 
reach a scale to accommodate the available inventions. Likewise, this line of reasoning implies that 
there are many inventions which could be implemented only when a sufficient scale of production is 
reached.
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The need for specialisation in attaining critical mass is not restricted to small countries. Kenichi 
Ohame, a McKinsey consultant in Tokyo, frequendy comments on the fact that Japoan has many weak 
industries as well as strong ones. His analysis is supported in Europe and the US by studies showing 
comparative advantage in manufactured exports. Ohame makes the point that specialisation, attaining 
critical mass, and the development of net works are key to competitive advantage and that industries 
tend to cluster to gain competiveness and flourish as a whole, as in the case of aero space in the US, 
chemicals in Germany, and cameras and consumer electronics in Japan. It takes decades to build up 
the infrastructure needed to excel in any industry worldwide.
Herein lie the benefits of globalisation of markets to a small open economy such as Australia. The 
globalisation of industry provides potential access to huge mass markets. Globalisation also opens up 
access to smallest niche or specialised markets. Global niche markets together add up to insufficient 
scale to realise available economies or to apply the latest developments in manufacturing technology. 
These returns previously lay outside the purview of the smaller nationally based or inward looking 
firms. The need for specialisation and networks can help explain 'the ones that got away', the 
inventioins that were lost to Australia. The fact that critical mass ingredients were not in place means 
that the risks to an Australian firm would have been extremely high (Ian C. Marsh, 1988, ;pl53)
Operating within a global environment allows firms to realise the benifits of global returns to scale and 
thereby to reduce costs per unit of production. This brings about price returns to scale and thereby to 
reduce costs per unit of production. This brings about price reductions which in turn stimulate 
increases in demand. This
process-or as it has been called, this 'virtuous cycle of growth'- is repeated as firms continue to 
expand output and reap the benefits of increasing returns to scale ( Young, 1928 and Salter, 1966 ) .  
The process is one of cumulative causation whereby each round of production has a cumulative 
reinforcing impact on the costs of production ( Young, 1928,p 533 ).
There is a distinct advantage in being the first mover to initiate these virtuous cycles of growth. The 
first mover to reap the benefits of increasing returns may obtain a competitive edge in international 
markets which could set up significant barriers to entry for followers.
With the possibility of increasing returns, a country may therefore be able to create its own 
comparative advantage by prompting or subsidising a particular domestic industry, thereby giving it a 
'head start and a persistent advantage' (Krugman,1988,p.7). This does not necessarily mean that a 
particular comparative advantage would not arise without government involvement. In the absence of 
government intervention, however, international competitive advantage may simply reflect 'accidental
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A new theory that begins from the premise that competition is dynamic and evolving and that 
companies compete with global strategies, implying not only trade but also foreign investment 
and which goes on to explain why some nations provide an environment that enables companies 
to improve and innovate faster than foreign rivals, is given by Harvard Professor Micheál Porter 
(1990).
Based on his “Diamond of National Advantage”, his theory contradicts conventional wisdom and 
goes on to suggest that a nation’s competitiveness depends on the capacity of its industry to 
innovate and upgrade and that the basis of competition has shifted more and more to the 
creation and assimilation of knowledge. The role of the nation has grown and Competitive 
advantage is created and sustained through a highly localized process. Differences in national 
values, culture, economic structures, institutions, and histories all contribute to competitive success. 
There are striking differences in the patterns of competitiveness in every country; no nation can 
or will be competitive in every or even most industries. Ultimately, nations succeed in particular 
industries because their home environment is the most forward-looking, dynamic and challenging.
Porter’s national diamond figure shown below is based on Four broad attributes of a nation that 
individually and as a system constitute the diamond of national advantage - the playing field that 
each nation establishes and operates for its industries. He goes on to stress that national prosperity 




Contrary to the doctrines of classical economists like Adam Smith and Ricardo, Porter 
says that a nation creates the most important factors of production such as skilled human 
resources or a scientific base. Moreover, the stock of factors that a nation enjoys at a 
particular time is less important than the rate and efficiency with which it creates, upgrades, 
and deploys them in particular industries.
The most important factors of production are those that involve sustained and heavy 
investment and are specialized. Nations succeed in industries particularly good at factor 
creation and selective disadvantage in the more basic factors can prod a company to 
innovate and upgrade - a disadvantage in a static model of competition can become an 
advantage in a dynamic one.
2) Demand conditions
Nations gain competitive advantage in industries where the home demand gives their 
companies a clearer or earlier picture of emerging buyer needs, and where demanding 
buyers pressure companies to innovate faster and achieve more sophisticated competitive 
advantages than their foreign rivals. The size of home demand proves far less significant 
than the character of home demand and competitive advantage is built when the particular 
industry segment is visible in the domestic than in international markets and when the 
nation's values are spreading.
3) Related and supporting industries
The presence of internationally competitive home based suppliers create advantages in 
downstream industries in several ways. First, they deliver the most cost-effective inputs in 
an efficient, early, rapid and sometimes preferential way.
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Far more significant than mere access to components and machinery, however, is the 
advantage that home based related and supporting industries provide in innovation and 
upgrading an advantage based on close working relationships. The nation's companies 
benefit most when the suppliers are, themselves, global competitors. Home base 
competitiveness in related industries provides similar benefits: information flow and 
technical interchange speed the rate of innovation and upgrading, and increases the 
likelihood that companies will embrace new skills and provides a source of novel entrants.
4) Firm strategy, structure and rivalry
Competitiveness in a specific industry results from convergence of the management 
practices and organizational modes favoured in the country and the sources of competitive 
advantage in the industry. No one managerial system is universally appropriate - not 
withstanding the current fascination with Japanese management. Individual motivation to 
work and expand skills is important to competitive advantage. Outstanding talent is a scarce 
resource in any nation. A nation's success largely depends on the types of education its 
talented people choose, where they choose to work, and their commitment and effort. The 
goals a nation's institutions and values set for individuals and companies, and the prestige 
it attaches to certain industries, guide the flow of capital and human resources - which, in 
turn, directly affects the competitive performance of certain industries. Nations tend to be 
competitive in activities that people admire or depend on.
Porter argues that among all the points on the Diamond the presence of strong local 
rivalry is the most important because of the powerfully simulation effect - it creates 
presence for constant upgradation of the sources of competitive advantage to look at global 
markets and toughens them.
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Porter goes on to stress that all the 4 points of the Diamond are self - reinforcing and they 
constitute a system whose effects work: in all directions and create' an environment that 
promotes clusters of competitive industries. According to Porter the proper role is as a 
catalyst and challenger, it is to encourage or even push companies to raise their aspirations 
and move to higher levels of competitive performance, even though this process may be 
inherently unpleasant and difficult Government cannot create competitive industries; only 
companies can do that. Government plays a role that is inherently partial, that succeeds 
only when working in tandem with favourable underlying conditions in the Diamond. Still, 
government's role of transmitting and amplifying the forces of the Diamond is a powerful 
one. Government policies that succeed are those that create an environment in which 
companies can gain competitive advantage rather than those that involve government 
directly in the process, except in nations early in the development process. It is an indirect, 
rather than a direct, role. He suggests the following specific policy approaches to guide 
nations seeking to gain competitive advantage:
- focus on specialized factor creation
- avoid intervening in factor and currency markets
- enforce strict product, safety and environmental standards
- sharply limit direct co-operation among industry rivals (only when projects are in
the areas of basic product and process research, not in subjects closely connected to
a company's proprietary sources of advantage).
- promote goals that lead to sustained investment
- deregulate competition
- enforce strong domestic antitrust policies
- reject managed trade.
He however reaffirms that the aim of remedies should be adjustments that allow the remedy 
to disappear.
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How companies succeed in international markets
As mentioned before Porter stressed the important role of individual companies over 
nations in creating and sustaining advantage. Companies achieve competitive advantage 
through acts of innovation including both new technologies and new ways of doing things. 
They perceive a new basis for competing or find better means for competing in old ways. 
Innovation can be manifested in a new product design, a new production process, a new 
marketing approach, or a new way of conducting training. Much innovation is mundane 
and incremental, depending more on a cumulation of small insights and advances than on a 
single, major technological breakthrough. Once a company achieves competitive advantage 
through an innovation, it can sustain it only through relentless improvement and 
upgradation.
Today's competitive realities demand leadership from managers and Porter stresses the 
importance of leadership as a goal in achieving international competitiveness.
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WHAT KIND OF FORIEGN OWNED BUSINESSES CONTRIBUTE TO 
NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS





-fully integrated business operations.
For those complex, discrete manufacturing businesses, such as electronics, which is at the heart 
of trade concerns, it is only fully integrated operations that build the local skill base and infra­
structure in ways that increase international competitiveness and consequently raise living stan­
dards. They do so by bringing in Country the engine of business competitiveness,
Im porting com panies limit local economic activity to sales, marketing and distribution. Their 
aim is to win the local share and broaden the business base for an engine of competitiveness 
located off-shore . They may buy some components locally but they are likely to import key 
components and all the sourcing decisions are made in the home country, making it difficult for 
the local companies to become suppliers, the most important supply positions often go to local 
subsidiaries of home country suppliers.
P lan t complexes add a further level of value added and begin to add intellectual content. 
Typically , it will fabricate product components and the amount of local engineering content 
increases, but still it falls well short of a fully integrated business operation and the key elements 
of the product and production system are in the home country, even if distinctions are becoming 
subtle.
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Assembly operations and planned complexes look good on simple economic measures because 
they provide employment to many assembly workers and some middle managers and engineers. 
However, they do not upgrade the local skill base and technology infra-structure to world leader 
status; they won’t attract the best managers and engineers and they are unlikely to stimulate the 
creative work that spins off new businesses ( The “Silicon Valley Effect”).
The real payoff from local operations for foreign owned companies, then comes in the form of 
fully integrated business operations-when product design, process design, manufacturing and 
vendor management are co-located and tightly integrated in-country and the operation is set up 
to do business in the global market, example IBM’s operations in Japan and Hewlett Packard’s 
operations in Singapore. When foreign owned businesses come to built a platform to compete in 
global markets, only then they contribute to national competitiveness.(Todd Nixon and Ranch 
Kimball, 1990, HBR, Jan-Feb- p.57).
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The Competitiveness Issue and Australia
The most significant official report on competitiveness is undoubtedly that of the Presidential 
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness headed by John Young, the chief Executive of Hewlett 
Packard. The Young Report ‘ Global Competition - The New Reality* was finalised in early 
1985 in response to President Reagan’s Presidential order of June 1983 ( DITAC, 1990,plO) .
At the outset the Young Report came to grips with the question of defining competitiveness. The 
Commission dismissed the notion that the absence of a current account deficit in itself was an 
adequate definition of competitiveness. The point was made that a current account balance or 
surplus could be achieved by devaluation and on-going reductions in living standards. The 
Commission also rejected the notion that competitiveness is reflected in the ability to maintain 
and increase employment in the manufacturing sector. It also argued that US competitiveness is 
not defined as the ability of any single US industry to remain viable.
The Young Report noted that at the level of the individual firm, competitiveness is defined as 
the ability of the firm to produce products or services of superior quality or lower costs than its 
domestic and international competitors. Competitiveness is then synonymous with a firm’s long- 
run profit position and its ability to compensate its employees and provide superior returns to its 
owners. Competitiveness for a nation was defined as the degree to which it can, under free and 
fair market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the test of international markets 
while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of its citizens. In other words, 
competitiveness is the fundamental basis of a nation’s living standards.
A number of important messages flow from the definition of competitiveness proposed by the 
Young Report. First, that there is more to competitiveness than relative levels of productivity, 
although a high productivity performance is an essential element of competitiveness. Second, 
quality and service also are important elements of competitiveness. Third, that while devaluation 
might be a useful element of a competitiveness package, it is not a permanent basis for such a 
policy if living standards are to be raised in the longer term. Fourth, the general business 
environment is as significant as the performance of individual firms to a nation’s competitiveness.
Through studies prepared for the OECD and elsewhere, the notion of a nation’s structural com­
petitiveness has been more fully elaborated. Key elements in this concept include the dynamism 
of a nation’s firm, the links between leading-edge consumers and local industry, and the degree 
of articulation between a nation’s science and technology base and its wealth creation processes. 
When stripped back to fundamentals the connecting element is the quality of a nation’s human 
resources, including their ability to learn and to adapt rapidly to take advantage of emerging 
opportunities ( DITAC Annual Report, 1990,pH ).
The Competitiveness Agenda;
An important statement on the competitiveness agenda is contained in the 1989 US Senate 
documents associated with the ‘ US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative ( SII)’ which was an 
exercise conducted by US and Japanese authorities to identify structural impediments to trade 
between the US and Japan. There is a high correlation between this agenda and that proposed by 
the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness.
Recently, the MIT commission on Industrial Productivity canvassed much the same areas in its 
1989 report Made In America, Regaining the Competitive Edge’. It did however place particu­
lar emphasis on the high cost of capital in the US which, combined with a tendency for capital 
markets to take a relatively short-term view when compared to the approach taken in Japan and 
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Measures of Competitiveness
While a number of Researchers have attempted to measure the relative economic performance of 
nations, the most interesting and consistent measures for a number of advanced countries over a 
reasonable time period are those presented by the World Economic Forum in their Annual World 
Competitiveness Report. This report has been published for a decade. The definition of competi­
tiveness used by the world Economic Forum Report is the ability of a country’s entrepreneurs to 
design, produce and market goods and services that are better and / or cheaper than those of the 
international competition. The World Economic Forum uses almost 300 criteria grouped into ten 
basic factors to evaluate the competitiveness of the advanced industries nations.
The structure underlying the ten basic factors is illustrated in the following figure(figure 1). The 
inputs into the transformation process include human and natural endowments. The transforma­
tion process depends on industrial efficiency, the innovative orientation of business and its 
outward or international orientation. The quality of the supporting environment comprises the 
dynamism of the economy, its market orientation, the level of state interference and the degree 
of socio-political stability. Business confidence reflects the opinion of the country’s managers
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about their international competitiveness. Finally, the industrial portfolio, comprising the country’s
10 leading exports gives a picture of the kinds of markets in which the country is internationally 
competitive.
As shown in the following figure( figure 2 The Competiveness Scoreboard 1986), Australia 
rated fourteenth out of the 22 leading industrialised countries on the World Economic Forum’s 
measure in 1986. This was behind Canada (6th place), New Zealand (9th place) and in front of 
the UK (15th place). As shown in the following figure (figure 3 The Competitiveness Scoreboard 
1990), by 1990 on the same set of measures Australia had moved up one place to 13th out of 23 
nations compared to Canada which had risen one place to 5th, New Zealand which had fallen 
back eight places to 17th and the UK which had risen three places to twelfth.
A relative rating of Australia on the ten basic measures of competitiveness by The World 
Economic Forum shows that, in 1986 and 1990, not surprisingly Australia rates highest on 
natural resources, in the middle of the field for human resources, future orientation, socio 
political stability, impact of the state, dynamics of the economy, market orientation and financial 
dynamics and towards the tail on industrial efficiency and international orientation. The most 
marked areas of improvement between 1986 and 1990 were in human resources up from 12th to 
7th place, impact of the state up from 16th to 12th place, future orientation up from 18th to 12th 
place and industrial efficiency up from 18th to 15th place. International orientation also im­
proved but remained relatively low at 19th place (World Economic Forum & IMEDC Re­
ports,1986 & 1990 ).
The World Economic Forum’s measures are to a degree subjective and therefore open to debate. 
However, the overall findings are not out of line with expectations and do in fact accord with the 
widely held view that raising industrial efficiency and international orientation remain priority 
tasks. While significant parts of Australian industry, such as the steel industry, have made very 
considerable gains in industrial efficiency and export performance, other parts of industry still 
have a long way to go before they could be considered to be world class.
The measure of competitiveness which has now entered into the public debate in Australia shows 
movements over time in Australia’s competitiveness taking account of relative rates of inflation 
and relative movements in exchange rates. In terms of this measure of competitiveness, the 
international competitiveness of Australian industry rose dramatically in 1985 following the 
major devaluations of that time, but since 1988 has gradually fallen to a position where it is now 
lower than it was prior to 1985 (BIE; Reuters and Treasury; Index of international competitive­
ness).
F i g u r e  1

























•  1.2 -1 - 0.8 - 0.6 * 0.4 - 0.2 0 0.2 0
Based on The World Competitiveness Report 1936
Figure 2
























Based on The World Competitiveness Report 1936
27
AUSTRALIA AND COMPETITIVENESS
Recently three significant reports have been published in Australia which address 
industrial competitiveness and what needs to be done to improve it These are: Australian 
Exports for Performance, obstacles and issues of assistance ( The Hughes Report)’; 
Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendency ( The Gamaut Report )’,* and ’The Global 
Challenge: Australian Manufacturing in the 1990s (The Pappas, Carter, Evans and Koop/ 
Telesis Report)' commissioned by the Australian Manufacturing Council (AMC). The 
reports have somewhat different starting points but have a significant degree of 
commonality, although this has been lost to some extent in the public debate which has 
focused on points of difference.
The major points of agreement can be summarised as follows:
- macro-economic policies play a very significant role in setting the environment for 
business, especially through relative rates of inflation, the cost of capital, swings in real 
exchange rates and government expenditure and business taxation settings. The Gamaut 
and Hughes report both make a case for greater macro-economic stability. The Hughes 
Report also argues for a value added tax to replace the existing indirect tax system;
- a number of very significant distortions exist in important sectors of the economy such 
as transport, the waterfront, power generation and communications which reduce the 
competitiveness of the trade-exposed sectors of the economy. These impediments which 
impose far greater costs on the economy in aggregate than barrier protection should be 
removed as quickly as possible; and
- barrier protection while now falling should continue to do so beyond 1992. The Gamaut 
report argues for zero protection by the year 2000 (DITAC, Annual Report, 1989- 
90,pl6).
Beyond this, Bill Dix, Chairman of AMC, in his preface to the PCEK/T report identifies 
three points which are believed to be fundamental to the nation’s economic well-being:
-There is significant potential to increase exports derived from the further processing of 
Australia's natural resources.
-Australia's existing industry may not be 'the only game in town' but it is of critical 
importance to its traded sector performance and it has to maximise its economic viability. 
Significant improvements in quality and productivity are possible and essential across the 
board which will require rapid dissemination of international 'best practice', which has 
only been implemented in a few isolated firms to date; and
-Australia needs to take a more strategic approach to assisting industrial development built
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around an understanding of its competitive position.
The differences between the reports turn on the appropriate role for government beyond 
these areas of agreement. This is a subject of on-going debate both in Australia and in 
other industrialised countries. Suffice is to say that no developed country has adopted a 
pure model of self denial as far as industries, technologies, export promotion and training 
are concerned. Each country has followed a pragmatic path which suits its own 
circumstances. The real points of difference concern whether such policies are inward or 
outward looking, defensive or pro-active and successful or otherwise.
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INDUSTRY POLICY: KEY ISSUES FOR THE 1990s
Australia faces a fundamental problem in combining a satisfactory rate of economic 
growth with a sustainable current account deficit. This is not a recent problem. Over the 
past ten years the current account deficit has averaged more than 5 % of GDP.The 
increased current account deficit has been financed by a rapid growth in net foreign debt, 
which has risen from 7.4 % of GDP in March 1979 to 31.6 % in March 1989 ( DITAC, 
1989. pl3-18). Increases in foreign indebtedness cannot continue to escalate indefinitely. 
At some time overseas creditors will no longer be willing to sustain a situation where a 
society consumes substantially more than it proceeds.
On the basis of reasonable assumptions of economic growth, debt stabilisation is 
consistent with a current account deficit of around 2.5 % of GDP, or around half the 
present level (DITAC, 1989,pl3). This implies that some combination of increased 
exports and reduced imports of goods and services is required. Viewed from another 
perspective, a higher proportion of Australia's investment must be financed from 
domestic ( rather than overseas ) savings, so that current consumption is reduced in 
favour of future consumption.
In order to achieve this objective, Australian industry must become more internationally 
competitive. This is the overriding goal of industry policy. Increased international 
competitiveness is necessary in order to raise exports and replace more imports with 
domestic production.
While the agriculture and mining sectors will continue to provide the bulk of exports, as a 
result of Australia's natural competitive advantages, there are strong arguments for 
diversifying the export base towards sophisticated manufactured products ( elaborately 
transformed manufactures) and services. First, dependence on commodity exports tends 
to lock the economy into the boom and bust cycle of the international commodity markets. 
Secondly, elaborately transformed manufactures and services constitute the fastest 
growing areas of world trade, and unless Australians are more competitive in these 
industries living standards are unlikely to increase as quickly as the community expects.
A lack o f industrial 'poles' based on patterns of industrial concentration
Australian success in manufactured exports rest largely on comparative advantage 
(minimally processed primary products) or highly firm-specific competitiveness (niche 
products). Largely due to the history of import substitution and distance from markets,
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Australia has not developed large export-oriented manufacturing firms. Unlike most small 
OECD countries that have been successful exporters, it has not developed specialisation 
based on clusters of interacting firms and an historical accumulation of capabilities. In 
particular, with some important exceptions, there are few examples of successful 
exporting manufacturing or service firms conceived through close commercial and 
technological interaction with its major resource-based and service industries.
Limited export capacities
Export growth expectations of Australian industry often underestimate the barriers arising 
from : the limited development of market knowledge and marketing capabilities and 
infrastructure; the lack of product development and differentiation for exports markets; 
and the low level of structural competitiveness. In high-growth technology-based product 
areas, the small size of the domestic market and the few 'leading edge' local customers has 
limited the scale of R&D, making it difficult to achieve and sustain 'first mover' 
advantages.
These barriers to beginning and sustaining an export momentum suggest a long time scale 
for substantial improvement in export performance. They also underline the necessity for 
increasing the pace of micro-economic reform.
By international standards Australian firms are small. This is particularly so in high 
value-added products areas where, due to the limited national market, small firms must 
export at an early stage in their growth. Niche-Market firms may have to gain entry to 
several export markets to sustain growth. The costs and risks of market entry, 
exacerbated by distance from customers, severely tests the capabilities and financial 
resources of small firms. For Australian firms the rungs in the export development ladder 
are very widely spaced.
Competitiveness is one aspect of export development but experience continuously 
illustrates that access is another. A common tactic is to advocate free trade in the sectors in 
which one can compete and protect those that are uncompetitive. The appeal of 
unobtrusive protective devices such as the use of technical standards and anti-dumping 
laws to exclude threatening imports lies in the ability of countries to protect while 
maintaining commitment to their international treaty obligations (TASC, 1990, p.21).
Asian opportunities and realities
There are strong current and likely future complementarities between the Australian and 
Asian economies. But Australian manufacturing industries, in particular, have not actively 
responded to these opportunities. There are some indications that this is beginning to
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change. However, the cultural gap remains a major obstacle to a more broadly-based 
integration that neither geographical proximity nor apparent complementarity will 
automatically overcome.
International alliances
Australian firms and research organisations are not significant participants in major 
international inter-firm or multi-party cooperative research alliances. There is a real threat 
that this marginal status will be reinforced if the triad countries act to concentrate 
collaboration and strengthen knowledge appropriation within each region. This fear is 
shared by several other small countries. Indeed, recent experience indicates that the major 
European countries have very little interest in research collaboration with Australia.
Potential investors from Europe and North America have become sceptical of the 
'Australia-the springboard to Asia' message. Ambitious expectations on the part of 
government have been replaced by an acceptance that foreign investment in such ventures 
will be likely to grow slowly (and cautiously) and involve acquisitions or joint ventures 
more often than ’green field' investments. However participation by Australian firms in 
international alliances is generally increasing (TASC, 1990, pi8-23).
The discussion in this examines some broad indicators of manufacturing industry's 
performance over the last decade and consider whether a trend towards a greater degree of 
international competitiveness can be observed.
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LESSONS OF THE 1980s
Australian Technology policy in the 1980s has been directed towards one primary objective: 
developing export oriented and internationally competitive manufacturing and service industries. 
The following is a selective review, rather than a detail account of the experience of the 80’s and 
is concerned with issues of raising Australia’s competitiveness. A discussion of certain key 
indicators of comparative performance is presented later.
A Long Process of Transformation
The barriers to international competitiveness are deep-seated, embodied in attitudes and regulation 
and in industrial and institutional structures. Skill and knowledge levels are inadequate. The 
scope for achieving cost competitiveness in other than some resource-based commodities is 
severely limited by low labour productivity, the high cost of capital, high inflation, and pervasive 
inefficiencies in transport and many other service industries. The research and education infra­
structure has not developed close industry links. Few firms have the products, production and 
marketing capabilities and the market position from which to rapidly expand their share of export 
markets. The purpose of this recitation is not to compound negativity, but to emphasise two 
points.
First, Australia is starting from a long way behind almost all otherwise comparable OECD 
countries. Second, a wide ranging transformation of the economy is required. There is very 
limited scope for substantially raising competitiveness through grafting new technologies, firms 
or industries onto a fundamentally uncompetitive industrial system.
A Small economy at the edge of the world
The effort required to address Australia’s internal adjustment problems too often distracts attention 
from the wider perspective- rapid global change in trade patterns, industrial technologies and 
inter- firm relationships.
While many aspects of industry performance in Australia have improved relative to the past, it 
remains a marginal player in the wider arena:
-market share in important Asian markets is declining;
-market share in rapidly growing world markets for technology-intensive products is declining; 
-there is minimal involvement in international technology development programs,
-unlike other small OECD countries Australian industry has not developed international strengths 
in specialised areas of high-value adding industry;
-the costs of export market entry place severe demands on the resources of small firms and entail 
a high level of risk.
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Building Structural Competitiveness
Underlying and supporting the strong competitive performance of many small OECD countries 
are robust systems of technology innovation, acquisition and diffusion. These systems are far 
more than the sum of activity within industry and the public skill and the development of 
complementary strengths and relationships. Such ‘national systems of innovation’ generate ex­
ternal economies on which individual firms can build. Indeed, without the existence of these 
external economies the scope for individual firms to achieve and sustain international competi­
tiveness is limited.
In contrast to these countries, the ‘national systems of innovation’ in Australia is weak and 
fragmented. There are few strong industry clusters and little evidence of the existence of net­
works that facilitate innovation and diffusion. Consequently, firms benefit to a more limited 
extent from external economies and the task of building international competitiveness falls more 
heavily on the individual enterprise. „
The Limits of Innovation Push
Despite its appeal, the ‘innovation push’ model is inappropriate in Australia because of the 
environment in Australia for new technology and firm development and the obstacles to export 
development.
While the scientific and technological research base is vitally important, its most significant 
contribution is likely to come from the adaptation of major technologies to Australian require­
ments- i.e. through linking technological capabilities and industrial problems (TASC, July 1990, 
p.vii-x) .
Diffusion and intangible assets.
Policies throughout the 1980s generally placed too little emphasis on adaptation and diffusion 
and on engineering and management relative to the emphasis on R&D and innovation. (Australia’s 
protectionist tradition has been one of the principal reasons for the low level of dynamic perfor­
mance in much of our economy. Because producers (including State-owned producers) are 
protected from international (and internal) competition, the level of environmental uncertainty to 
which they are exposed has been reduced. It has also facilitated the development of more 
mechanistic organizational structures based on autocratic decision-making. Numerous studies 
have compared Australian managers with their overseas counterparts, and have found that, in 
general our managements are more paternalistic, more conservative, more resistant to change, 
and more autocratic. They are also lacking in boldness, initiative, ideas and techniques and are 
more dependent on government on government and foreign capital (Mark Wooden, Roy Kriegler, 
Peter Dawkins, March 1989). New approaches involve production and knowledge acquisition 
and in particular, an effective strategic management of such intangible assets as corporate 
culture, skill and knowledge resources, reputation and intra and inter-firm relationships ( EPAC , 
Report No.91/03; 1991,plO).
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INDICATORS OF COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE:
This review provides a back ground for the preceding discussions.
WORLD TRADE AND AUSTRALIA'S EXPORT PERFORMANCE:
As mentioned before there is little alternative to a substantial increase in exports if 
Australia is to achieve long-term growth. Given the long term downward trend in the 
prices of primary commodities and the agricultural protection practiced by the major 
trading blocs, much of this increase will have to come from manufactures and services.
The role of manufactures exports has received particular attention. This has arisen from a 
number of observations:
- Manufactured goods and services have been the fastest growing area of wold trade;
- the terms of trade for natural and mining products are on a downward, albeit erratic, 
trend; and
- Australia's share of world trade in manufactures is small and the scope for expansion is 
potentially enormous.
From another perspective, the interest in the growth in exports is sparked by the fact that 
firms which export a significant proportion say 20 % of their production exhibit the 
characteristics required for Australian industry to become more efficient and dynamic. 
Exporting forces providers of goods and services to improve design, lower production 
costs and reduce delivery times. Those that are able to survive and prosper in export 
markets are the ones that offer the best prospects for a substantial increase in the size of 
Australia's manufacturing industry (DITAC, Annual Report, 1989).
In 1980, manufactures accounted for 56%, mining 29% and agricultural commodities 15 
% of world merchandise trade but through the 1980s, the composition of trade continued 
to change rapidly. By 1988, the share of manufacturers had increased to 73 % while 
mining had declined to 13 % accounting for 6.7% of top 30 dynamic products in world 
merchandise trade ( World Merchandise Trade, 1980 and 1989; GATT 1989).
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Although there are a few exceptions, growth in trade during the 1980s was particularly rapid in 
high value-added, technology-intensive products.
Changes in the composition of world trade were not reflected in Australian exports over the 
period 1982 to 1989. The share of manufactured exports remained around 54 % and more than 
65 % of Australia’s largest manufactured exports in 1986-87 were low-valued added, resource- 
based commodities. This proportion has not changed significantly in more than twenty years.
Of Australia’s total manufactured exports in 1986-87, $12,482M (71 %) can be classified as low 
export growth and low value-added while only $1,746M (10 %) were both high growth and high 
value-added (Australian Merchandise Exports 1982-83 and 1988-89, ABS Cat.No.5424.0 and 
Export growth and level of Value added 1986-87, ABS Cat.No.8203.0).
While exports of manufactures increased in real terms, particularly from 1984 to 1988 the 
performance of individual sectors varied considerably. Increases were confined to only a few 
sectors while in others, export growth was over a narrow base. Consequently, the export intensity 
of manufacturing as a whole increased only marginally, from 0.14 to 0.16 ( ABS, Changes in 
Export intensities, manufacturing Cat.Nos.5201.0; 8203.0,1982-88).
By 1990, Australia’s merchandise export performance remained overwhelmingly dependent on 
low value-added, resource-based commodities. A strong domestic demand (Gross National Ex­
penditure increased in 1988-89 by 7.7% more than double the increase in GDP) had adverse 
consequences for exports of manufactured goods ( DITAC, Annual Report, 1988-89 pl39).
Jervices also have a role to play in improving Australia’s export performance. Over the past two 
ecades, world trade in service has expanded slightly more rapidly than trade in goods, but 
Australia has had lower than average growth here as well. An exception has been tourism, which 
as shown exceptional growth over the past three years. Some other services, such as education, 
so have the potential to become major export earners (DITAC; Annual Report, 1989,pl41-
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TRENDS IN TRADING SERVICES
Historically Australia has recorded a net services deficit. In 1989-90 the net services 
deficit accounted for $3,656M or 17.6% of Australia's total current account deficit.
There has been a significant improvement in the contribution of services to Australia’s 
current account over the last five years. In 1984-85 services exports were $5,543 M and 
accounted for 15.9 % of total exports of goods and services. This increased to $11379 M 
or 19.4% of total exports in 1989-90. In 1984-85 services imports were $9412M or 23.8 
percent of total imports of goods and services. By 1989-90 service imports were $15,035 
or 22.9% of total imports. However in 1987, Australia accounted for approximately 1 % 
and 1.5 % of the world services exports and imports respectively, only. Australia was 
only the twentieth largest participant in world services exports and the sixteenth largest 
participant in world service imports.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,  INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITIVENESS
Technological change in a dynamic economy occurs through:
-the diffusion of new products, process technologies and management practices into 
existing industries and
-the establishment of new product and service industries.
High technology products have assumed increasing importance in world trade over the 
1970s and 1980s. Between 1970 and 1983, the value of high technology exports from 
the OECD countries increased by an annual average of 15.3 % while the proportion of 
high technology exports in total manufactured exports increased from 13.7 % to 17.5 %. 
The largest increase in the share of high technology exports occurred in the US, where it 
increased from 23.4 % in 1970 to 30.3 % in 1983, and in Japan where the proportion 
increased from 11.6 % to 19.2%. The EEC also achieved a significant increase from 13.6 
% to 16.4%. In comparison, between 1970 and 1982 Australia's high technology 
products increased their share o manufactured exports from 1.9 % to 3.5% (EPAC Paper 
No.25, 1987,p4)
OECD studies indicate that there is a strong linkage between R&D expenditure and trade 
performance in high technology products ( OECD, 1986). Countries such as the US, 
Japan and Sweden have both high R&D intensities and high proportions of high
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technology exports in their manufacturing trade. In the industrialised economies, 
manufactured exports with a high ratio of R&D expenditure to value added (or R&D 
intensity) grew at a faster rate than medium to low technology exports between 1975 and 
1983. During the slow-down in world trade between 1980 and 1983, manufactured 
exports with a medium to low R&D intensity declined in real terms while high R&D 
intensity exports continued to increase.
Among a list of eleven industrial countries, Australia had the lowest R&D intensity in the 
manufacturing sector and the lowest proportion of high technology exports in its 
manufacturing trade ( OECD, 1986). Moreover, a study of private sector R&D in 
Australia by the Australian Science and Technology Council (1985) shows that, in 
contrast to most other industrial countries, Australia's share of high R&D exports in 
manufactured exports is well below the proportion of high R&D industries in its 
manufacturing sector (EPAC Paper No.25; 1987,p5).
The main factors which determine a country's innovative performance have been 
discussed by Ergas (1987). Three sets of interacting factors seem critical:
-The scientific education and research base of the economy determines whether a country 
has the required skills and capability to produce technologically complex products.
-The level and intensity of competition determines whether firms have the incentive to 
seek and engage in production of new products.
-The size of the domestic market and access to export markets establish the demand 
conditions for new products or services.
Australia appears to have been traditionally strong in basic research but weak in the 
conversion of this research into marketable products. Chart 1 presents international 
comparisons of the allocation of R&D between basic research, applied research and 
experimental development. Australia compares favourably with other OECD countries in 
both basic and applied research expenditure. However, Australia's poor performance in 
the commercial application of its basic research is reflected in the deterioration of its trade 
deficit in technology based products, which has increased from 1.4 % of GDP in 1973 to 
1.8% in 1983-84 ( EPAC, Paper No.19; 1986,p4)).
One of the factors which explain this weakness is the low proportion of business R&D 
expenditure in Australia's total R&D effort as shown in chart 2. While R&D expenditure 
by the public sector compares well with other medium R&D OECD countries, Australian 
business sector expenditure on R&D has ben very poor. The private sector, funds and 
performs about 20 % of R&D in Australia, well below the proportion in most other
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industrial countries . The public sector can provide the finance for basic research in 
universities and other research institutions, but business sector involvement is needed to 
provide the commercial orientation and the application of the research. Commercially 
oriented R&D is also needed to strengthen the capacity for technology transfer. Since 
most of Australia's industrial technology is imported, the growth of high technology 
industries will depend on being aware of and able to take advantage of the largest 
technological developments overseas. Awareness of such developments can be 
significantly enhanced through informal personal contact between Australian and foreign 
entrepreneurs ( EPAC; Paper No.25, 1987,p8).
There has been a significant improvement in private R&D effort in recent years chart 3 
Private business enterprises increased their R&D expenditure by 52 % in real terms from 
1981-82 to 1984-85 and the R&D effort in person-years by all business enterprises 
increased by 43 %. Despite this rapid increase, business R&D expenditure still 
represented only .34 % of GDP in 1984-85, which is less than half the average for 
comparable OECD countries. To encourage further growth, a 150 % tax deduction for 
expenditure on plant and equipment which is wholly attributable to R&D has applied from 
July 1985 (EPAC, Paper No.25, 1987,p7).
The early period when new technologies are being developed but not yet commercially 
viable is crucial and in some countries this early stage was basically supported by 
government investment. As Dr Hellestrand, a member of the Senate Standing Committee 
on Science, Technology & the Environment ( AGPS , 1989, plO) points out:
For each $1 which the Australia Government invests in Electrical Engineering & 
Computer Science (EECS) research the US Government invests $74. Our population 
ratios are 1 to 15, respectively, representing a governmental investment imbalance of 5 to 
1 not in our favour. The ratio of government to private investment in EECS research is 
$0.20 compared with the American investment of $3.96, a pro-rated ratio of 1:18.7 . 
When it is remembered that the US is highly industrialised and Australia is not, then the 
figure representing the imbalance is under-inflated, probably by a factor exceeding 2, 
since the lack of industrialisation denies the necessary infrastructure with which to 
support new industry.
Australia's historically low levels of expenditure on experimental development relative to 
basic or applied research in manufacturing can be attributed to a number of factors:
- The structure of tariff protection encouraged inward looking industries which focussed
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on competition for domestic market share. This reduced the competitive pressure on 
protected industries to develop new products or apply new technologies;
- A shortage of technological, management, marketing and entrepreneurial skills in the 
Australian workforce;
- Inadequate exchange of information between groups conducting research (such as 
universities and government agencies) and the business community;
- The reluctance of many Australian financial institutions to provide risk capital for new 
firms and the absence of established capital market institutions to facilitate the early stages 
of a firm's development;
- The strength of the agriculture and resource commodity industries and an over-valued 
exchange rate prior to 1983 tended to deter the emergence of new manufacturing 
industries (EPAC, Paper No.25, 1987,p25).
Innovative performance is more difficult to measure. Several studies have argued that 
Australian industry has not been particularly innovative. It appears that the level of 
innovation is not sufficient to capitalisions of these constraints still persist, though 
recent policy developments are helping to improve R&D performance and its commercial 
application. The floating of the exchange rate, the sharp deterioration in commodity prices 
and the subsequent fall in the exchange rate and the 150% tax concession for R&D (the 
150% tax concession scheme for example helped increase business R&D which was
0.24% of GDP in 1982-83 by almost double to 0.46% by 1986-87 (TASC, 1990) have 
transformed the climate for the manufacturing and services sectors.
VENTURE CAPITAL
A recent OECD report (1985) noted that information technology industries are the most 
affected by the development of venture capital arrangements. New firms play a key role in 
the development of these industries and many of these firms have been selected, funded 
and piloted by venture capitalists  ̂EPAC Council Paper no. 25; Jan 1987).
The growth in venture capital and investment in new innovative industries has been 
facilitated by the introduction of the Management and Investment Companies(MIC) 
program and the establishment of Second Board Markets in all capital cities.
The Australian Industry Development Corporation (AIDC) has expanded its role in the 
provision of venture capital. Despite encouraging growth, the level of funds provided by
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venture capital companies in Australia remains small compared with some other OECD coun­
tries. In 1986, Australian venture capital funds amounted to about $15 per head. The correspond­
ing figure for the US is estimated to be about $73 per head while high technology companies are 
major recipients of venture capital as would be shown by the following chart of a breakdown of 
the investments of MICS by industry; they are far below world levels e.g. in 1982 about 75% of 
US venture capital investment was devoted to information technology industries against 19.2% 
for computer technology industry by MIC investments in 1996 in Australia( EPAC; 1987, pp23). 
The MIC scheme did not meet the opportunistic expectations that it would significantly increase 
the rate of formation and growth of high technology firms.
However, as noted above, the availability of finance (whether tax-deductible or not) is not the 
only short-term constraint on the expansion of venture capital companies or the development of 
commercial venture utilising new technology. A perhaps more intractable constraint is the avail­
ability of managers with appropriate skills in risk analysis, with entrepreneurial flair and with the 
scientific or technological support to evaluate high technology projects.
PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE IN AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING AND IN­
TERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
Highlights :
There are many reservations concerning the measurement of productivity. Subject to those 
reservations, the evidence presented in the Council Paper by EPAC on productivity in Australia 
points to the following conclusions:
- measured productivity growth in the Australian economy has been appreciably slower in the 
80s and early 70s (although this pattern is less clear in regard to manufacturing)
- the slow - down appears to have been more pronounced for labour productivity than for 
multifactor productivity.
- a similar slow-down in productivity occured in most other OECD countries, reflecting both 
macro economic and structural influences.
In recent years, the decline in real unit labour costs has reduced pressures to replace labour with 
capital and has made possible stronger growth in employment. This change, while desirable for 
several reasons, has had some dampening effect on measured labour productivity growth and to 
some extent, on multifactor productivity growth.
Precise international comparisons are not possible, but the general impression derived from the 
following two Tables is that:
-growth in mutifactor productivity in Australia was below the OECD average in the 1960s but 
the underlying growth has remained close to the OECD average since 1973. In manufacturing
42
there has been some relative deterioration in the first half of the 1980s.
-the Asian NICs have been markedly outperforming (most other OECD countries too) on 
productivity growth.
-the Australian economy as a whole appears to be middle ranking and broadly comparable 
with a number of industrialised countries ( Henry Ergas, Oecd Monash University , Productiv­
ity in Australia in an International perspective).
Table I : Nummary of data on produciiviiy growth rates.
Annual averages Year on year
1960s 1973 1979 1985 1986 1987
-1973 -7 9 -85 -8 6 -8 7 -8 8
Australia:
W hole econom y:
Labour: hw: ABS 2.1 1.5 -1.6 0.2
emp: ABS 1.9a 1.3 1.3 -1.4 0.6
1AESR 2.2 1.6 1.1 -0.2
B usiness/ m arket sector:
Labour: hw: ABS 3.1a 2.1 1.7 -1.3 0.9
Treasury 1.7 2-2 -1.0 0.1
—adj for terms of trade 1.7 0.4 -2-2 2.0
1AESR 2.9 2.3 1.2 0.4
OECD 3.9 2.4 1.7b
emp: OECD 2.9 2.0 l.Ib
Capital: OECD 0.1 -1.8 -0.6b
MFP: ABS 2.3a 1.4 2.1 -1.9 1.1
OECD 2.1 0.6 0.5b
M anufacturing:
Labour: hw: Newcastle 3.9 2.1 5.7 1.1 0.9
B1E: TFP1 0.3 2.4 1.7 3.7 -2.5 1.7
BIE: TFP2# -1.2 4.4 0.9 8.1 -4.4 1.3
Labour: emp: B1E1 2.6 3.5 3.1 5.4 -1.0 1.1
BIE2# 1.0 5.4 2.3 9.8 -3.0 0.8
MFP: Newcastle  ̂ ■> 0.6 4.4 -1.4
OECD 2.1 1.7 0.4c
Average of OECD Countries:
Whole economy: Labour (emp) 3.4 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.7
Business sector: Labour (emp) 4.1 1.6 1.4b
Capital -0.4 -1.4 -1.3b
TFP 2.8 0.7 0.6b < 1.2>d
Manufacturing: TFP 4.5 1.5 1.8c
Average of Asian NICS:
Whole economy: Labour (emp) 4.3 4.0 4.7
Business sector: TFP 8.0 5.0b 10.0e
Noies: Variations between series may be due to differences of definition.
Starting point in 1960s for data in first column varies.
hw: dividing output by hours worked
emp: dividing output by numbers employed
if using the double-deflation method (see section 2.7).
a: 1974-75 to 1978-79.
b: 1979-86.
c: 19*»9-83.
d: 19S7-90—estimates and projections from OECD Economic Outlook Dec 198S.
e: 1987.
Asian NICs: Hong Kong. Korea. Singapore and Taiwan, plus Thailand for labour 
productivity only. Office estimates.
Table 2: Productivity growth in OECD countries: average percentage change per annum.
OECD
Au>l. .4vee USA Japan Germ France UK Canada Sweden
I960s-1973
Labour prod’y 3.2 4.1 S.6 4.9 5.9 3.3 2.9 3.1
Capital prod’y 0.1 -0.4 0.3 -2.4 -1.1 0.6 -0.7 1.1 -1.7
TFP 2.1 2.S 1.5 6.1
oo r i 4.3 2.0 rici 1.4
1973-79 
Labour prod’y 1.8 1.6 0.3 3.2 3.4 3.5 1.3 2.0
Capital prod’y -1.8 -1.4 -0.9 -3.0 -1.1 -1.2 -1.9 -0.3 -1.8
TFP 0.6 0.7 -0.1 1.8 1.8 2.1 0.2 1.1 0.8
1979-86
Labour prod’y 1.1 1.4 0.6 2.8 2.0 2.5 1.9 1.1 1.2
Capital prod’y -0.6 -1.3 -1.0 -2.0 -1.3 -1.4 -0.8 -2.6 -1.9
TFP 0.5 0.6 0.0 1.7 0.8 1.3 1.1 -0.3 0.1
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GLOBALISATION
Globalisation is a term which appears to have taken on increasing importance in the 
lexicon of management and, more recently, industry policy. As a result, there has been a 
tendency for the term to become overused and misunderstood.
What does globalisation mean ? In essence, it denotes the increasing interdependence of 
international markets. Thus, it relates to the strategies of corporations and governments, 
the competitive environment, the nature of international markets and so on.
A plethora of new words and phrases has permeated the literature. Terms which tend to 
recur include: global strategies, global firms, global industries, global markets, global 
oligopolies and a global configuration, global coordination, global competition, global 
perspective, global position and the global competitive environment
Likewise we have a proliferation of unlike but related terms. These include the notions of 
internationalisation, transnationalisation, insiderisation, the transnational corporation 
(TNQ, the multinational enterprise (MNE) and the multidomestic enterprise(MDE).
Many of these terms emanate from management literature. The leading writers dealing 
with the globalisation phenomenon tend to come from business schools as well as 
departments of economics. Some are practising management or business consultants. 
(Kenichi Ohmae, author of Triad Power, falls into this category. His insights into the 
globalisation process have come from experience as an employee of Mackinsey & Co., 
where he worked with major corporations and the Japan, the US, Europe and was 
recently in S.E.Asia). The theory of globalisation is not only of academic interest but 
also of practical interest to business community.
The notion of global competition has similarities and linkages to the economics of 
industrial organisation and international trade. It is also argued that the forces promoting 
globalisation have changed the pattem of trade, particularly between the advanced 
industrial and the newly industrial countries (NICs).
The concept of globalisation
Globalisation is really a simple concept It denotes a recognition that markets, industries 
and indeed enterprises transcend national boundaries. Economic activities in a particular 
region may have effects in other regions.
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The focus of attention is, therefore, no longer small oligopolistic industries contained 
within single national boundaries but international markets supplied by large MNEs. The 
image of the successful enterprise is no longer the traditional concept of a nationally 
focussed firm operating within a set of narrowly defined boundaries. The dominant new 
entity is now the MNE which is characterised by a perspective which is world-wide in 
scope and takes a strategic view of a world populated by actual and potential competitors 
operating in many, if not all, of the important national markets.
The world class firm must configure and coordinate its international activities in such a 
manner as to extract the maximum returns from any technological or competitive 
advantage it holds. In order to keep abreast of technological or other developments in 
production and marketing it must maintain presence inside the markets of Europe, North 
America and Japan where its major national and international competitors are operating. 
No longer is a purely national perspective adequate.
Accordingly, the essential feature of globalisation is that firms pursue global strategies in 
which their international activities are linked and coordinated on a world-wide basis and 
those firms which fail to implement such strategies will be at a distinct disadvantage in 
global industries.This is implied by Porter's definition of a global industry where he 
points out that:
An industry can be defined as global if there is some competitive advantage to integrate 
activities on a world wide-basis ( Porter 1986, )pl9).
Again Porter(1980, p. 275) defines a global industry as follows :
A global industry is one in which the strategic positions of competitors in major 
geographic or national markets are fundamentally affected by their overall global 
positions.
Firms that configure and coordinate their activities on a global basis are termed 
transnational corporations. These are to be distinguished from multidomestic coiporations 
which, though operating across national borders, do not coordinate their production, 
marketing, research and development and other related activities on an international basis.
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GLOBALISATION OF INDUSTRY
Globalisation means that what happens in one particular location may affect activity elsewhere 
(KPMG, 1988). Industries exhibiting global characteristics include commercial aircraft, television 
receivers, semiconductors, photocopiers, motor vehicles, and digital watches (Porter, 1986, p. 18); 
many more industries are now exhibiting global characteristics. This is true not only in manufacturing 
but also in the primary and tertiary sectors, as multinational companies standardise products, services 
and processes around the world. For instance, telecommunications, banking, food preparation, 
tourism, accommodation and animal husbandry are now being targeted by multinational companies.
IDENTIFYING GLOBAL INDUSTRIES
Perhaps the most noted industry classification scheme is found in Porter who suggests five generic 
industry environments as the basis of business competitioniemerging, mature, declining, fragmented, 
and global(Allen J.Monison, 1990,p36). The identification of global industries has been the subject of 
considerable research. For example, Hout, Porter, and Rudden(1982f 998-108), and Hamel and 
Parahalad(1985, p i 39-148), both defined global industries according to a business strategy where 
competitive position in one national market is subsidized by competition in other national markets.
Such an approach to industries has been common in studies of competition in global industries. It is, 
however, inconsistent with the need to define the industry context independently of strategy.
Beyond identifying global industries through dominant patterns of business strategy, four key 
structural dimensions have consistently been cited as fundamental to independently defining global 
industries. First, global industries have been associated with intense levels of international 
competition. The intense competition encouraged by the globalization of markets, which is represented 
by the world-wide standardization of buyer demand. From a structural perspective, global industries 
have been characterised by the dominance of competitors marketing a standardized product world­
wide. As a result of the above two global industries have also been identified by the presence of 
industry competitors that have a presence in all key international markets. Finally, global industries 
have been differentiated by high levels of international trade in terms of product flow across national 
borders.
Indeed, according to Cvar (1984):
a necessary condition of industry globalization is the cross-border flow of a significant portion of 
components that make up the total cost of the product.
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Using these broad dimensions of global industries, various attempts have been made to identify and 
discuss the structural dynamics of specific global industries. Levels o f trade and international 
competition, the marketing of standardized product world-wide, and the presence of competitors in all 
key international markets are cited as critical definition variables and yet are frequently ignored in 
identifying global industries. Much of the reason for this is " that 'globalness' is inevitably a matter of 
degree," and the degree to which an industry is global is viewed as shifting with time. The evolution 
of an industry into a global state is due to a changing environmental factors and strategic repositioning 
on the part of industry competitors (Allen J.Morrison, p38).
The importance of International Trade Flow Levels:
Recent empirical investigations by both Prescott (1983) and Cvar (1986) , quoted in Strategies in 
Global industries-Literature Review; Allen J. Morrisson, have identified international trade flow 
levels as a necessary dimension in classifying industries and in determining the globalness of 
industries. In addressing this issue, Porter has suggested that:
intra-industry trade is a good sign of the presence of global competition, and its growth is one 
indication that the incidence of global industries has increased.
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COMPETITION IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES
Competition in global industries presents some unique strategic issues compared to 
domestic competition. Although their resolution depends on the industry and the home 
and host countries involved, the following issues must be confronted in some way by 
global competitors(Porter, 1980P291-294).
Industrial Policy and Competitive Behaviour
Global industries are characterised by the presence of competitors operating world-wide 
from home bases in different countries. Home governments often have objectives, such 
as employment and balance of payments, that are not strictly economic, certainly from the 
point of view of the global firm. Government industrial policy can shape companies' 
goals, provide R & D funds, and in many ways influence their position in global 
competition. The home country's industrial policy must be well understood, as well as 
the political and economic relations of the home government vis-a-vis governments in 
major world markets for the industry's product and competitive strategy may have to 
include actions designed to build political capital, such as locating assembly operations in 
the major markets, even if they are economically inefficient.
Relationships with Host Governments in Major Markets
Where host governments are prone to exercise their power, they can either block global 
competition altogether or create a number of different strategic groups in an industry. For 
international companies, the degree of responsiveness to host government concerns 
becomes a key strategic variable according to studies by Doz (1979). The firm trying to 
compete globally may need to compete in certain major markets to gain necessary 
economies; it must therefore concern itself strategically with protecting its position in such 
markets in order to fulfil a global manufacturing strategy. A good example, is IBM's 
policies of local full employment, balanced intra-company transfers of goods among 
countries, and some local R&D (Doz, 1979,P27-26).
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Systemic Competition
A global industry, by definition, is one in which firms view competition as global and 
build strategies accordingly. In maintaining a competitive balance from a systemic 
viewpoint, it may be necessary for firms to make defensive investments in particular 
markets and locations so as not to let competitors reap advantages that can be factored into 
their overall global posture. Knickerbocker's (1973) study of international competition, 
quoted in Porter (1980; p293), found much evidence of this pattern of behaviour.
Difficulty in Competitor Analysis
Analysis is difficult in global industries because of the prevalence of foreign firms and the 
need to analyze systemic relationships: analysis of foreign firms may also involve 
institutional considerations that are hard for outsiders to understand, such as labour 
practices and managerial structures.
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TRENDS AFFECTING GLOBAL COMPETITION AND EVOLUTION OF 
GLOBAL INDUSTRIES
The essence of a global industry is the coordination of international activities by firms in 
the industry. A freer aggressive and cheaper flow of technology appears to be giving a 
wide variety of firms, including NDC competitors, the ability to invest in modem, world­
scale facilities, which tends to promote more global competition. Developments in 
communications have also produced spin-off benefits in terms of product differentiation 
and a convergence and standardisation tastes across national borders. This has tended to 
produce a homogenised society spanning the US, Japan, the EC (European Community) 
and their satellites. Ohmae (1985, PP.xvi-xvii), in describing the coming shape of global 
competition points out that:
There is the emergence of the Triadians, or the residents of Japan America, and the 
European Community. We may call them Triadians, or OECDites. These are the people 
whose academic backgrounds, income levels (both discretionary and nondiscretionary), 
life style, use of leisure time, and aspirations are quite similar. In these democratic 
countries, the national infrastructure, is also very similar. From a corporation’s point of 
view, their basic demand patterns enable them treat this group of people, some 600 M 
residents, as belonging to virtually the same species.
Accordingly, the essence of the of the global strategy is to penetrate the Triad markets 
simultaneously because of the speed of diffusion of new technology dramatically and 
secondly, developments in consumer electronics also increased the speed of diffusion of 
new tastes and preferences throughout the Triad. Thus, according to Ohmae 
( 1985, p.17):
The bottom line is that companies that choose to develop domestic markets first before 
moving on to overseas markets may find themselves totally blocked out by competitors 
that are well entrenched and ready to launch an offensive on others home markets.
Uncoordinated and directionless movement overseas is not enough. The successful global 
competitor must establish a presence inside the major Triad markets and thereby maintain 
and hone its competitive edge. In other words, if a TNC is to survive in a global industry, 
it must maintain its competitive position vis-a-vis its main global competitors. It cannot do 
this by locating plants in some less developed country (LDC) and siphoning off 
monopoly profits in the short term.
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Ohmae calls the maintenance of a presence inside major Triad markets insiderisation. It is, 
allegedly, for this reason that the US has steadily become an important destination for 
FDI since the mid 1970s.This behaviour of TNCS is consistent with the proposition that 
insiderisation is becoming an important consideration in the locational choices of 
multinational companies (The CTC Reporter, 6;No.26, Autumn, 1988,p.7).
Acknowledging the crucial importance of insiderisation, Ohmae (1985.p.l49) points out 
that!
One of the reasons many larger West German companies are faced with the rapid decay of 
their global competitiveness is that they went into the lucrative developing regions in Latin 
America, the Middle East, and Africa where competition was weak and the local 
government hospitable.... They should have been investing in advancing their 
mainstream technology and becoming true insiders in Japan and the United States.
Along with insiderisation the shift from labour intensive to capital intensive 
manufacturing technologies has helped manufacturing plants to be optimally located in 
developed countries rather than in the developing countries which were previously 
attractive because of their relatively cheap labour. The availability of substantial 
economies of scale plus the enormity of the initial investment required to locate and to 
establish automated plants are such as to require recourse to global markets(BIE; 1989, 
p23).
Small NGEs , often have such small market shares that they cannot afford the capital 
costs to establish flexible computer integrated manufacturing production facilities in 
products such as semiconductors and machine tools (Ohmae, 1985,p.7) The automated 
production line relies on the existence of global economies of scale and established 
distribution channels along with a universal demand for relatively undifferentiated or 
engineered products. Here, of necessity, competition is in terms of price (Stopford and 
Turner, 1985,p.26).
A further reason for the emergence of global industries is the increasing complexity of 
technology and the relatively large outlays on R&D required to maintain a competitive 
edge. It is reported that in both Japan and the US, in house business R&D spending has 
doubled since the turn of the decade (1980). Multinational firms such as Siemens and 
IBM are said to spend as much on research as some of the smaller industrialised countries 
( AFR,21 December 1988,p. 14).
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There are obviously global economies of scale in R&D to be realised in some industries.
presence of these economies and the large outlays involved provide a rationale for 
government interventions to coordinate and direct the R&D efforts of competing 
indigenous companies. Once the product of the research has been brought to the 
commercialisation stage, then these companies can go their separate ways. In this way 
governments can act as catalysts. However, the point to note is that success in 
international markets is required to justify the enormous outlays on R&D. In other words, 
R&D projects are increasingly being undertaken with the global marketplace in mind 
rather than a particular market.The TNC has the option of locating R&D facilities 
anywhere in the world,since its R&D workload can be divided into R&D subtasks.R&D 
centres are characterised by the availability of substantial economies of agglomeration in 
R&D. This international perspective has led to the involvement of governments, 
particularly in Japan and Europe(Porter ; 1986, p51).
Trade liberalisation is another force promoting the emergence of a more global industrial 
configuration movement away from a multidomestic industry configuration. As trade 
barriers, notably tariff barriers, are progressively dismantled, the incentive to establish 
single plants to service particular markets is lessened.
TRENDS AFFECTING GLOBAL COMPETITION
Gradual emergence of new large scale markets,
Wheras the United States has long been the strategic market for global competition 
because of its unique size, China, Russia, and possibly India may ultimately emerge as 
huge markets in the future. This possibility has a number of implications. First, if China 
and Russia control access to their markets, their firms may become major global powers. 
Second, gaining access to one or both of these markets may well become a crucial 
strategic variable in the future because of the scale it will provide to successful firms 
(Porter 1980, p294-296).
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Reduction in differences between countries
A number of observers have pointed out that the economic differences among developed 
and newly developed countries may be narrowing in areas like income, factor costs, 
energy costs, marketing practices, and distribution channels. Part of this reduction may 
be due to the aggressiveness of MNCs in spreading their techniques around the world. 
Whatever the causes, it works toward reducing impediments to world competition 
(Vernon, 1979, 265-267).
More aggressive industrial policy
The industrial policies of many countries are in flux. From passive or protective 
postures, governments like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and West Germany are 
taking aggressive postures to stimulate industry in carefully selected sectors that will 
transform industries to global status. They are also facilitating the abandonment of sectors 
deemed less desirable. Thus, for firms that remain in global industries may well for firms 
that remain in global industries the resources available for competition and the stakes 
involved are increased. Non-economic objectives made central by government 
involvement come increasingly into play. There is the possibility that international rivalry 
will escalate as a result of these factors and that barriers to exit will also increase, which 
further increases rivalry.
National recognition and protection of distinctive assets
Governments seem to be increasingly cognizant of which of their resources are distinctive 
for economic competition, and they are increasingly prone to capture the economic 
benefits from their possession (Eg. natural resources and the presence of abundant low- 
paid semi-skilled and unskilled labour in countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong which are explicitly recognized there). Foreign firms may be cut out of effective 
control of key resources and may give certain firms of the home country fundamental 
advantages in global competition thereby escalating world competition.
NDC Competition
A phenomenon of the last ten to fifteen years is competition from NDCs in world 
industries, particularly the emergence of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Brazil. 
Traditionally, NDCc competed on the basis of cheap labour and / or natural resources,
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which still occurs. However, NDC competition has increasingly made a major impact in 
such capital-intensive industries. NDCs are increasingly well prepared, to make major 
capital investments in large-scale facilities, to seek aggressively to buy or license the latest 
technology, and to take enormous risk. Those industries most vulnerable to NDC 
competition are those who lack the following entry barriers 
-rapidly changing technology that can be kept proprietary;
- highly skilled labour,
- sensitivity to lead times;
- complex distribution and service;
- high consumer marketing content;
- complex, technical selling task.
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THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A GLOBAL INDUSTRY
The alternative to a global industry is a multidomestic industry. In a multidomestic 
industry, local managers of country subsidiaries have a substantial degree of autonomy 
example, retailing, consumer package and goods industries, etc.(Porter, 1986, p.18). 
MNEs pursue separate strategies in each of their foreign markets ( Hout, Porter and 
Rudden, 1982,p 103 ).
The main distinction between global and multidomestic industries lies in the scope of 
strategic planning. Enterprises operating in a global industry are impelled to implement a 
globally integrated competitive strategy, whereas enterprises operating in a multidomestic 
industry tend to follow country-centered strategies.
Globalisation and multidomesticity represent opposing ends of an industry strategy 
continuum. An industry can fit in the middle with its firms displaying both features. In 
one industry firms can display more or fewer global characteristics than their competitors 
but the forces of international competition are impelling all companies to refine their 
existing international business strategies and to adopt global strategies ( Porter; 
1986,p.27).
In the present Report, globally integrated and strategically coordinated multinational 
enterprises will be referred to as transnational corporations (TNC). The term 
multidomestic enterprise (MDE) will be used to refer to those multinational companies 
(MNEs) which follow country-focussed international competitive strategies.
An industry may also be populated by indigenous non-global enterprises (NGEs) which 
are wholly indigenous enterprises which have their production, research, product 
development and other activities based in a single country. For example in the information 
technology industry indigenous non-global enterprise are small component software 
suppliers(BIE, 1989, pl7).
As an exporter, the NGE may operate in a number of markets. The indigenous NGE may 
form strategic alliances with MDEs or with TNCs in order to make use of established 
overseas distribution networks( without establishing a presence in these markets) and/ or 
become a subcontractor or component supplier.Thus indigenous NGEs follow a country- 
centred competitive strategy and they have no aspirations to establish their own global 
networks even though they may become linked into the global networks and interests of
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MNCs and are not seen as competitors by foreign MNCs. They are aware o f their 
dependence on the fortunes of major transnational companies.
Another important player in the global industry is the indigenous pre-global enterprise 
(PGE). Under normal circumstances the PGE could be regarded a s  TNC or MNE in its 
own right but is better described as an immature transnational. They have been variously 
labelled as threshold firms or as multinational firms. PGEs are not big enough to be true 
multinationals but are on the way to establishing effective overseas presence; they have 
aspirations to become a full fledged TNC.
While MDEs and TNCs may act against pre-globals in the latter's domestic markets, 
TNCs can be expected to bring their world-wide organisation to bear in order to choke off 
any movement off-shore by indigenous PGEs and indigenous transnational enterprises.
Global industries are not exclusively made up of TNCs. A global industry may have 
TNCs, MDEs, indigenous PGEs, small NGEs and of course some larger indigenous 
NGEs ( Ghemawat and Spence, 1986,p.62).
These various types of organisations and their strategies are outlined in the foil, table :









The important distinction between a global and a country-centred, multidomestic industry 
is that in a global industry the centrally coordinated TNC will have a strategic advantage 
over the other three types of enterprises. In particular, in a global industry one would 
expect to see the TNCs predominate over the less coordinated MDEs and are likely to be 
more successful in terms of long term growth and survival. The success and long-term 
survival of the NGEs in a global industry will really depend on their contribution to the 
global activities of the TNCs; and MDEs will be forced to adopt global strategies thereby 
transforming themselves into TNCs ( Porter, 1986,p.28). Likewise, successful PGEs 
will ultimately mature into TNCs in their own right
The essence of the global strategy is strategic planning or coordination of activities over a 
number of country markets in order to take full advantage of the international 
interdependence of markets and industries.
There are two types of competitive advantage a TNC can attain in a global industry. First 
there is the competitive advantage that lowers costs per unit of output from the realisation 
of economies of scale due to the division and specialisation of labour within the 
enterprise. These cost advantages tend to be associated with maturing or mature 
industries. For instance, as the semiconductor industry developed and matured, scale 
became more important from the smaller innovative enterprises of Silicon Valley to the 
large concentrated semiconductor manufacturers in Japan.
The second type of competitive advantage is that derives from technological innovation 
and technological leadership which may come from the improvement of existing products 
or processes. Sometimes innovation may be through developing a completely new 
market,( for example, the personal computer market (Apple Macintosh)) acquiring first 
mover advantages. This competitive advantage is associated with the achievement of 
market power through product differentiation.
Porter (1986,p.20) points out that:
Competitive advantage is a function of either providing comparable buyer value more 
efficiently than competitors (low cost), or performing activities at comparable cost but in 
unique ways that create more buyer value than competitors and, hence, command a 
premium price (differentiation).
In particular industries there are potential benefits which come from the coordination of 
activities on a global basis, by speedily transferring the knowledge that can be transferred 
to other subsidiaries enabling subsidiaries to move down the learning curve much faster
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and give them a strategic advantage over their less -coordinated or multidomestic 
competitors.
Accordingly, centralised coordination is necessary if competitive advantage is to be 
derived from information flows (Porter, 1986,p.31). In multidomestic industries the 
information accumulated by country-based subsidiaries is generally country-specific and 
therefore of little use to other subsidiaries (Porter, 1986,p.l8). Inevitably, however, even 
in multidomestic industries, some knowledge will be globally useful.
In a global industry, country subsidiaries maintain a notional presence and become the 
receptors for information which is transmitted to the central coordinator. Scitec 
Communications Systems of Sydney, for instance, is reported to have established an 
office in the US in 1982 mainly as an 'eye and ears' branch rather than a marketing outlet 
for its first communications processor launched in the same year. (AFR, March 22, 
1989, >p42). Stopford and Turner (1985, p40) point out that:
No multinational can afford to be without an adequate mechanism designed both 
defensively for scanning and understanding what the opposition is doing around the 
world, and offensively for identifying new market opportunities. It is no longer adequate 
to monitor developments only in the countries where the firm is currently doing business.
A second source of competitive advantage for TNCs operating in a global industry is 
realised through the division and specialisation of labour. Porter (1986,p.31) points out 
that*
Coordination among dispersed activities also potentially improves the ability to reap 
economies of scale if subtasks are allocated among locations to allow some specialisation, 
for example; each R&D centre has a different area of focus.
The concentration of particular activities at certain locations gives rise to economies of 
agglomeration. Accordingly, a TNC can coordinate and configure its technological, 
marketing and production activities in such a way as to maximise realisation of these 
economies. The ability to shift operations in response to changing circumstances can 
provide substantial leverage to a traditional MNE over host governments. Finally, 
strategic coordination increases the flexibility of an enterprise in responding to its 
competitors.
In summary, MDEs and domestic competitors suffer a competitive disadvantage in global
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industries because o f their lack o f strategic coordination (Ghemawat and Spence, 1986,p.63) 
wheras on the other hand, in multidomestic industries they have the competitive advantage. The 
competitive advantage o f the global strategy comes In part from catering to the common elements 
o f international markets and from catering to the idiosyncratic elements in a multidomestic 
strategy.
Factors influencing the location and operation o f the subsidiaries o f multinational and transnational 
companies are shown in the figure.
W ith the emergence o f global industries, to study an industry in isolation o f the web o f global 
interrelationships into which firms have been thrust is to miss out on an essential part o f the 
dynamics o f modern industry. A  key characteristic o f the global industry is that domestic markets 
and domestic competitors have become less important and global competitors constitute the 
most potent threat and these do not necessarily play by the traditional rules.
M ult i 'C O unlry
scale
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STRATEGIES IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES
The use of multiple methodological tools has resulted in the identification of four composite 
strategies in global industries. These include :
(1) domestic, product specialization,
(2) exporting, high-quality offerings,
(3) international, product innovation, and
(4) global, combination strategies (Allen J .Morrison; 1990 . p i02).
In identifying strategy taxa or composite strategies, two broad strategy dimensions are isolated: 
-internationalization and 
-competitive positioning.
Within each of these two dimensions, four different strategy types were observed. This hierarchi­
cal classification of business strategies in global industries is reviewed in the following figure.The 
partitioning of composite business strategies provides a conceptually consistent framework for 
discussing the types of internationalization and competitive positioning activities that character­
ize the four group classification.
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGY DIMENSION





(4) global strategy dimensions.
These four internationalization strategy types are broadly interpreted from the emphasis that 
businesses placed on political, investment, and integration activities as they transcended national 
boundaries. Clear differences in how businesses stressed these conceptualized substrategies en­
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abled the iden tification  of a d iscrim inating in ternationalization  strategy 
dimension.(AllenJ.Morrison, 1990 ,p 103).
THE COMPETITIVE POSITIONING STRATEGY DIMENSION
Four distinct competitive positioning strategy types are identified in businesses competing in 
global industries, these were
(1) product specialization,
(2) high-quality offerings,
(3) product innovation, and
(4) combination based on complex innovation and marketing.
COMPOSITE STRATEGIES IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES
Competitive positioning and internationalisation:
While seperate dimensions of business strategy, are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are two 
essential components that every business must specify in developing an overall strategy. Indeed 
both dimensions work synergistically to determine overall patterns of strategic behaviour or, in 
the development of a strategy classification, actual composite strategies. Fayweather (1981,p25- 
36), for example, suggests four composite strategies:
(1) dynamic high technology model
(2) stable or low technology model
(3) advanced management skill model and
(4) unified logistic, labour transmission model.
Porter (1986) also suggests four strategic alternatives in global industries;
(1) broadline global ccompetition
(2) global focus
(3) national focus and
(4) protected niche.
IN D U S T R Y  G L O B A L IS A T IO N  D R IVER S
Few industries begin as global industries, but they tend to evolve into them over time. 
Triggers involve either establishing or enhancing the sources o f global competitive 
advantage or reducing or eliminating impediments to global competition. The latter w ill 
not lead to globalization, however, unless significant sources o f strategic advantage are 
present In all cases, it takes a strategic innovation by a firm  or firms to make the industry 
global even though economic or institutional changes may have created the potential
Industry globalization potential ,i.e., the likelihood that a global strategy w ill be effective 
depends on a combination o f four sets o f conditions:
Market, Cost, Government regulation and Competition (See Fig.)
Figure : INDUSTRY GLOBALISATION DRIVERS:
G lobalization  D rivers
Industrial globalization potential 
depends on four sets of condi­
tions: market, cost, government 
regulations, and competition.





















• Competitors Use Global Strategy
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The above case represents a comprehensive framework for diagonising industry globalisation 
potential.
The following conditions set the direction of markets and trends and are called globalisation 
drivers ( Globalizing Strategy: George Yip;Extract Published in Planning Review Jan.1991, 
Book to be Published later this year).
Market Drivers 
Global Channels -
The existence of global or regional channels of distribution spurs producers in an industry 
toward global marketing uniformity. These channels may expand the international scope of 
manufacturers while reducing the costs of distributors.
Transferable Marketing'
Trends towards globalization affect most global industries including global cultural convergence 
largely caused by satellite television and other multi-country media. For example, the global 
success of the movie “E.T.”, in which the appealing extra-terrestrial was fond of Reese’s Pieces, 
gave Hershey Foods the opportunity to promote that product world-wide, although Hershey did 
not mount such a campaign. The response of chocolate producers to the advent of globally 
transferable marketing is mixed. Their premium products, brand names and packaging already 
tend to be globally uniform. However, mass market products often use different brand names 
from country to country, even when the product is the same.
Common customer preferences
Common customer needs and tastes allow producers in any industry to market globally standard­
ized product.
Cost Drivers
There are also cost drivers which affect global markets and industries. Cost drivers for globalization 
in any industry depend on the economics of the individual businesses. They particularly affect 
how a business configures its network of activities.
Global Scale Economies
High manufacturing economies of scale in an industry encourage global market expansion, 
globally standardized products, and globally centralized production.
Reduced cost of adaptations
The impediment to global competition posed by national product differences is eased if firms can
64
create ways of lowering the cost of altering basic product to meet these local needs. Any 
innovation that modularizes a product for easy adaptation or increases its range of compatibility 
opens up possibilities for global competition. So do production technology changes that lower 
the cost of producing special varieties.
Logistics
In any industry, low transportation cost relative to value favours global market expansion, 
centralized global manufacturing, and competition among global rivals.
Differences in Country Skills and Costs
In some industries large differences among countries in skills and costs determine where manu­
facturers locate. That is, producers have many options in siting their plants.
High product-development costs
In actuality, national brand development in managing industries is economically unfeasible for 
small companies and highly risky for major firms. This encourages the major producers to 
globalize existing brands and centralise their development costs, rather than start new ones in 
each country and counter high product development costs and centralize their development 
costs..
Government Drivers'
The strength of government globalization drivers depends on the effect of rules set by national 
governments regarding trade, activities by foreign firms, and marketing regulations.
Trade Policies
Nationalistic trade policies can greatly constrain companies’ use of global strategy, particularly 
in terms of where the product is manufactured. Government policy changes that remove quotas, 
reduce tariffs, promote international cooperation on technical standards, and the like serve to 
increase the possibilities for global competition. For example, the formation of the European 
Economic community promoted a major increase of U.S. direct investment in Europe. As geo­
graphic markets become more similar in their economic and cultural circumstances as they react 
to a particular industry, the potential for world competition increases, provided sources of global 
advantage are present in the industry.
Compatible Technical Standards
Differences in technical standards pose a barrier to globalization in any industry. Regulations 
imposed by different governments have a significant competitive impact and must be taken into 
account when planning global moves.
Marketing Regulations
The special marketing regulations of individual countries affect the extent to which uniform 
global marketing approaches can be used. Sophisticated advertising agencies can produce adver­
tising themes that can be transferred from country to country. However localization of ads can 
be a crucial marketing factor. Critical cultural and regulatory barriers can thwart an international
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TV campaign. Comparative advertising and lotteries are forbidden by a number of countries, so 
campaigns with those themes would have limited scope.
Competitive Drivers.
Competitors Globalized,
Competitive drivers emerge in all industries, as competitors globalize by participating in more 
markets and rivalry increases. Powerful competitors intrude on each other’s turf. Growth impera­
tives increase competitive pressure. For example global initiatives in the chocolate industry, once 
spurred by the lure of international opportunities, have become increasingly defensive and pre­
emptive. The recent spate of foreign acquisitions, which proved the quickest route to global 
growth, has particularly heightened the need for industry players to have a global strategy for 
market participation.
Competitors Use Global Strategy
The more some competitors use global strategy-affecting global products, marketing, integrated 
competitive moves, and location of activities, as well as global market participation- the more 
need there is for other competitors to match them. One reason is that countries become strategi­
cally interdependent. When a competitor shares any value-adding activities across countries-such 
as central R&D or manufacturing-its market share in any one country affects its scale and overall 
cost position in the shared activities.
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THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION
The importance of the multinational enterprise in the global economy
A description and analysis of the behaviour of the integrated and diversified multinational 
enterprise is required as a first step to attaining an understanding of the nature of global 
competition ( Chandler, 1986,p.406). The essential feature of multinational enteiprises ( 
MNEs) is that these are companies which undertake productive activities outside the 
country in which they are incorporated ( Dunning, 1977, p.400). MNEs have also been 
described as companies which have taken on global markets by investing rather than 
exporting ( Stopford and Turner, 1985, p.17).
The importance of MNEs in the global economy can be gauged from the fact that, 
according to the UN, the largest 56 MNEs had sales ranging from $ US 10B to $ US 
100B in 1988. The largest 600 industrial companies are estimated to have accounted for 
between 20 to 25% of global production and between 80 and 90 % of the exports of the 
US and the UK ( The CTC reporter, No. 26, Autumn 1988, p p 2 ).
The typical MNE, however is not a giant company. It is reported that most MNEs are 
medium-sized companies with sales well below the $US IB mark and are based in the 
developed economies of the US, UK and Japan; however, MNEs which are based in the 
developing world are now becoming increasingly important participants in the global 
marketplace ( The CTC Reporter, No. 26, Autumn 1988, P.2).
The theory of the multinational enterprise
MNEs include both MDEs and TNCs . The economic theory of the multinational or 
international enterprise embraces a number of distinct specialisations including the 
theories of industrial organisation, international trade and international finance (Casson, 
1987, ppl). More recently the political influence of MNE's has been recognised, thereby 
introducing elements of political science into the explanation of MNE behaviour (Magge 
and Young; 1983 ; Boddewyn; 1988). This latter development is an explicit 
acknowledgement of the important relationship between host governments and 
multinational enterprises ( Piore and Sable, 1984, pp 9-10).
There are two popular explanations for the emergence of multinational enterprises as 
dominant forces in the global economy(BIE, 1989, p27). The first emphasises the role of
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multinational enterprises as a means of exploiting monopolistic advantage.
The first explanation of the emergence of multinational enterprises suggest that their 
primary role is to supersede markets and reduce international competition ( Hymer, 1976, 
p. 25 ) by exploiting the imperfections which occur in international markets. The major 
market imperfections include the existence of economies of scale, technological 
advantages, established distribution networks, product diversification and differential 
access to credit ( Bain, 1956 ; Dunning and Rungman, 1985, p; 229).
Proprietary knowledge can be an important element in the development of competitive 
advantage. Possession of internationally transferable proprietary knowledge is seen as a 
positive incentive to undertake multinational operations ( Casson, 1987,pv>2).
The second popular explanation for the emergence of MNEs suggests that a multinational 
type of organisation is superior in terms of efficiency for all sorts of international 
transactions. The multinational firm therefore performs the role of internalising many 
international market transactions. An essential precondition to internalising marketplace 
activities is the existence of market imperfections. (Dunning; 1977, pp404, Williamson, 
1981,p. 1537 and Teece, 1985,p. 235).
Transaction costs are much higher in some industries than in others and firms in these 
industries would have a greater incentive to internalise their transaction costs by adopting 
a multinational organisation ( Teece, 1983, Casson; 1985, Buckley and Casson; 1985, 
Chapter 2).
Buckley ( 1988, pp 181-2) points out that the internalisation theory of the TNC and the 
MNE is based on the following two general axioms:
(1) R im s choose the least cost location for each activity that they perform.
(2) Firms grow by internalising markets up to the point where the benefits of further 
internalisation are outweighed by the costs.
Internalisation, as Buckely (1988, pl83) goes on to suggest, allows firms to transfer 
price and select locations on the basis of their tax iegimes.The computer industry is one 
of the industries predicted by the internalisation theory to be dominated by MNEs 
according to Buckley (1988, pl83).
The notion of internalisation, with its emphasis on low cost locations, is quiet different 
from the notion of insideration which means that it is imperative for transnational 
corporations to participate in all of the major global markets regardless of location 
costs(BIE Research Report No. 30; 1989).
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Dunning (1977, 1988) has combined the above explanations of the emergence of 
multinational enterprises in his Eclectic theory of the multinational enterprise. Dunning 
identifies three different types of advantage that are necessary to explain the existence of 
multinational enterprises. These are ownership advantages, internalisation advantages and 
location advantages.
The distinctive feature of Dunning's Eclectic theory is that each of these advantages is 
complementary to the other in explaining the competitive edge achieved by MNEs 
operating in global industries. For instance, as Dunning (1977, p.407-8 ) points out;
... it is not the possession of technology per se which gives an enterprise selling goods 
embodying that technology to foreign markets ( irrespective of where they are produced) 
an edge over its competitors, but the advantage of internalising that technology, rather 
than selling it to a foreign producer for the production of those goods.
The main elements of the Eclectic theory of international production are outlined in the 
foil, table. Dunning's hypothesis is that a specific country characteristic has a tendency to 
generate a particular advantage. While the country-specific characteristic is, by definition, 
immobile the resulting ownership advantage may be mobile across national boundaries 
providing an incentive for firms to adopt a hierarchical, multinational and organisational 
framework in international markets in order to capitalise on their particular advantage 
(Dunning, 1979).
Tabi« Tha Eclectic Theory of International Production
1. O W N E R S H IP -S P E C IF IC  A D V A N T A G E S  (of enterprises of one  
nationality (or affiliates of sa m e ) over those of another):
(a ) W hich need not a rise  due to m ultinationality.
T h o se  due m ainly to s ize  and established position, 
p ro d u ct or p ro ce ss d iversificatio n, ability to take  
ad van tage  of d ivision of labour and specialisatio n , 
m onopoly pow er, better reso u rce  cap acity  and usage.
P rop rietary technolo gy, trade m arks (protected by 
patent and other legislatio n ).
E x c lu s iv e  or favoured a o ce ss to inputs, e .g . labour, 
natural re so u rce s, fin an ce, inform ation.
A bility to obtain Inputs on favoured term s (due to size  or m onopsonistic influence).
E x c lu s iv e  or favoured a c c e ss  to product m arkets.
G o vernm ent protection (e .g . control on m arket entry).
(b ) W hich those branch plants of established  
en terp rise s m ay enjoy over de novo firm s.
A c c e s s  to cap acity  (adm inistrative, m anagerial, R 4 D . 
m arketin g, etc.) of parent com pany at favoured prices.
E co n o m ie s of joint supply (not only in production but in 
p u rch a sin g , m arketing, finance and other arrangem ents).
(c )  W h ich  sp e cifica lly  a rise  b e cau se  of m ultinationality.
M u ltin a tio n a l^  e n h an ce s above advantages by offering 
w ider opportunities.
M ore favoured a c c e s s  to and or better know ledge about 
inform ation, in p u ts , m arkets.
A b ility  to take ad vantage of international differences in 
facto r endow m ents, m arkets.
A b ility  to d iversify  risk s, e .g . in different currency areas.
2. IN T E R N A U S A D O N -IN C E N T 1 V E  A D V A N T A G E S  (l.e. to protect against or exploit m arket failure)
A v o id a n ce  of fransaction  and negotiating oosts.
T o  avo id  oosts of enforcin g property rights.
B u ye r uncertainty (about nature and value of inputs, 
e .g . tech n o lo gy, being so ld ).
W h ere  m arket d o es not perm it price discrim ination.
N e ed  of se ller to protect quality of products.
T o  cap tu re  econo m ies of interdependent activities (see  
1(b) ab o ve ).
T o  co m p e n sate  for a b se n ce  of futures m arkets.
T o  avo id  or exploit governm ent intervention (e.g. 
q u o ta s, tariffs, price  oontrols. tax d ifferences, ete.).
T o  co n tro l su p p lie s and conditions of sa le  of inputs 
(in clu d in g  technolo gy).
T o  oontrol m arket outlets (including those that m ay be 
u se d  b y  com petitors).
T o  be a b le  to e n ga ge  in p ractices, e.g. 
cro ss-su b sid isa tio n , predatory pricing a s a 
co m petitive  (or anti-com petitive) strategy.
3. L O C A T IO N -S P E C IF IC  V A R IA B L E S  (Th e se  m ay favour home or host co untries):
S p a tia l distribution of inputs and m arkets.
In put p ric e s , quality and productivity, e g. labour, 
e n e rg y , m ateria ls, com ponents, sem ifinished goods.
T ra n sp o rt and com m unication co sts.
G o ve rn m en t intervention.
C o n tro l on im ports (including tariff barriers), tax rates 
in ce n tiv e s, clim ate for investm ent, political stability, etc.
In frastru ctu re  (com m ercial, lega l, transportation).
P s y c h ic  d ista n ce  (la n gu a ge , cultural, b u sin e ss custom s, 
a n d  other d ifferen ces).
E co n o m ie s  o f R A D  production and m arketing (e g. extent to 
w h ich  s c a le  eco n o m ies m ake for centralisation of 
p ro d u ctio n ).
Source: D u n n in g  (1 9 7 9 , p. 276)
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Potential links between ownership advantages and underlying host country characteristics 
are outlined in the foil table:
Specific ownership advantages imparts a competitive edge to MNEs operating in 
particular industries.
C A n e rs h ip -s p e a fic  A d v a n ta ge s
1. S iz e  of fum  (e  g  eco n o m ies of 
s c a le , product d ive rsificatio n )
2. M anagem ent and o rgan isatio n al 
e xp ertise
3. T e ch n o lo g y -b a se d  a d v an tage s
4. Labour-intensive and/or small 
scale technologies
5. Pro d u ct differentiation, 
m arketing e co n o m ies
6. A c c e s s  to (d o m e stic) m arkets
O w n e rsh ip -sp e cific  A d v a n ta ge s
7. A c c e s s  to. or know ledge about, 
n atu ra l re so u rce s
6. C a p ita l availab ility  an d  
fin an cia l e xp e rtise
H o st Cou ntry C h aracterist.es
Large  and standard ised  
m arkets.
Liberal attitude tow ards m ergers, 
co nglo m erates, industrial 
concentration.
A vailability of m anagerial staff; 
educational an d  '
training facilities 
(e .g . b u sin e ss sch o o ls). S ize  of 
m arkets etc.
G o od R A O  facilities.
G overnm ent support of innovation. 
A vailability of skilled  m anpow er 
and in som e c a s e s  of local 
m aterials.
Plentiful labour su p p lies; G ood  
tech n ician s. E xp e rtise  of sm all 
firm /consultancy operation.
N ational m arkets with reasonab ly  
high in co m es; h igh  incom e  
elasticity of dem and. A ccep tan ce  
of ad vertising and other p ersu asive  
m arketing m ethods. Con su m er 
tastes an d  culture.
La rge  m arkets. No governm ent 
control on im ports. Liberal attitude 
to e xclu siv e  d ealin g.
H o st C ou ntry C h a racte ristics
Lo ca l availab ility of reso u rces  
en co u rages export of that 
know ledge and/or p ro ce ssin g  
activities. A ccu m ulated  experience  
or expertise required for resource  
exploitation/processing.
G ood and re liab le  capital m arkets 
and p ro fessio n al ad vice .
Source: D u n ning (1 9 7 9 , p. 2 8 0 ).
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According to the Eclectic theory, therefore, specific country characteristics are linked to 
specific ownership, location and internalisation advantages. The later, in turn, explain the 
success of a particular country's MNEs or TNCs in certain global industries .
Dunning (1981, p.99) points out that,
The growth of the modem MNE may be explained in terms of the growth of ownership 
advantages of enterprises. Particularly in knowledge and resource intensive industries. A 
country with a history of above-average expenditures on R&D or with a relatively skilled 
labour force will enjoy a competitive advantage in technology and skill intensive 
industries ( Dunning, 1979,p.28).
However, the international enterprise is in a constant state of evolution ( Buckley, 1988). 
The movement of parts of the computer and semiconductor industries off-shore to Asia 
and Europe from the US during the 1970s is an example of the evolutionary process 
whereby competitive advantage shifts from location to location over time. Government 
intervention can ultimately change the nature of a country's international industrial 
advantage (BIE, 1989, p29-33).
Likewise, as the process of globalisation gains pace, the MNEs themselves have been 
exhibiting new behavioural patterns- they are now tending to relax their control over 
international production while tightening their control over international distribution 
channels and sub contract production, while maintaining tight control of key core 
functions such as R&D, quality control, marketing and distribution ( Buckley, 
1988,p.l83).
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T he evolution of the  tran snationa l corporation;
The globally integrated TNC today is regarded as, currently, the highest evolutionary 
stage of the multinational enterprise. Three main types of multinational enterprise 
preceded the modem transnational corporation ( Casson, 1987, p.2). These were:
a) The US based multinational enterprise predominant in the 1950 s and early 1960 s. 
These undertook import-substituting FDI in Europe and other developing countries, 
mainly in response to the erection of tariff barriers in the post war period.
b) The European-based multinational enterprises which integrated backwards into 
agriculture and minerals in the colonies during the 1920s and 1930s.
c) The Japanese multinational enterprises which invested in the low-wage new industrial 
countries of South-East Asia during the 1970s (BIE Report No.30; 1989,p33).
The European and North American multinational enterprises, referred to above, tended to 
take on a decentralised type of organisation . These multinational enterprises emerged in 
an era of tariffs and other forms of protection. Example include the motor vehicle 
manufacturers General Motors and Ford.
The decentralised, federated type of organisation is based on the implementation of 
multidomestic strategies. Controls between multinational enterprise headquarters and 
foreign subsidiaries are quiet loose and the lines of control are relatively simple ( Bartlett, 
1986, p.373). Strategic decision-making is completely decentralised. Indigenous 
personnel may occupy the top-level positions of the subsidiaries with the result that, 
although wholly foreign owned, these subsidiaries are perceived by host governments as 
indigenous companies.
Most of the managers of multinational enterprise subsidiaries who were interviewed by 
BIE, Canberra (BIE Report No.30, 1989,p35)) took pains to persuade that their particular 
enterprise operated a decentralised federation type of model. They stressed that foreign 
subsidiaries were largely autonomous of head office when it came to the important 
decisions affecting country-specific operations. There was a distinct impression on the 
part o f these mangers that host governments such as the Australian Government would 
tend to favour more independent subsidiaries.
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Japanese global firms have traditionally, provided an example of the centralised hub 
organisational m odel. This global organisation is characterised by very tight, but simple, 
controls with all strategic decisions being carried out at the centre ( i.e Japan). Thus the 
organisation is more export-oriented than the globally dispersed decentralised federation 
model. Further, the tight central control means that such an organisation is extremely 
communications and people intensive (Bartlett, 1986,pp373-4). Many of the major 
information technology transnational corporations operating in Australia evince similar 
characteristics to the centralised hub organisational model. Tight head-office control is 
usually looked upon unfavourably by host governments seeking to maintain, at least, the 
appearance of independence from multinational influence.
The increasing coordination of dispersed activities has been brought about by the same 
forces underlying the globalisation of industry. The forces include free trade agreements, 
declining transport costs, deregulation and consequent advances in communications 
technology and the new CAD/CAM technologies. These forces have given rise to the 
integration of the whole global (Japanese style) and multinational (European and North 
American) type of corporate organisations to bring about a new globally-integrated but 
still nationally differentiated type of organisational structure (KPMG, 1988,P .l). This 
new type of organisational structure, is called the transnational model (Bartlett, 
1986,p377). It is characterised by tight but complex lines of control and coordination. Its 
major feature is that strategic decisions are shared throughout the global corporate 
network.An important feature of these new, but strategically integrated global corporate 
organisations is that they provide scope for the decentralised location of design, 
manufacturing and R&D centres. In other words, the new transnational model allows for 
the development of centres of excellence throughout the global network (BIE Report 
No.30, 1989,p35). Accordingly, there is an incentive for the host governments to 
compete to influence the transnational corporations in their choice of strategic activities 
such as manufacturing operations and R&D.
74
TYPES OF MNE ACTIVITIES
Investment to Supply the Local Market
If firms of one nationality choose to supply foreign markets from a local production base 
rather than by exports, then it is assumed this is because advantages favour the host 
rather than the home country. The product cycle theory of investment suggests there is a 
natural progression from exports to foreign production. Thomas Horst (1974) has 
estimated that in the early stages of foreign production by US firms, US exports increase 
along with the production; in those cases where it is realistic to assume the foreign 
investment substitutes for domestic or other foreign investment in the host country, it 
may permit exports to be higher than they otherwise would have been ( Reddaway et al., 
1968; Haufbauer and Adler, 1968; Stopford and Turner, 1985).
There are many ways in which exports of the home country might be directly increased 
or reduced as a result of an internalized transfer of technology. For example a firm's 
products may bring with it economies of increased size and scope, and the spreading of 
organisation and administrative overheads and R&D expenditure and where there are 
pressures on the firm's domestic operations, production abroad may release capacity for 
more productive use at home. There may be technological feedback from the affiliate to 
the parent company, firms may be better able to take advantage of the geographical 
diversification o f activities in their purchasing arrangements, fund raising and 
management recruitment, protect themselves against exchange rate changes, engage in 
transfer price manipulation and so on.
Resource based investment
The purpose of this investment is usually to supply the home firm or country and other 
countries with resources. The technology required for exploration, extraction and 
processing, together with the large amount of capital required, gives MNEs advantages 
over domestic competitors in a number of industries. Here there is no substitution 
between foreign and domestic investm ent; it may also strengthen the technological 
capacity of home companies in engineering, chemical design, consultancy and 
maintenance work.
In some cases, technology transfer to promote secondary processing activities may be at 
the expense of secondary processing in domestic markets. But the basic equation is the
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relationship between social and private opportunity costs. The amount or kind of 
technology transferred may be too high because FDI confers lower net benefits from a 
social rather than a private viewpoint
Export Platform Investment
It is the transfer of technology associated with this kind of investment which is likely to 
have the most effect on domestic employment as it is concentrated in labour-intensive 
activities and firms do have options on the locations of their export platform investment. 
There are two forms of this kind of investment The first one is to produce (Natural) 
resources-intensive goods in labour and resource-rich countries ; and capital or 
technology-intensive goods in countries that are rich in capital and technology.
The second kind of export platform investment is in labour-intensive parts of a production 
process for sale in world markets, the capital or technology-intensive part of the 
production being produced in the capital or technology-rich countries. Again, this 
conforms to the principle of the international division of labour, except in so far as the 
action is promoted by distorted markets or government policies.
It is strongly criticised because the critics believe that, without it, the adverse effects on 
domestic employment can more easily be arrested. The fact that if the home country's 
MNEs did not invest other firms would do so, and compete the home firms out of the 
markets, cuts no ice, because it is also argued that this can be prevented by import 
controls. But, it is not the transfer of technology by MNEs per se which is the root of the 
concern, but the general dissemination of technology.
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COUNTRY COMPETITION FOR GLOBALLY INTEGRATED FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT
A method favoured by countries for promoting the growth of strategic sectors is to attract the major 
foreign multinational corporations to develop production, research and development facilities within 
their borders. There are many attendant benefits from an active transnational presence. Further, 
foreign direct investment(FDI) may be a relatively cheaper or more practical method for a small open 
economy such as Australia to participate in global industries currently dominated by multinationals 
from Europe, North America and Japan.
It is pertinent here to explain the existence of some sort of Verdoon effect and Cumulative Causation 
model which some commentators invoked to explain the phenomenal growth of IT industry in the 
Santa Clara County of California.
The cumulative causation model
The process of cumulative causation is driven by increasing returns. The foil. Figure provides an 
illustration of the process in action. The model is an adaptation of the regional growth models of 
Dixon and Thirwall (1975) and Cantwell (1987).
The first step in the process is illustrated in the top right-hand quadrant of the figure. This is the 
positive linear relationship between productivity growth and output growth which is known as the 
Verdoon effect. This relationship, which is described by the line AB in the figure, is also referred to as 
a technological progress function in the literature. The argument implicit in the line AB is that an 
increase in output (q) will generate an increase in productivity (y) through the achievement of 
economies of scale.
The activities of multinational corporations have a direct impact on the slope of the technological 
progress function (AB). The existence of subsidiaries of multinational corporations in a host country 
speeds up the diffusion of technological change. In addition, the agglomeration of multinational 
enterprises leads to increases in the level of technological competition. As a result, a given increase in 
the size of the market will generate more technological progress in locations with substantial 
multinational presence than in locations lacking multinational presence. Hence there is a direct 
relationship between the extent and the significance of the multinational presence and the slope of the 
technological progress function (AB).
A mod«I of cumulative causation 77
q represents output growth 
I represents employment growth 
y represents productivity growth, ie. y ■ q -l 
P represents the rate of growth of phces 
x represents the rate of growth of export demand
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The economies which accrue to an industry as a result of agglomeration are to be distinguished from 
the returns which are primarily due to increases in the size of the industry as a result of the expansion 
of export markets. The former affect the slope of the technical progress function while the latter are 
reflected by a movement along the technical progress function ( AB ). In countries or locations with 
little activity by multinational companies and , hence, little scope for realising economies of 
agglomeration, the slope of the technological progress function will be lower ( Cantwell, 1987a ).
The deflation function CD, shown in the top left-hand quadrant of the figure, translates productivity 
gains into domestic price reductions. The export demand function EF, in the bottom left-hand 
quadrant, translates the price reductions into export demand growth.
The final step in this circle of growth is a relationship between the rate of growth of exports and the 
rate of growth of output shown in the bottom right-hand quadrant of the figure. Thus a rise in exports 
increases the level of sustainable output growth which then increases productivity growth, thereby 
initiating the process again in what is described as a virtuous circle of growth. In this way once a 
location attains a start, the process keeps on repeating thereby sustaining the initial advantage (Dixon 
and Thirlwall, 1975, p.201)
It is worthwhile noting that the model discussed above is extremely sensitive to underlying 
assumptions regarding the nature of economic relationships. The outward spiralling 'virtuous' cycle of 
growth result, of course, depends critically on the slope and shape of the various functions, i.e. the 
productivity effect (AB), the deflation function ( CD ), the export function ( E F ), and the sustainable 
growth relationship ( OG ). For instance, if productivity is relatively unresponsive to scale ( i.e. AB is 
relatively fla t) then the model will yield a relatively stable growth rate ( q ). Likewise, a relatively high 
income elasticity of demand for imports ( i.e. the line OG rotates towards the axis Ox ) will produce a 
'vicious' inwardly spiralling growth result (i.e. continually declining growth of output).
Further, as noted above international competitiveness and consequently the demand for exports is 
becoming less dependant on price advantages and more related to such things as technological 
leadership. Nevertheless, some commentators have invoked the existence of some sort of verdoon 
effect and cumulative causation type of model to explain the phenomena growth of IT industry in the 
Santa Clara county of California and Central Scotland ( Henderson and Scott, 1987 ).
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In a world characterised by technological competition, increasing returns and the locational advantages 
based on the agglomeration of activities, mutual reinforcement and complementarities in research and 
development, unless a country is already an established location for MNCs or their subsidiaries, then 
it must usually rely on special incentives to bring its potential as a global platform to the attention of 
multinational corporate headquarters. As a result, the competition between governments for FDI is 
something like the competition between producers for market share with the MNCs holding the whip 
hand as the suppliers of scarce new FDI ventures (Encamation and Wells, 1986, p. 271)
The private benefits of globally integrated FDI are those which accrue directly to multinational 
corporations, while the social benefits of foreign direct investment accrue to the host country. FDI can 
foster resource-based developments, import substitution, or the establishment of export-platform of 
globally integrated operation bringing about a beneficial transfer of technology to indigenous firms, 
open up access for indigenous firms to new intra-company, global production and distribution and 
increase employment. FDI is again highly prized because of the informational impact it generates in 
terms of the signal to the international business community that it is a credible participant in the global 
market place. However, as the country becomes a preferred destination for globally integrated FDI and 
is already a global platform for many multinational companies, the benefits of promoting the 
establishment of further multinational subsidiaries decline and ultimately, it is possible that negative 
net benefits on the establishment of further MNC subsidiaries which may occur to the host country 
due to the promotion of vicious cycles of growth in other sectors or the perceived loss of control over 
the domestic economy that is an inevitable consequence of excessive MNC presence. Also, the 
activities of MNCs and their consequent demands on scarce labour and capital resources may make 
things extremely difficult for indigenous firms operating within the industry.The following model is 
developed by the BIE , Canberra ( Report No.3G, 1990, p i 1-15).
Accordingly, the benefits of attracting another foreign multinational subsidiary are much smaller for a 
host country with a very extensive multinational presence than for a host country with very little 
multinational presence.
The attractiveness of a country as a site for globally integrated FDI corresponds to the potential 
benefits individual multinational companies can derive from operating inside that country (Porter, 
1986, P. 39). In the absence of specific incentive packages, the benefits of locating a subsidiary in a 
particular host country come from sharing in the available economies of agglomeration and from 
insiderisation. The best example of the role of economies of agglomeration has been the Santa Clara 
(Silicon) Valley of California, other examples which will be discussed later in this Report include the












concentration of specialised IT facilities in Ireland, the central valley of Scotland, Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Tokyo.
The private benefits to a multinational corporation of locating a subsidiary in a particular country, and 
hence the attractiveness of that country as a location, is positively related to the number of 
multinational subsidiaries already domiciled in the country.
The benefits to the entrant foreign multinational from agglomeration and insideration rise with the 
number and significance of the presence of the foreign multinational companies already operating in 
the country. Again the benefits from agglomeration and insiderisation will be much higher in the new 
high technology, knowledge-intensive or high value-added industries. At some point the 
private(i.e.MNC) benefits of establishing an MNC subsidiary are equal to the social (i.e.host country) 
benefits.
Countries with very little existing multinational presence may be induced to intervene and to provide 
multinational companies with additional incentives to locate facilities on their soil in order to bridge the 
gap between private benefits to the MNC subsidiary and social benefit. The extent of the incentive 
really depends on the divergence between the benefits. As suggested already, this depends on the 
significance of the existing multinational company presence.The justification for government 
intervention invokes the familiar market failure argument.
However MNCs are able to make use of their locational flexibility to advantage in bargaining with 
countries with less significant transnational company presence ( Pitelis; 1988,p.8). However when the 
host country holds the bilateral bargaining power there is absolutely no role for location incentives 
such as tax holidays or the establishment of technology parks. Indeed, a host government finding 
itself in this envious position might not only ration the entry of globally integrated foreign direct 
investment, but also consider appropriating some of the benefits of agglomeration through its tax 
regime if it does already do so.
It is worthwhile pointing out that an effective system of location incentives should attract additional 
Multinational presence and ultimately, the program should be able to be discarded as Multinationals 
enter and the benefits of agglomeration begin to be realised, thereby attracting other MNCs and 
providing spin-off benefits to indigenous MNCs.
V
All else being equal, globalisation of industry tends to reduce the bilateral bargaining power of host 
countries while the increasing technological sophistication of industry tends to strengthen the 
bargaining position of host governments. In other words, according to the model developed above,
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there will be more of a tendency for governments to adopt a strategic approach to international trade 
policy in global industries and intervention will tend to be more effective ( Less costly) in the high 
technology industries than in less technology-intensive industries.
MNCs have quite clear perceptions of the relative positions of countries on the host country benefits 
spectrum. These are provided by consultants in each industry who furnish information for prospective 
foreign direct investors.
Furthermore, the Asia-Pa;cific region-from South Korea in the North to Australia and New Zealand in 
the South, is one of the most 'watched' regions in the world because of its recent growth performance 
and its proximity to Japan, the major new source of globally integrated FDI. With the continuing 
appreciation of the Yen, Japanese companies have been rapidly increasing their investment in the 
region. The competition for Japanese direct investment, and its attendant benefits in the form of 
technology transfer and increased exports to other subsidiaries, places Australia in direct competition 
with other countries within the region.
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THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
Objectives of Industry policy
The paramount objective of Australia's industry policy is to improve the international 
competitiveness of indigenous industry and to increase the level of integration of national 
enterprises within the world economy (DITAC, Annual Reportv 1988, P.150). In 
Australia's case, under the present circumstances, this is taken to imply measures to 
increase exports of manufactures and services and to replace imports with domestic 
products to help Australia achieve higher levels o f employment creation, economic 
growth and prosperity in the longer term.
A similar strategy is being pursued by other industrialised countries with similar balance 
of payments constraints. But even countries such as Japan and Federal Republic of 
Germany, without balance of payments problems, feel the needs, particularly in the IT 
sector.
The Existence of Strategic Sectors and the rationale for government 
intervention :
Industrial sectors exhibit real differences in technological and dynamic or exponential 
returns to scale. Further, global competitive advantage in particular sectors is seen to be 
more dependent on technological leadership than in others. As a result, these 
technologically driven sectors can, potentially, grow much faster than other sectors of the 
economy.
A strategic sector which presents the possibility for appropriating monopoly economic 
rents ( arising from first mover advantages) will be characterised by a relatively fast rate 
of technological progress, together with rapidly changing technological leadership that 
provides substantial market power and an entry into global m arkets. In a strategic sector, 
successful indigenous firms are able to earn significantly higher returns than in other 
sectors o f the economy (Krugman, 1986, p.16). This notion of a strategic sector is 
predicated on the existence of monopoly rents which can, potentially, be appropriated by 
any firm, technological leadership of the local research community and potential for 
developing linkages between the scientific and business communities in the 
commercialisation of resulting technological breakthroughs.
Certain strategic sectors yield important external benefits thereby giving rise to virtuous
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cycles o f growth within the host country. The major problem for industry policy is to 
identify strategic sectors which offer positive returns to intervention. Governments must 
be concerned that, by targeting particular sectors, vicious cycles o f decline are not 
initiated in other less favoured sectors of the economy.
The focus o f industry policy on the IT industry denotes a recognition on the part of 
governments that IT is a key or strategic sector which will play a major role in the future 
development of their economies and accordingly, has experienced substantial intervention 
by governments not only of advanced industrial nations but also by governments of the 
newly industrialising countries (NICs), governments o f the less developed countries 
(LDCs) and governments of the small open economies like Norway, Sweden and 
Australia.
A major reason for government intervention in a strategic sector is the idea of market 
failure. Governments, therefore, may intervene to ensure that the social benefits of 
investment in strategic sectors are not totally disregarded so long as social benefits yielded 
exceed the private benefits to the enterprises within that sector(BIE, Report No.30, 
1989,p54).
High technology industries such as the IT industry with its data processing and 
communications segments, for instance, provide the systems which are crucial to the 
productivity and hence the competitiveness of most manufacturing, mining, service and 
even modem agricultural enterprises.
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THE BREAKTHROUGH OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRY IN JAPAN AS AN ENGINE FOR CREATING NEW 
DEMANDS
Technological innovation and induced structural change within industry are the major 
driving forces behind progress in industrial society. The following Fig provides 
statistical confirmation of the remarkable structural changes that have occurred in the 
labour composition of both American and Japanese societies and notes the growth of the 
information sector, which has now become the leading sector, surpassing all other sectors 
o f the economy. Figure divides the economy into four sectors-agriculture, 
manufacturing, information and the service industries-in terms of employment on the 
basis of statistical estimates provided for the United States by Porat (1977) and for Japan 
by the Research Institute of Telecommunications and Economics ( 1983). The three 
turning points for changes in industrial structure are depicted by A l, A2 and A3 in the 
case of United States and by J l ,  J2 and J3 in the case of Japan. A l and J1 indicate the 
year that the manufacturing sector surpassed the agricultural sector, A2 and J2 the year 
that the information sector overcame the manufacturing sector and A3 and J3 the year that 
the service sector eclipsed the manufacturing sector. In the US the information sector 
began to absorb the largest share of labour in approximately 1960; in Japan the same 
phenomenon occurred around 1980. Although Japan’s structural changes have followed 
the American pattern, they have taken place in a much shorter time span.
In other words technology was and will be used to revitalise agriculture and 
manufacturing and the service sector was and will grow as a result of utilisation of 
information technology and through joint ventures with firms in the Information 
technology sector not only in Japan & US but the world over.
Likewise, the compilation and distribution of information constitutes the core of the new 
industrial society and forms the basis for many recent improvements in office 
productivity.
With social or economy wide benefits in mind, a government may be prompted to 
intervene and to offer additional incentives to multinational investors where the private 
incentive fails to yield the requisite level of investment in the strategic sector.
A second rationale for government intervention is to stimulate innovative activity or the 











Figure . CHANGING INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN JAPAN 
AND UNITED STATES
Source: Research Institute of Telecommunications and Economics (RITE), Tokyo.
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appropriated by enterprises based in other countries. It is argued that the capture of these 
rents brings about a net increase in economic welfare ( Krugman, 1986, p.13 ). This 
argument for intervention is predicted on the existence, momentarily, of an imperfectly 
competitive market in which the technological leaders can exercise market power. The 
implication is that these rents are there for the taking and that without government 
intervention, national industry would miss out. The argument implies a very narrow 
definition of entrepreneurship in that it presumes that entrepreneurs require government 
direction and assistance to go out and press a competitive advantage in national and 
international markets.
One of the principal arguments for government intervention in the IT industry, has rested 
upon the need to protect the domestic industry from the competitive advantage enjoyed by 
rivals already receiving and benefiting from considerable government support. For 
e.g.,the heavy investment by the DoD in the US semiconductor industry during the 1960s 
and 1970s gave American companies, including Texas Instruments and Intel, an 
important competitive edge, which, in the absence of similar assistance, others seemed 
unlikely to erode (Computer Science and Technology Board; 1990,pl3).
A study by the US International Trade Commission ( USITC) (quoted in Keeping the 
U.S. Computer Industry competitive; Computer Science and Technology Board; 
1990,p 14) defines
" industrial targeting " as coordinated government actions taken to direct productive 
resources to help domestic producers in selected industries become more competitive " 
(USITC 1983, p.17 ). So defined, targeting entails four basic elements :
1) Government initiatives to compensate for market failures
2) singling out only certain industries for preferential treatment
3) preferential allocation of finite resources, and
4) enhancing the competitiveness of domestic producers.
Government purchasing has traditionally played a strong role in the emergence of global 
competitive advantage and the development of TNCs. Often, a product design or 
marketing advantage will come from an enterprise's earlier work on government 
contracts. The US computer sector is a creature of government industry cooperation, 
motivated by a strategic interest, namely, national security. During and after World War 
II, the Department of Defence funded will over half of the research that resulted in the 
first electronic computers, and it supported much of the work that led to subsequent 
refinem ents and innovations that made the machines commercial products. A 
Congressional Committee estimated that in 1959, 85 % of electronics R&D in the US was
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funded by the federal government. More than half of IBM's R&D during the 1950s was 
conducted under government contract, and even after the commercialisation of computers 
had begun, over a third was government supported in 1963 (Computer Science and 
Technology Board, 1990,p 14).
The US government's influence extends over many of the important technological 
developments in computer hardware and software, sometimes creating marketing niches 
effectively exploited by IBMs US based competitors. For e.g., time sharing, a product of 
work supported by what is now known as the Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency, was a boon to the Digital Equipments Corporation, whose PDP-6 computer was 
the first commercially available machine to offer the feature. Today the federal 
government, primarily through the Department of Defence, continues to fund much of the 
basic research in computer science and engineering, such as studies of gallium arsenide 
and other nonsilicon semiconducting materials. Some of today's leading-edge computing 
technologies - among them, parallel processing and artificial intelligence - are outgrowths 
of military supported projects.
The USITC goes on to identify the use of five targeting techniques in Japan :
1) home market protection
2) preferential tax treatment
3) selective exemptions from antitrust
4) promotion of science and technology and
5) subsidies.
The later success of the Japanese in the semiconductor industry is attributed to 2 forms of 
intervention by the Japanese Government First, the Japanese protected their home market 
during the infancy and adolescence of the industry. Subsequently semiconductor tariffs 
were reduced and ultimately eliminated in 1985. Coordination of the Japanese industry by 
the Ministry for International Trade and Industry ( Mi l l  ) in the 1980s has taken the form 
of fostering joint research programs by Japanese semiconductor producers ( OECD, 
1989, p.21 ).
The Japanese government also promoted demand for computers through its own 
procurement This extends to national universities and government affiliated institutions, 
and included situations where Japanese products were not the most appropriate or the 
least expensive. Japan is not, of course, unique in this regard, although it has perhaps 
gone further than most countries. To counter IBM s strength in rentals, the government 
created JECC ( Japan Electronic Computer Corporation ) in 1961 to buy computers from
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seven major Japanese manufacturers and lease them. During its first 20 years JECC 
purchased over $7B worth of computer equipment ( D.I. Okimoto, 1984,p i 10).
There is some evidence that a strong domestic base may not necessarily be a pre-requisite 
to success in international markets. It has been suggested that small, innovative, 
entrepreneurially driven US companies have gone into world markets much faster than 
traditional exporters who like to establish a strong domestic base prior to entering the 
major Triad markets. These companies, members of the American Business Conference 
(ABC), compete by going transnational very early in their corporate lifetime. They set up 
overseas subsidiaries or acquire overseas factories and laboratories as a venue into the 
foreign markets ( Econom ist^ June 1988, p .62 ).
It is noticeable that some Australian PGEs are following a similar path. In a recent report 
it was noted that some Australian telecommunications equipment suppliers had achieved 
credible success in foreign markets. Telecom Australia, it was reported, was not a major 
customer of these firms ( NIEIR, 1988, p.55).
Another form of government intervention which is increasingly becoming popular is the 
establishment of joint ventures between the government and private firms to develop a 
particular technology for eg. the Japanese VLSI Technology Research Association. 
Subsequently, commercialisation of the resultant product is handed over to their 
participating firms. This sort of intervention has been contributing to the leadership of 
Japanese TNCs in VLSI technology BEE Report No.30; 1989,p56 ).
Likewise, the Nordic telecommunications companies, Ericsson in Sweden and Nokia in 
Finland, owe their success to joint ventures with the government and strategically planned 
government purchasing programs (Dalum, Fagerberg an4 Jorgenson, 1988,p.l33). 
Thus, even in small countries, governments and firms can interact to create new, long 
term technological capability and competitive advantage in a predominantly global sector 
of an industry.
Again, government tendering requirements and government agencies often exercise 
considerable influence in the development of industry standards and give indigenous 
TNCs a substantial advantages in local and international markets. It is argued that a 
substantial increase in UNIX sales can be credited to the combined efforts of General 
Motors and the US Government, both of which gave substantial boost to the growth 
prospects of particular US TNCs (for e.g., the growth of the US Pyramid Company} 
O^FR, 26 Sep. 1988, p48 ).
90
John Zysman argues that the nature o f a country's financial system holds the key to its 
capacity to administer industrial policy ( Zysman, 1983, p 55-95). Righdy levered 
companies look to the state to provide not only preferential loans and R&D subsidies but 
also a whole range of other supportive policies, including quick and effective 
countercyclical measures, stable interest rates, and trade assistance. MITTs ability to 
intervene effectively in the economy through the vehicle of industrial policy has also been 
gready facilitated by the states extensive regulatory control over financial institutions. 
MTITs capacity to persuade private companies to take a long term view of their collective 
interests, makes Japan one of the few countries in the world that has demonstrated an 
ability to organise a series of ambitious national research projects (Daniel I Okimoto, 
1984).
To conclude the functional requirements of government intervention or policy a re :
-Coming from behind and catching up with foreign front runners
-Staving off the threat of being overwhelmed by foreign Goliaths
-Compensating for deficiencies in the market mechanism that lead to neglect of basic
research
-Offsetting the high uncertainties, risks, and costs associated with R&D
-Ensuring that adequate supplies of capital are allocated to the information industry
-Providing optimal tax provisions and incentives
-Avoiding needlessly wasteful duplication of national R&D efforts
-Achieving research economies of scale
-Creating a climate conducive to vigorous market competition
-Facilitating the diffusion of technology
-Coming up with ways of generating greater domestic demand
-Promoting related and end-user industries
-Handling international trade and investment issues
-Taking care o f all relevant legal matters ( e.g., patent protection, antitrust )
-Providing for the education of technological manpower.
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Governments and locational choice
One area where governments can and apparently do exercise considerable influence on 
TNCs is in the choice of location for their manufacturing plants or their research facilities. 
The specific location advantages identified by Dunning (1980, p. 18) have already been 
explained.
Directly and indirectly, government policy has considerable influence on most of the 
locational variables mentioned above. In some areas, however, government policy may 
not be able to exercise a major influence to remedy inherent problems. For instance, the 
industrial relations environment generally and the degree of unionisation of the 
workforce. It has been argued that the relocation of the US semiconductor industry from 
the North-Eastern States to the Santa Clara Valley in California from the mid-1950s was 
due in large part to this problem.
This is not to say that the industrial relations climate is the major determinant of locational 
choice.The tariff policies of the EEC promoted the setting up of US semiconductor plants 
in Europe. Further,in spite of a highly unionised workforce, Scotland was successful in 
attracting a disproportionate share of these plants because of the availability of a steady 
supply of highly skilled labour and a stable political environment. In addition the British 
Government provided up to 22 % of initial development costs as an incentive to attract 
new investment into central Scotland and other depressed areas of Britain ( Henderson 
and Scott, 1987, p.69 ). One locational advantage that central Scotland had over other 
British locations was 'an existing corpus of plants with strong potential linkages to and 
from the semiconductor industry ' and the potential for realising economies of 
agglomeration, thereby setting in train a virtuous cycle of development in much the same 
way as occurred in Silicon Valley in the period from the mid -1950s to the mid 1960s 
(BIE Report No.30; 1989,p57).
It is apparent that the government can influence a country's locational advantages in the 
sense that the incentives offered may be instrumental in determining whether a country 
becomes a global platform or is left out of the TNCs global networks. Guisinger (1986) 
suggests that if incentives are defined to cover tariffs, trade controls, tax holidays, 
subsidised loans, cash grants, and other fiscal or taxation measures then more than forty 
specific incentive measures are identifiable. The .table provides a list
o f these incentives and disincentives and the resultant effect they may have on the after­
tax return to the foreign direct investor.
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Guisinger (1986) reports the result of a study in which data on multinational enterprises 
in four industries - foodproducts, motor vehicles, computers, and petrochemicals - was 
compiled covering 74 TNC location decisions, indicated that approximately two-thirds of 
the investment would have been located elsewhere if the government location incentives 
in their existing country of domicile had been withdrawn. The investments unaffected by 
the incentives were largely located on the basis of market or raw material proximity except 
in the food products industry.
However there is the problem that successive rounds of competitive bidding between 
countries may be counterproductive,particularly for the less developed countries. 
Guisinger ( 1986, p.166) points out:
This dependence of outcome on the strategies of other participants in a particular process 
is characteristic of 'the prisoner's dilemma’. In the case of incentives, the prisoner's 
dilemma often leads to competitive bidding in which all participants are left worse off than 
if no bidding had occurred. But the fact that granting incentives is not effective for all 
countries involved in bidding wars does not imply that any one country can withdraw 
with no injury to itself. Incentives may be effective in an asymmetrically perverse way : 
an increase in incentives may produce no net gain in competitive situations, but unilateral 
withdrawal may be highly detrimental to a country's inflow of foreign capital.
Out-of-control investment incentive packages represent a direct transfer of income often 
from the population of less developed countries to the shareholders of TNCS. As a result 
of the addictive nature of government location incentives, attempts have been made to 
place ceilings on the total value of incentives particularly in view of the burden they place 
on developing countries. These limits, however, are hard to enforce and provide 
substantial rewards for cheating ( Guisinger, 1986, p. 171).
One country that has attracted substantial foreign investment in the IT industry has been 
Ireland. As a result of its extensive incentive package for foreign direct investment, 
Ireland has become with Scotland, a major centre for the IT industry in Europe. Like 
Scotland, Ireland has developed a sizable semiconductor industry.Ireland's attraction is 
based on a maximum corporate tax rate of 10 %, building and machinery depreciation 
allowances, start up assistance packages administered by Ireland's Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA), R&D grants, training grants, low interest loans, 100 % 
capital tax allowances, tax loss carry- forward, subsidised rentals on industrial estates, 
and easy repatriation of dividends and profits.lt is quiet clear that the major beneficiaries 
of Ireland's generous incentive package have been the multinational companies but had
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little impact on the emergence of credible indigenous companies in the IT sector. It is 
reported that in 1984,126 foreign companies in the IT industry had 14 650 employees ( 
average size 19 employees ) while 150 indigenous firms had 2800 employees ( average 
size 19 employees ). Although the incentive package has obviously contributed to 
employment creation and had a beneficial impact on the balance of trade (90%  of all IT 
products and services are exported), the cost has been a very high personal tax rate (60  
% marginal ra te ) and a high value added tax ( VAT of 20 - 35 % ) (IDC, 1987).
The more relevant examples of applied strategic industry policy are to be found in the 
Asia-Pacific region. This is the fastest growing market for IT products in the world and in 
some ways Australia is uniquely positioned(geographically at least) to take advantage of 
that growth. However, it is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the locational 
advantage or disadvantage will depend on the incentive package offered by the Australian 
Government to potential and existing FDIs; its role as a global platform and the 
consequent development and success of indigenous TNCs will also depend on the 
incentive packages offered by other governments throughout the region.
In so far as the IT industry is concerned, the two most successful locations in the region, 
apart from Japan, are the two city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong. These locations 
are attempting to become regional centres of development, procurement and customer 
service. In this way, these centres are in direct competition with any aspirations 
Australians might have for Australia to become the focal point of an Asian-Pacific hub for 
the global networks of the major TNCs. Further, with the rising value of the Yen 
increasingly forcing Japanese TNCs to move some of their operations off-shore, the 
locational advantages of countries within the region take on particular importance.
Singapore is an island of only 2.5M people with a relatively high per capita income 
among NICs and one of the highest saving ratio (40 % in 1985) in the world. It has 
always been a major centre of trade, transport, and communications, as well as a leading 
regional centre for business and financial services. Accordingly, Singapore would already 
appear to have many location-specific advantages and it is not surprising that the major 
manufacturing industries in Singapore are dominated by foreign TNCs (BIE Report 
No.30; 1989, p59).
The increasing importance of the IT industry in Singapore's manufacturing sector is 
indicated where the share of electronic products and components in manufacturing value- 
added is more than doubling over the decade from 1975 to 1984. The IT industry 
accounted for approximately 21.5% of Singapore's exports in 1984. In 1984 over 90%
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of Singapore's electronic production was exported. However the bulk of these exports 
reflected the impact of off-shore processing and intrafirm trade by the multinationals 
(OECD, 1988, p.45). Given that this is precisely the sort of export trade which is 
espoused by the current Australian IT industry policy, it may be worthwhile surveying 
the type of incentive package which has been offered by Singapore to FDIs.
The Economic Development Board of Singapore promotes both indigenous and foreign 
investment through a series of tax incentives, and loan and grant schemes, as well as the 
provision of infrastructure support. Tax schemes available to foreign multinationals 
which establish or expand their Singaporean facilities include complete tax holidays for 
up to five years for so-called pioneering or selected industries; temporary tax exemptions 
for expansion of productive capacity; tax exemptions on export profits for upto 15 years; 
investment allowances; tax reductions for expenditure on consultancy, warehousing and 
product servicing; there are a selection of R&D allowances including double depreciation 
of R&D expenditure; accelerated depreciation over three years for all plant and machinery; 
investment allowance of upto 50 % of capital investment in R&D; allowances on R&D 
building; and write-off of payments for manufacturing licensing. Tax incentives are also 
available to investors in venture capital. There is also tax relief on the value of services 
provided by Singaporean TNCs to their overseas subsidiaries. In addition, there are 
capital assistance schemes where an investor can obtain both quality and loan capital 
(IDC, 1987).
However, the major locational advantage of Singapore is that it is a very open economy 
with no import controls, a few very small tariffs and no limitations on the repatriation of 
profits and dividends. In addition Singapore, like most NICs in Asia, has a reputation for 
a very disciplined and hard-working workforce with a solid core of skilled and technically 
proficient personnel. As a result, the nature of the foreign direct investment in 
Singapore's IT industry has changed from simple assembly operations based on the 
existence of cheap labour towards such areas as integrated circuit design, production of 
work stations, microprocessors, industrial systems, and associated software. In addition, 
there appears to be some move towards establishing advanced research facilities on the 
island and the participation of indigenous firms in joint ventures with major foreign 
subsidiaries. In other words, Singapore is well down the track towards becoming the 
second force (after Japan) in the Asia-Pacific region in the global IT industry.
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In terms of exports the Hong Kong electronic industry, which includes the IT sector, is 
the second most important industry after clothing. The IT industry in Hong Kong is 
mainly geared to subcontract work for TNCs or original equipment manufacture (OEM). 
As in Singapore, the Hong Kong IT sector has moved towards producing the more 
sophisticated IT products with the more labour-incentives assembly operations being 
moved into mainland China.
However, unlike Singapore, Hong Kong does not target specific industries for 
development The government follows a strictly free enterprise industrial and trade policy 
with minimal interference in the operation of market forces. There are no restrictions on 
foreign investments.
The main attractions of Hong Kong as a location for TNC subsidiaries a re :
- its low corporate and personal tax rates;
- excellent infrastructure facilities in terms of communications, transportation and 
banking;
- a disciplined, educated, hard working and versatile workforce;
- a capable civil service;
- a steady supply of skilled technical and entrepreneurial talent;
- well-developed business services;
- its proximity to mainland China and its suitability as conveniently located entry point for 
TNCs into emerging market of China (IDC, 1987 and OECD, 1988).
The future of Hong Kong, of course, will depend on its post-1977 role as entrepot to 
China. However, to date Hong Kong has been able to achieve a pre-eminent position in 
the regional IT industry without resorting to the expensive incentive packages of Ireland 
and Singapore.
Apart from Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong the most successful locations in the Asia- 
Pacific region for high technology growth industries are Taiwan and Korea. For capital 
intensive or technology intensive industries in Taiwan, tax incentives available to local 
firms with foreign equity and include special lower tax rates, tax holidays, investment tax 
credits and deferrals of tax on reinvested earnings.
Again, Korea provides tax benefits to attract foreign investment - mainly a five year tax 
holiday from corporate and property taxes in proportion to a firm's foreign equity. A 
deferral or exemption of customs duties is available to firms if they operate in a free trade 
zone (D IT A C f Annual Report 1989 ; Appendix, pl41). There is considerable evidence
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that incentives can influence the multinational firms in footloose industries. Competition 
among countries for such investment does little to increase the share held by an 
aggressive government; in particular, when a country is one of a number of inherently 
suitable (or even unsuitable) locations for investment, an incentive package may be 
decisive in tipping the balance one way or another.
Government support for pre-competitive research
For the IT industry, the rapid rate of technological change and the direction of the change 
have been key determinants of its competitive position. Recognizing that technological 
leadership does not automatically transfer from one generation of products to the next, the 
U.S. computer industry has traditionally invested heavily in research and development In 
a recent study of 897 firms in over 40 industries, computer manufactures averaged the 
highest investment as a percent of sales (8.2 %) for all industries except one, software, 
which as an industry invested an average of 13.3 % of sales revenues into R&D 
activities( BIE; Report N o.30,1990, p61-62).
The rationale for government support and assistance for pre-competitive research is much 
the same as the arguments put forward above in favour of government intervention in 
industry generally. First of all, it is suggested that the risks, cost and the gestation period 
involved in undertaking basic research exceeds more often than not, the capacity of any 
single firm or even a group of firms. Accordingly, government coordination and 
sometimes participation in particular projects may be warranted. Since the complexity of 
IT is increasing with the existing focus on the development of supercomputers, artificial 
intelligence, neural computers, microprocessors, superconductors, ferroelectronic 
semiconductor technology, the development and application of fibres and laser 
technologies and fault-tolerant systems, the scientific requirements, in terms of both 
personnel and facilities, is often well outside the capacity of the private sector to supply or 
finance and is demanding of effective collaboration between government, private firms 
and academic research laboratories.
Proponents of the interventionist industrial policies of Japan believe that market forces 
provide inadequate incentives to invest in the emerging, new, high-technology industries. 
They regard the risks of creating a new technology as too large for competitive firms to 
bear alone, especially in those areas where these firms have little experience. Moreover, 
the externalities or spill-overs to other industries and even other firms within the same 
industry may be so large as to justify some sort of government stimulus. That is, the
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economy wide benefit of investing in these strategic industries may far exceed the profits 
accruing to the private firm taking the risks. Because of market imperfections, the 
advocates of targeted industry policy believe that government intervention is specifically 
required to initiate or to accelerate the flow of resources into high-technology industries or 
the so called knowledge intensive sector (Carliner, 1987,p 149). The scale of such 
research programs would be well beyond the capability of a single firm. Accordingly, it 
is argued that, in view of the external benefits to the other industries-direct government 
intervention or, at the very least coordination may be well justified.
Apart from the compelling market failure arguments the fact is that governments overseas 
are massively supporting R&D programs in an attempt to provide their own TNCs with 
some technological and hence a competitive edge in the global market place. Thus, there 
is a distinct trend towards international collaborative research in IT to challenge directly 
the R&D programs being undertaken in Japan and the US.
The Japanese government, by developing the concept of collaborative, pre-competitive 
R&D between private electronics companies, effectively matched the American effort at a 
fraction of the cost. Although MITI's attempt in the early 1970s to restructure the 
Japanese industry at the marketing and product level were largely unsuccessful, the 
collaborative R&D programme into VLSI in 1976-80 was an unprecedented success. By 
the beginning of the 1980's as a consequence of pooling the resources of its 
manufactures, MTTI managed to push the Japanese semiconductor industry ahead of its 
American counterpart without sustaining the massive financial cost of the American 
procurement policy of the 1960s and 1970s (D.LOkimoto; 1980,p50-51).
In addition to the national government focus, IT R&D has attracted the attention of the 
EEC, which is sponsoring an ambitious program for resource pooling. The EEC believes 
that fragmented national approaches to R&D result in duplicated efforts and do not allow 
for cross fertilization. Therefore, it has been vigorously prosecuting a 5-year Europe­
wide research program called the European strategic program for research in information 
technology. (ESPRIT). ESPRIT is designed to foster Pan-European cooperation and give 
European IT suppliers a better chance to compete more effectively world-wide by sharing 
front-end research costs.
One major ESPRIT program involves pre-competitive research with planners of twelve 
major European IT companies in areas of advanced microelectronics, software 
technology, advanced information processing, and IT integrated manufacturing. The first 
pilot projects were begun in 1983 and the early results are encouraging. The costs (1.5
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billion European Currency Units) are being shared equally between the EEC and industry 
participants. Over the life of the program, hundreds of companies are expected to 
participate in a work plan designed by the European Community Commission.
EEC proponents have also defined another program called RACE (Research and 
Development in Europe). RACE'S objectives are to specify and develop inter-operable 
network technologies. When completed, the program could cost the European 
Community and other sponsors $1 billion (Kenichi Imai; 1980,pl45-150).
Many of these European programs have been aimed specifically at reducing the 
technology and also at the fifth generation program in Japan, and various U.S. 
government programs (Garrett-Jones, 1988).
Intersectorial allocation problems
The dangers of excessive government intervention, particularly in the high tech ares, are 
fairly obvious. Incentive schemes can become totally unproductive and self-perpetuating. 
Once a country establishes an incentive program it becomes locked into maintaining that 
program because unilateral withdrawal of benefits will tend to be perceived by both 
existing and potential resident TNCs as a breach of an implicit contract. Stopford and 
Turner (1985, p. 18) describe the process whereby governments compete in providing 
investment climates, which are at least as attractive as those offered by neighbouring 
governments, as constituting a sort of 'Dutch auction'.
Second, if every country embarks on a program of encouraging the development of its IT 
industry then the prospects for global over-supply of IT products is real. These high­
technology industries may ultimately become the declining sectors of the future (BIE, 
1987, p. ix).
Further, promotion of high-technology sectors, like IT, can exacerbate problems in other 
less favoured sectors as already discussed. While incentive packages can set in train the 
process of cumulative causation in some sectors,other sectors may be starved of 
investment and skilled resources. Thus as Salter (1966, p. 148) suggests, the very 
success o f the 'pace setting' industries causes serious demand and cost pressures for the 
less fortunate industries.
There may even be problems of allocation both between and within the targeted sectors. 
For instance, even within the strategic sector itself, there may be fierce competition for
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scarce resources such as technically skilled personnels (Krugman, 1986, p.17). 
Likewise, incentive packages may favour a particular part o f the IT industry at the 
expense of some other part. Thus in Ireland the assistance and incentive packages seem to 
have promoted the development of foreign TNC operations at the expense of indigenous 
firms.
Likewise in Australia, it is sometimes claimed that existing government packages are 
favouring the TNCs and thereby starving indigenous firms of skilled personnel (BIE; 
Report no.30, 1989,p60-63).
Finally, co ordination of the operations of transnational companies generates considerable 
intra-company and intra- industry trade. The resultant transfer pricing of the international, 
intra company trade in intermediate and final products provides considerable scope for 
global tax minimisation. This is particularly the case where host governments, eager to 
attract foreign FDI, offer tax incentives (Caves;, 1982, p.283)
1 0 0
ROLES FOR NATIONAL SUBSIDIARIES
The actions MNC subsidiaries have taken suggest an organisational model of diferentiated rather 
than homogenous subsidiary roles and of dispersed rather than concentrated responsibilities.
The strategic importance of a specific country unit is strongly influenced by the significance of 
its national environment to a company’s global strategy. A large market is obviously important, 
and so is a competitor’s home market or a market that is particularly sophisticated or technologically 
advanced. The organizational competence of a particular subsidiary can, of course, be in technol­
ogy, production, marketing or any other area. The model developed by Christopher A.Bartlett 
and Sumantra Ghoshal (pp 90-92) represents a somewhat oversimplified conceptualization of the 
criteria and roles, but it is true enough for discussion purposes.
Strategic leader: This role can be played by a highly competent national subsidiary located in a 
strategically important market. In this role, the subsidiary serves as a partner of headquarters in 
developing and implementing strategy. It must not only be a sensor for detecting signals of 
change but also a help in analyzing the threats and opportunities and developing appropriate 
responses. The part played by the U.K. subsidiary of Philips in building the company’s strong 
leadership position in the Teletext-TV business provides an illustration.
C ontributor: Filling this role is a subsidiary, operating in a small or strategically unimportant 
market but having a distinctive capability. A fine example is the Australian subsidiary of 
L.M.Ericson, which played a crucial part in developing its successful AXE digital telecommuni­
cations switch. The Downunder group gave impetus to the conversion of the system from its 
initial analog design to the digital form. Later its engineers helped construct several key components 
of the system. This subsidiary had built up its superior technological capability. If the company 
inhibited the development activities of the local units, it risked losing these special skills. Under 
the circumstances, management saw the need to co-opt this valuable subsidiary expertise and 
channel it toward projects of corporate importance.
Implementor: In the third situation, a national organization in a less strategically important 
market has just enough competence to maintain its local operation. The market potential is 
limited, and the corporate resource commitment reflects it. Most national units of most companies 
are given this role. They might include subsidiaries in the developing countries in Canada, and in 
the smaller European countries. They are deliverers of the company’s value added; they have the 
important task of generating the funds that keep the company going and underwrite its expansion.
The implemented’ efficiency is as important as the creativity of the strategic leaders or contribu­
tors and perhaps more so, for it is this group that provides the strategic leverage that affords 
MNCs their competitive advantage. The implementers produce the opportunity to capture econo­
mies of scale and scope that are crucial to most companies’ global strategies.
The Black hole: Philips in Japan, Ericson in the United States, and Matsushita in Germany are 
black holes. In each of these important markets, strong local presence is essential for maintaining 
the company’s global position. And in each case, the local company hardly makes a dent.
The black hole is not an acceptable strategic position. The objective is not to manage it but to 
manage one’s way out of it. But building a significant local presence in a national environment 
that is large, sophisticated, and competitive is extremely difficult, expensive, and time consum­
ing.
One common tack has been to create a sensory outpost in the black hole environment so as to 
exploit the learning potential even if the local business potential is beyond reach. Being confined 
to window status, the local company is prevented from playing a strategic role. It is condemned 
to permanent existence as a black hole.
Another way to manage one’s way out of the black hole is to develop a strategic alliance. Such 
coalitions can involve different levels of cooperation. Ericsson’s joint venture with Honeywell in 
the United States and AT&T with Philips in Europe are examples of attempts to fill up a black 
hole by obtaining resources and competence from a strong local organization in exchange for 
capabilities available elsewhere.
1 0 2
The Australian Information Technology industry: A case study of 
Globalisation
The Australian information technology (IT) industry offers an excellent case study for investi­
gating the impact of globalisation on the IT industry. There were a number of reasons for select­
ing the IT industry.
First of all, IT has some very special features. The computing or information processing side of 
IT represents a classic case of an industry dominated by MNCs with their associated global 
networks. On the other hand, the telecommunications side of IT has until recently been 
characterised by national monopolies. In the terminology of Porter (1986) telecommunications,at 
least till the 1980s could still be regarded as the archetypal domestic industry while information 
processing represented the archetypal global industry. Now with the creeping deregulating of 
telecommunications throughout the world, we are seeing the gradual emergence of a global 
telecommunications industry.
Hence IT provides us with essentially two case studies: an established global industry-informa­
tion processing; and an emerging global industry-telecommunicaions; not to mention the pro­
spective marriage of these two industries.
Secondly, IT is a classic case of a potential generic technology in the sense that IT has potential 
application across most sectors of the economy. In other words,promotion of the Australian IT 
industry could provide a fillip to the international competitiveness of Australian Industry gener­
ally.
Thirdly, the rapid progress of IT provides the potential for Australian participants to appropriate 
substantial economic rents. These economic gains come from the significant first mover advan­
tages that accrue to the successful and timely commercialisation of the results of pre-competitive 
research.
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COMPETITION IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRY
Introduction to the global information technology industry
The global IT industry comprises two main segments; information processing and 
information transmission or communications. The information processing segment 
consists of a number of distinctive industry groups, each of which has peculiar 
characteristics likely to have a significant impact on both the structure and conduct of the 
group. The industry groups involved in information processing include Mainframe 
computers, microcomputers, computer printers, plotters, scanners, monitors, magnetic 
disc storage devices, integrated circuit or semiconductors, and software.
The information transmission side of the information technology industry has traditionally 
been dominated by private and public telecommunications monopolies. Competition in the 
global information technology industry has been characterised by global competition in 
the information processing sector and multidomestic competition in the communications 
sector. Deregulation of the telecommunications industry, however, is beginning to break 
down the telecommunication monopolies, particularly in the UK, North America and 
Japan (BIE, 1988, pp.25-44).
The Infotrends: Go for IT,
Most discourses on information technology (IT) start naturally enough with the 
technology. They depict plummeting price-performance curves, and show photographs of 
the incredibly shrinking chip.
We readily concur that the technological accomplishments of the IT era are indeed 
daunting. Looking ahead we anticipate still further advances in addition to technology, the 
governing forces are complex blends of market, environment, and strategic management 
These blends have spawned five distinct, yet interrelated phenomena called "Infotrends’' 
that are driving both the use and supply of IT .
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INFOTRENDS: WHY IT IS HAPPENING 
Demand Side:
One reason for intensified global competition is the diffusion of similar IT demands 
world-wide. Despite local market differences, products demanded in America are 
increasingly the same as those in demand in Japan and Europe. Six reasons explain this 
growing, broadly based similarity.
Different IT literacy levels lead to varied rates of business and consumer diffusion across 
countries. Stimulated by their high tech proclivity, the Japanese population enjoys the 
highest per capita use of advanced electronics. Overall, however, IT literacy gaps among 
countries are shrinking rapidly.
A second diffusion variable is the IT cost benefit relationship. The user cost of emerging 
technology, such as high powered computers and communication networks, has differed 
across countries by a factor of 3 or 4 during the initial market product life cycle stages. 
Differences in consumer benefit values, however, will narrow somewhat as world-wide 
IT literacy levels rise.
Government support is the third variable. For example the French have invested heavily 
in videotext and currently have the highest penetration rates in the world. The French 
government has anticipated that IT export market opportunities have much in common 
with other successful French export products, namely perfume and champagne. The 
packaging often yields more revenue than the contents. As of mid-1986, well over one 
Million terminals were in operation in France, or one for every fifty people. And, many 
U.S. information providers are taking a close look at French-made terminals.
During the 1970s several European countries with government support, most notably in 
Scandinavia and Switzerland, pioneered on-line banking networks. Norway gained an 
early lead in mobile communications penetration that was due to regulatory 
encouragement. Driven in part by diffusion objectives, the Japanese government is 
making sustained IT commitments, the most visible of which is the current fifth 
generation computer development effort.
The relative merits of technology cross substitution is yet another diffusion variable. In 
Japan, word processing was slow to develop because typewriters were not as widely 
used, while facsimile flourished early because of the heavy use of image laden
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documents; and, in banking, the United States has lagged many European countries in 
cross substitutable electronics funds transfer (EFT) applications because of the ingrained 
use of paper checks and cash. Many of these variations in cross substitution will persist 
to some extent because of entrenched infrastructure differences.
But technology availability, the sixth variable, will slowly mitigate them. Technology 
availability also is a bridge between IT demand and supply sides. Cross-country 
diffusion variations appear during the initial market product life cycle stages when 
suppliers of emerging technology typically are hard pressed to serve native country 
demands. Foreign import restrictions or export subsidies do not wield much influence 
during these stages. Because their suppliers have dominated both content and facilities 
innovations to date, the United States, Canada, and Japan have usually led in demand 
side penetration. This is best illustrated in the software consumption of 65 to 70 % of 
world software consumption primarily because of the strong lead established by U.S. 
software suppliers, most of whom are fully occupied trying to keep up with domestic 
market demands.
Compact disc players, robotics, and office imaging products are three other leading edge 
examples of mutually reinforcing supply and demand in Japan. But some Asian countries 
are exceptions to supply driven consumption, Korean and Taiwanese suppliers aim 
directly for the large export rather than the limited native markets; and IT penetration 
rates within these countries are much more modest than their supplier successes would 
imply.
Technology availability and hence diffusion rates will continue to vary as new market- 
product segments go through their first and second stages. But on average, life cycles are 
telescoping and, therefore, diffusion difference will shrink. Nevertheless, some 
government programs have been ineffectual. The Canadian Development Corporation, for 
one, has experienced a string of failures in its IT investment and probably has not 
stimulated Canadian IT usage measurably. Perhaps the highly restrictive Foreign 
Investment Review Act, which initially discouraged U.S. participation, contributed to 
these failures. Pioneering efforts by the United Kingdom to lead world-wide in videotext 
produced the Prestel technology. This now appears to have been equalled or surpassed by 
French and North American developments.
Restrictive government policies can slow diffusion. Business computer penetration 
started lagging in Brazil during the mid to late 1970s because of government import 
restrictions on the leading U.S. manufacturers. In Washington, the FCC's procrastination
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in setting aside spectrum and establishing other ground rules delayed the emergence of 
newer mobile telephone technologies in the U.S. by at least 5 years, even while the 
Norwegian market using the same technologies was burgeoning.
But, despite these travails, restrictions are on the wane.
Laurence DeMuth, Jr., EVP, general counsel and secretary, U.S. West says :
*We simply must understand that regulators and regulation are no longer the wave of the 
future. In the information distribution business, which is our business, regulation is the 
dying exception to the national rule which favours competition/(Poppel & Goldstein, 
1987, pp76)
The FCC example illustrates a fourth variable which governments often influence 
standardization. Simple differences in electrical or frequency standards have discouraged 
many product manufacturers from globalizing their markets rapidly because of the added 
product development and certification costs. More complex variations in emerging ISDN 
data communications protocols, systems software, and media format standards will 
undoubtedly continue to mire diffusion in those countries either lacking indigenous 
suppliers capable of unilaterally setting de facto standards or clinging to restrictive IT 
policies. But, as stated earlier, most governments are bending toward more 
encouragement and less restraint which will temper future diffusion rate differences.
In the present overview of the global information technology industry, we will 
concentrate on the Mainframe computer industry, microcomputers, and integrated circuit 
or semiconductors.
The Mainframe computer industry
The electronic computer and the transistor arrived on the commercial scene almost 
simultaneously in 1951 and 1952 respectively; development came mainly from research 
laboratories under contract to the Government ( Dorfman; 1987, pp43).
The commercialisation of the large Mainframe computers occurred in the early 1950s and 
evolved as an oligopoly dominated mainly by IBM and a few much smaller rivals: Sperry 
Rand, Burroughs, the Radio Corporation America (RCA ), and National Cash Register 
(NCR) (Dorfman, 1987, p.43).
IBMs dominance of the Mainframe computer industry at this early stage owed a lot to its 
global marketing strategy. IBM confronted its competitors with a world-wide sales force
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dedicated to identifying customers needs and designing systems to fulfil them ( Dorfman, 
1987, p.57).
In those early days the Mainframe computer industry was characterised by substantial 
barriers to entry—very high initial capital costs and customer dependence on the 
established reputations of suppliers.
The means of entry of new enterprises into the tightly controlled Mainframe market is 
interesting and perhaps illustrative of entry strategies which are still employed. New entry 
by Control Data Corporation (CDQ, Scientific Data System (SDS) and Digital Equipment 
Corporation (DEC) was accomplished by targeting sophisticated scientific and as yet 
untapped new markets ( Dorfman, 1987, p.61 ). The new enterprise were started by 
employees of existing enterprises and university research laboratories and hence they 
were able to minimise their R&D expenditures by drawing upon existing research 
undertaken by the founder for his previous employer.
Likewise, the US Government played a very significant role in the early days of the 
computer industry. The Government was simultaneously a leading customer, a major 
source and financial supporter of R&D, as well as being a regulator of trade practices 
within the industry. US federal government agencies like the Defence Department, 
NASA, AEC and the Bureau of the Census were also the leading customers for 
computers during the industry's formative years. These still remain the leading customers 
for the most powerful computers. Half of IBM's sales during the 1950s were to the US 
Federal Government. Further, US government contracts for R&D provided substantial 
financial support to the computer industry as well as technological spillover which was of 
major benefit to the US industry ( Dorfman, 1987,p.7).It is certainly evident that, in these 
early days, the US industry enjoyed specific country characteristics which would have 
given rise to a substantial ownership advantage for US computer companies, thereby 
promoting the spread of US wholly owned subsidiaries throughout the industrialised 
world. A major source of this ownership advantage would have been the substantial 
government demand for specialised computers and the corresponding government 
support for R&D.
In the 1980s the computer Mainframe industry remains dominated by the large MNCs. In 
the early 1980s IBM could still lay claim to from 60 to 70 % of Mainframe revenues. 
Burroughs, Honeywell, Sperry, NCR and CDC were ne#  in line. RCA and GE dropped 
out in the early 1970s. The merger of Burroughs and Sperry to form Unisys in 1986 put 
them into second place ( Dorfman, 1987, p.96).
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The major new development in the Mainframe industry allowing entry by new or 
relatively new companies has been the supercomputer. Cray Research was set up in 1972 
by Seymour Cray as a spin-off company from CDC; Cray avoided the very substantial 
entry barriers by producing a new product which was considerably more powerful than 
the existing computers produced by IBM and its rivals and his previous experience in 
CDC provided him with access to capital and to the sophisticated research organisations 
which were to be the main customers for the supercomputer BIE Report No.30; pp39).
The minicomputer and microcomputer industry ;
The advent of silicon chips in the 1960s brought substantial changes to the computer 
industry. The arrival of the low-cost minicomputer with the launch of DECs PDP-8 in 
1965 heralded the opening up of an entierly new market for computers.The 
microprocessor was invented at Intel in 1972. This led to the development of the 
minicomputer or the popular personal computer of the late 1970s and 1980s. Capital costs 
of the microcomputer industry were much lower than the Mainframe and minicomputer 
industries and was initially swamped by hundreds of small competitors.
A feature of the minicomputer and the microprocessor industry is the relatively low 
barriers of entry; these industries do not require the very high investment in R&D or the 
substantial capital investment which characterises the Mainframe computer industry. R&D 
in the minicomputer industry is largely focussed on development and applications rather 
than fundamental research as in the miniframe sector of the industry. In addition, the 
manufacture of minicomputers is relatively straightforward.
The major resource constraint in the minicomputer and the microprocessor industries is 
the requirement for skilled scientific and engineering manpower are helping entry by 
innovative new firms. It has ben suggested that just about any financial viable and 
technologically progressive firms could crave out a niche for itself in these industries ( 
International Data Corporation, EDP Newsletter, October 9,1973).
This does not mean that the minicomputer industry is not dominated by large TNCs. 
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) with 30 % of total microcomputer revenues in 
1985 was the second largest computer manufacturer in the world. Data General, a spin­
off from DEC in 1968, and Prime Computer, a spin-of from Honeywell in 1971, were 
the third and fourth largest computer manufacturers respectively. Other well-known 
minicomputer companies including Hewlett-Packard, Wang Laboratories and Texas
109
instruments diversified into the microcomputer industry.
The m inicomputer and microcomputer industries represent classic examples of 
technological competition and their growth largely depended on the development of new 
innovative applications which are extremely demanding o f software thereby providing 
further venues for small innovative firms.
The country-specific characteristics which would give TNCs a distinct technology based 
{ownership-specific) advantage in the microcomputer and minicomputer industries would 
be the availability of skilled manpower. Many of the microcomputer and minicomputer 
companies started out as spin-offs from larger established companies. Other companies 
entered the minicomputer and microcomputer industries by acquiring successful new 




This industry presents an interesting case study on the development and location 
dynamics o f a global industry and has developed from the invention of the transistor at 
the Bell Laboratories of American Telephone and Telegraph ( AT&T ) in 1947. The 
technological history of the semiconductor industry follows through to the commercial 
development o f the integrated circuit in the early 1960s the large scale integrated (LSI) 
circuits and the very large scale (VLSI) integrated circuits in the 1970s.
Although the semiconductor industry originated in the North-East of the United States, 
the focus of growth subsequently transferred to the Santa Clara County, California, or 
Silicon Valley as it came to be known. The steady build-up of semiconductor plants and 
ancillary services there occurred from the mid 1950s through to the early 1970s. Thus 
Henderson and Scott (1987, p.51) in discussing the development of Silicon Valley, note 
the role o f economies of agglomeration and Verdoon effects underlying the growth and 
concentration of industry in specific regions.
Henderson and Scott(1987;p52) take particular note of the process of horizontal and 
vertical integration which characterised the development of Silicon Valley* As suuggested 
above, the semiconductor industry provides a particularly good case study of a global 
industry. Throughout its short history it has been characterised by technological 
competition and dominated by TNCs.
It was technological change which determined the nature of global strategic advantage. In 
the early days development involved the horizontal and vertical disintegration of the 
industry with the emergence of many technological progressive and innovative spin-off 
firms. This division and specialisation of labour and the resultant rise in indigenous US 
labour costs led to the physical dispersion of some manufacturing functions to Asia and 
Europe. As a result of these cost pressures wholly US owned semiconductor factories 
were set up in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, 
Philippines and Indonesia. The main location advantage possessed by Asia generally was 
the enormous pools of relatively cheap, underemployed and disciplined labour.
Within Asia a sort of specialisation and division of labour also emerged as a similar 
cumulative process pushed up labour costs in Hong kong and Singapore. These two 
locations came to specialise in the assembly of small-batch, high cost semiconductors. 
Final testing for products assemble in South-East Asia were also carried out within these
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two city-states. Large-batch, standardised, low-quality assembly operations were earned 
out within the other Asian locations.
The globalisation of the semiconductor industry was dependent on advances in 
telecommunications and air transportation. Silicon wafers were also flown from Silicon 
Valley to the Asian assembly plants. Once assembled the units were returned to Silicon 
Valley for final testing and marketing.
As the global industry developed, some of the more sophisticated technical functions such 
as final testing, customer service and regional control and marketing were located in such 
centres and Hong Kong and Singapore.
These centres had a number of recognisable characteristics which gave them an advantage 
over their Asian neighbours which were being established by US semiconductor 
companies. The main source of the location advantage of Hong Kong and Singapore 
were reportedly:
a) a history of political stability;
b) an open financial system with no limit to the repatriation of profits;
c) an excellent telecommunications network and well-developed air transportation 
facilities;
d) a disciplined labour force suitable to semiconductor assembly operations;
e) an education system which guarantee an adequate supply of skilled engineers and 
technicians.
Unlike the situation in Asia, the main incentive to locate US owned semiconductor 
factories in Europe was the imposition of a 17% Tariff on all semiconductor imports. As 
a result the US company Fairchild set up in West Germany; Motorola set up in France; 
Texas Instruments located plants in West Germany, Italy and France; Siliconix in Wales 
and so on (BIE; Report No.30,1989,p42).
The major recipients of wholly US owned semiconductor plants in Europe, however, 
were Ireland and Scotland. These locations were selected for the relatively capital 
intensive, skill-intensive and high quality wafer fabrication operation. The fabricated 
silicon wafers from these plants were subsequently exported to the assembly plants in 
Asia ( Henderson and Scott, 1987, p.67 ).
In particular Scotland's location advantage is identified as being based on the following 
factors :
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a) the availability of high-quality scientific and technical personnel from surrounding 
tertiary institutions;
b) the availability o f financial incentives, i.e. 22% of initial development costs are 
provided by the governments;
c) the cumulative causation process was already set in train in central Scotland giving it an 
early start over other regions in Europe.
The major location disadvantage of Scotland compared to Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Santa Clara Valley in California was its highly unionised workforce; this disadvantage 
was overcome by siting facilities away from major cities which constitute the major 
centres of union power.
While rising labour costs were the basis of the globalisation of the US semiconductor 
industry, the automation involved in VLSI production and the high capital costs ( it is 
reported that whereas in the late 1960s it cost approximately $2 M to establish a basic 
wafer fabrication facility, by early 1980s it cost $50 M or more (UN, 1986, p.298)) may 
ultimately reduce the location advantage enjoyed by the Asian countries, thereby bringing 
about a resurgence and growth of indigenous US semiconductor production. On the other 
hand, the rising value of the Yen is tending to promote the globalisation of the Japanese 
semiconductor industry.
The most significant development in the global semiconductor industry over the last 
decade has been the success of Japanese firms.
In the last decade, Japan's share of the world market for semiconductors rose from 28 % 
to 50 % chiefly at the expense of US companies whose overall share fell from 6 % to 37 
% during this period(OECD, 1989,pp6-9).
The early success of US-based TNCs occurred in the first decade of the industry's 
existence and was largely based on the technological superiority of the US TNCs and the 
agglomeration economies derived from the concentration of much of their manufacturing 
facilities in Silicon Valley. It is possible that the movement off-shore of the assembly 
operations in quest of cheaper labour may have contributed to the decline in 
competitiveness of the US industry relative to the Japanese industry.
The more recent success of the Japanese TNCs in the semiconductor industry is attributed 
to their relatively high expenditure on R&D. It has been suggested that the Japanese 
strategic planners work on the basis of much longer time horizons and give considerably
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more attention to commercial product development and process technology than their US 
counterparts. As a result, it is acknowledged that the Japanese have developed superior 
techniques for the mass production of the large capacity dynamic random access memory 
devices (DRAMS) (OECD, 1989, P.14). The transition to VLSI cicuitry has increased the 
requirement for automating the assembly process (UN, 1986, p.298). The concentration 
of production facilities , along with the rapid growth of the domestic market, gave 
Japanese TNCs a substantial ownership advantage in terms of the achievement of 
economies of scale over the last decade.
In addition to the economies due to automation, the Japanese semiconductor industry was 
provided with substantial protection during its infancy. Government agencies fostered 
and coordinated the development of the industry by setting technological targets for the 
industry and by promoting collaborative research projects between semiconductor firms, 
academic and other public institutions.
While US and Japanese TNCs continue to dominate the world semiconductor industry 
accounting for almost 90 % of output, collaborative research projects (e.g ESPIRIT, 
RACE and EUREKA) are being promoted by governments in Europe with the objective 
of upgrading European semiconductor capabilities
Getting IT on (Consortia, mergers and acquisitions):
There is a rapidly growing tendency of IT players to forge strategic affiliations with 
others, through outright acquisitions or lesser levels of corporate ownership. Within the 
past 3 years, once iconoclastic IBM has affiliated with such diverse partners as Sankyo 
Seiko, Sears, Agridata Resources, Merril Lynch, MCI, CBS, Rolm, Intel and Stratus. 
AT & T has struck partnership with Quotron, N.V. Philips, EDS, Convergent 
Technologies, Olivetti, Richoh, And Japan ENS (among many others)(Poppel and 
Goldstein; 1987,p60).
Since 1980, we have counted over 2000 acquisitions, and over the past 2 years the 
number of IT acquisitions show a 25 to 30 % year-to-year growth. As Joseph Dionne, 
CEO of McGraw-Hill reminisces:
... we tracked our company's evolution. It has been the result of one acquisition after 
another, all based on the recognition of new technology, its impact on society and the 
need to anticipate and interpret that impact(Poppel and Goldstein; 1987,pp84).
By the early 1990s, we see the infotrends driving the actual number of IT industry
114
mergers and acquisitions close to 1000 with some $5 to $10 B changing hands. The 
service clusters will continue to be the most active, but the product clusters will see a 
faster growth in deal making.
While FDIs has been the traditional vehicle for expanding the operations of the TNCs 
abroad, the increasing complexity and the rising per capita costs of semiconductor and 
mainframe computer production has led to the formation of international cooperative links 
between TNCs. This is a distinctively 1980s phenomenon. The rapid changes of the 
1980s have led many TNCs to reduce the cost and risks of the new technologies through 
cooperative efforts with firms in the same or related industries. Joint ventures, technology 
sharing agreements, cross-licencing and subcontracting are becoming increasingly 
common in the IT and other high-technology sectors (Gold, 1988, P.24).
Computer consortia involving joint ventures, joint subsidiaries or capital sharing 
arrangements are becoming more and more common as TNCs seek technical partners to 
complement their particular ownership and other advantages. It has been suggested that 
these new arrangements could herald the emergence of a new world economic order 
dominated by corporate clusters galaxies of TNCs linked together in collaborative equity 
and non-equity relationships (The CTC Reporter, UN Centre on Translator corporations, 
No 26, Autumn, 1988, p.2).
Globalisation is a very powerful rationale for external development. One goal is to gain 
economies of scale by spreading fixed and semi-fixed costs over a broader geographical 
base. But even the largest firms are finding it increasingly difficult to deepen penetration 
in foreign markets unilaterally. As a result, they have established collaborative 
relationships with strong indigenous players. Xerox ( Rank Xerox and Fuji Xerox), 
Honeywell (Honeywell Bull), and Fujitsu (Siemens, TRW and Amdahl) were among the 
first to go this route during the 1960s and 1970s. Some of these partnerships no longer 
exists, and there were relatively few followers until recently. Now such diverse entities 
as AT&T Technologies, Dun & Bradstreet, MCI, GE, GTE, and Ameritech are 
leveraging their products and service, in part through joint ventures and other 
collaborative agreements with foreign firms(Poppel and Goldstein; 1987, p86).
A second goal related to globalisation is to gain access to leading edge markets and 
technologies. And this is the principal rationale for the intensifying invasion of North 
America by European and Asian firms, most often through external development activity.
Specialised and often vertical marketing of content -differentiated products, make the 
available R & D dollars and talents to be spread too thin to satisfy all development
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imperatives.. As a result, hardware and telecommunications firms, previously vertically 
and horizontally integrate, are seeking content laden partners. Tandem, AT & T and most 
other computer manufacturers are increasingly cultivating value-added resellers with 
differentiated applications through co-marketing arrangements and even in some cases 
through financial and technical support.
Consortia involve complex interlinkages across the three Triad regions. For instance, the 
US-based Amdahl Corporation formed an alliance with Japanese-based Fujitsu in 1975. 
Under the arrangement, Fujitsu supplied Amdahl's central processing units and shared 
semiconductor technology with Amdahl. Likewise, the US CDC has joint ventures with 
Britain's ICL and W est Germany's Nixdorf and equity in Belgium's nationalised 
computer company ( Ohmae, 1985, pp 132-3).
Two of the major semiconductor firms, Texas Instruments of the US and Hitachi of 
Japan have also formed an international collaborative agreement to share R&D costs. The 
agreement represents an attempt on the part of these two companies to defray the massive 
costs involved in developing the 16-megabit DRAM ( dynamic random access memory) 
which will form the basis of the next generation of microprocessors ( Australian, Jan. 3, 
1989,p. 17).
The rising capital requirements of semiconductor manufacturer have also provided a 
strong impetus to vertical integration of the industry through mergers and acquisitions. 
The increasing investment requirements and the reduction in profitability and internal 
sources o f funds for investment have promoted the acquisition of US semiconductor 
firms by firms with strong cash reserves. Likewise, the increasingly closer interlinkage 
between semiconductor firms and mainframe computers has tended to promote inter­
industry acquisitions and mergers. Thus IBM acquired an 18 % equity stake in Intel, 
presumably to cement a closer technical relationship between the two companies.
Many firms are severely limited by current profit and cash-flow pressures in expanding 
their R&D budgets but can leverage their stock value or debt-equity position: acquiring 
other firms.
R&D is not the only area in which scale and scope is critical. Many manufacturing 
companies find that they lack distribution leverage. The leverage they seek may be 
geographic or horizontal in scale or it may relate to boosting sales productivity or 
tightening account control. As a result, larger IT firms with substantial marketing, 
maintenance, and physical distribution capabilities can often readily acquire or collaborate
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with the manufacturers and developers o f their choosing, especially those who bring 
vertical market expertise to the table.
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The role of the entrepreneur *
Entrepreneurship has been linked primarily to the ability to process and synthesize 
information coming from a wide variety of sources and to make quick informed decisions 
based on this information. In a high-technology industry entrepreneurship involves a 
competitive search for commercial information. Accordingly the successful entrepreneur 
or entrepreneurial team is seen as being imaginative, skilful in processing and evaluating 
both routine and strategic information, possessing a wide background knowledge and 
superior interpersonal communication skills. However, the entrepreneur's main attributes 
are a superior tactical awareness and a deviousness in the identification, pursuit and 
appropriation of international business opportunities ( Buckley and Casson, 1985,p.l84~
As outlined above, the abilities required by successful entrpreneurs and members of 
entrepreneurial teams are exceptional. Yet it is these qualities which spell the difference 
between success and failure in international business. Ohmae ( 1985, p.65) points out 
that it is a startling fact emerging from the study of successful Japanese operations 
overseas that the most successful multinationals have been those whose corporate culture 
is able to be explained by the activities of one entrepreneur. Most of the operations have 
been run by one or two individuals for more than a decade. Thus another key element in 
the emergence of entrepreneurial ability is the long-term commitment of the individual to 
the industry.
A feature o f the development of the three industries discussed above- namely the 
m ainframe computer industry, the minicomputer industry and most notably the 
semiconductor industry - is the central role played by entrepreneurs. In many cases the 
entrepreneur emerged from established firms within the industry, bringing to the new 
(spin off) firms the benefits of his previous experience or learning on the job.
The entrepreneurs in the computer industry required not only technical expertise but an 
ability to identify the commercial potential of a technological opportunity and to extract the 
maximum rents from that opportunity. Many of the major economically viable and 
socially desirable innovations which appeared during the 1980s have been attributed 
mainly to the enterpreneurship of small new business (Dorfman, 1987, p. 223). 
Accordingly, the long run commercial success of economies operating in a global 
environment has been linked to the promotion of an entrepreneurial culture (Casson, 
1987, p. 256).
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Dominance of the Transnational Corporations;
While the small, innovative, entrepreneurial firms provided the foundation for the early 
development of the IT industry, recent developments mentioned above tend to suggest 
that the future of the industry belongs to the multinational conglomerates. Given the 
existing technological imperatives o f VLSI, artificial intelligence (AI) and the 
development o f the new super computers, the existing process o f mergers and 
acquisition, joint ventures and collaborative projects - particularly amongst the major 
TNCs - is likely to continue(BIE , Report No.30; 1989,p50).
Further there seems to be a movement towards the merging of computer TNCs and 
communcation TNCs as a result of the deregulation of telecommunications in the major 
industrial countries. In Australia this tendency is manifested in the alliance between 
Telecom and Hewlett Packard.
The last decade has seen the merging and linking of the semiconductors and mainframe 
computer technologies. The next decade is likely to continue the integration of 
inform ation technologies with the interlinking o f information processing and 
communications (AFR, Monday, 12 September 1988, p.15).
While the large TNCs and consortia of the large TNCs will domain the mainframe and the 
standardised integrated circuit market, there will be always be scope for sm all, innovative 
and enterpreneurially driven firms to carve out niches in the design of customised chips, 
minicomputers, microcomputers or software for special or new applications. The real 
question relates to whether such niche markets can form the basis for the growth of new 
TNCs coming from outside the major Triadic countries.
Some of the world’s leading electronic companies are ranked in terms of profitability ( i.e 
profits as a proportion of total sales revenue) for the period 1986-87 by Elsevier-BEP 
Data Services (AFR; 10 Oct 1988). The absence of the large Japanese firms is 
conspicuous in the study. Interestingly, the Japanese companies ranked relatively low in 
terms of pre-tax profitability but quite high with respect to labour productivity measured 
in terms o f sales per employee. In fact it is reported that the Japanese scores on 
productivity were almost double those of the US companies, while the top Japanese 
companies Fujitsu, NEC and Toshiba came in 100th, 107th and 108th positions 
respectively in terms of profitability. The big US companies of DEC, IBM and Apple 
came in second, third and fourth respectively in terms of profitability after Norsak Data of 
Norway (AFR, 10 October 1988, p.67).
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Surprisingly, the world's most profitable electronics company, in profits as a proportion 
of total sales revenue, was Norsk Data from Norway. This shows that indigenous TNCs 
from small countries can prosper in global markets populated by the World's giants from 
the US and JAPAN.
O f course, the profitability of companies in most industries tends to fluctuate from year to 
year. The IT industry, in particular, is an extremely volatile industry with companies 
constantly changing relative positions. This is due to the nature of technological 
competition. Norsk Data, however is reported as posting its first ever loss in 1988 
(Canberra Times, 13 March 1989).
Dalum, Fagerberg and Jorgensen investigate the performance of Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway in the global IT industry. They conclude that the most significant small country 
disadvantages in the IT industry are to be expected in those sectors with substantial static 
and dynamic economies of scale such as the semiconductors and the mainframe computer 
industry. Dalum, Fagerberg and Jorgenson (1988, p. 133) conclude that:
... the cause of Norsk Data shows that it is possible, even in small countries, to establish 
successful computer firms if they are among the first world-wide to exploit possibilities 
offered by radical changes in component technology, and manage to combine this with 
software developments for targeted market segments. Norsk Data, though not directly 
supported, survived the initial phase mainly because it managed to get contracts, some of 
them technologically very demanding, from the Norwegian public sector.
The experience of the Swedish TNC Ericsson also supports the proposition that planned 
government procurement may be instrumental in overcoming small country disabilities. 
Ericsson's present competitive position in international market for telecommunications 
equipment reflects to a large extent strategic public procurement programs and extensive 
collaboration with the Swedish public telephone and telegraph administrative (PTT).In 
1987 it enjoyed US $3.2B in Telecommunications sales representing 4.9% world market 
share (Northern Business Information Inc, Australian Business, 1 June 1988, pp68).
Summary and conclusions
The early US lead in the mainframe computer industry coincided with substantial US 
government demand for specialised computers and US government support for research 
and development. The strategic procurement program followed by the US promoted the
1 2 0
development of a computer mainframe industry dominated by the larger multinational 
corporations.
The minicomputer and microprocessor industries represent classic cases o f technological 
competition. The relatively low barriers to entry compared to the computer mainframe 
industry allowed for the entry of smaller innovative companies. The availability of skilled 
personnel was the main source of competitive advantages in these industries.
The role o f economies o f agglomeration and returns to scale was evidenced in the 
development of the semiconductor industry particularly in Silicon Valley in California.. 
However, in the long run, advances in telecommunication and air transportation led to 
further division and specialisation of labour and, ultimately, to the movement of some 
segments of the industry off-shore to Asia and Europe.
Technological change in the semiconductors industry has determined the nature of global 
strategic advantage. More recently joint ventures, technology sharing agreements, cross- 
licencing and subcontracting arrangements are taking on an increasing importance in the 
global information technology industry. The rising capital requirements of the industry 
have also promoted vertical integration through mergers and acquisitions.
A feature o f the development of the information technology industry has been the central 
role played by entrepreneurs in the long-run commercial success of enterprises operating 
in a global environment. Accordingly, the creation of an indigenous entrepreneurial 
culture is a key element in the development of a successful, globally oriented information 
technology sector.
Although the global information technology industry has been dominated by multinational 
from the US and Japan, the Nordic experience has shown that it is possible for a small 
open economy such as Australia to develop indigenous multinational enterprises. In the 
emergence of indigenous transnational enterprises, strategic public procurement programs 
have tended to play a leading role.
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IT products, which range from individual components, devices and software packages produced 
in large volumes, to system integration services relying on a detailed understanding of individual 
customer needs,are extensively traded and their markets are growing. OECD, estimates world 
production to grow at 14% p.a. to US$1300 billion in 1995, and estimates of Australia’s market 
growth to 1992 are put at 17% p.a. (Australian Technology Magazine Special Edition - An 
Information Industries Strategy ; DITAC, 1991).
INFORMATION INDUSTRIES TRADE DEFICIT
Australia has participated unevenly in the rapid expansion of Information Industry trade, with 
imports rising from $1300 million to $3400 million in 1980-81 to 1985-86 and exports remaining 
flat around $100 million (with some increase, to $140 million in 1985-86). It is estimated by the 
Industry that its size will treble during this decade and exports grow tenfold to a level in excess 
of $1,500 million by 1995 (DITAC 1991, p4). According to the AHA which has a membership of 
more than 200 companies and represents over 90% of the IT market in Australia in 1987, it was 
estimated that the deficit was approximately $4 billion and would grow to approximately $10 
billion by 1996. However, recent trade statistics indicate that the deficit remains at around $4 
billion. The following chart (Chart l)sets out the potential growth for the Australian IT industry 
in terms of the export/import ratio under existing policies. It is based upon observed historical 
trends and the Partnership for Development Program goal of exports equivalent to 50% of 
imports for participating companies.
The following chart (Chart 1) highlights the current performance of a number of other nations, 
compared with the position Australia may read if existing policies deliver the outcomes planned.
Even though meeting this growth path involves considerable effort, there is a need to consider 
whether that potential path represents the best that can be done.
The performance of selected OECD and newly-industrialising Asian countries is shown in the 
preceding chart (Chart 2), which illustrates the ratio of exports to imports of Office Machines,
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Chart i  A Potential Growth Path for Australian IT Industry 
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Source: UN International Trade Statistics; Australian Bureau of Statistics; All A Member Company Surveys.
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CHART 2
IT T r a d e  P e r f o r m a n c e  -  S e l e c t e d  OECD a n d  A s i a n  N a t i o n s
Z)
Source: UN International Trade Statistic*. NB: chart fisduififi »oftware and services data.
124
ADP and Telecommunications Equipment in 1989.
Clearly, while the group average indicates a positive trade balance, this reflects the very power­
ful performance of Japan and to a lesser extent, other Asian producers; elsewhere, few countries 
have yet been able to develop their local industry to the extent that trade surpluses have been 
sustained. However, the line item deficit problem is but one aspect of the proliferation of IT and 
while it should be of concern to policy-makers, these deficits should not dominate the industry 
development debate.
Using a broad description, in 1990 the total market for IT goods and services in Australia was 
around $19.8 billion. The value of the major market segments is illustrated in the following pie- 
chart (Chart 3 and Table 4). Over the decade to 1989, the market (excluding carrier revenues) 
grew at an average annual rate of over 17%.
Industry growth has stabilised. AIIA’s 1990 survey of member companies reveals 
revenue growth of less than 6%, although particular segments of the industry are 
growing will in excess of this industry average. The recent decline in growth, while 
largely reflecting the current economic downturn in Australia, also mirrors worldwide 
trends and may indicate maturation of major segments of the IT industry. In terms of 
the economic activity generated by the IT industry in Australia, AIIA’s 1990 survey 
data is summarised in the following chart (Chart 4).
AIIA’s 1990 survey data reveal:
-Imports of $2.5 billion (3.8% of total imports of goods and services)
-Industry value-added of $5.1 billion (1.4% of GDP)
-Exports o f $455 million (0.8% of total exports of goods and services)
-Investment by the industry of $436 million (1.6 of total private capital investment)
-Expenditure on R&D of $181 million (20% of total private R&D expenditure)
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CHART 3
The Australian  Information Industry  Marketplace -1 9 9 0
§3 Telecommunications Services Software and Services
0  Computer Hardware |  Other
0  Communications Equipment
Source: I D C  Australia; Annual Reports of Telecom, O T C . Auasat
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TABLE
AUSTRALIAN IT INDUSTRY REVENUES
REVENUES A t M 
1990 «  1991 %
CAGR % 
90 - 96
HARDWARE 3902 08) 3953 13 5.0
COMMUNICATIONS 2388 7 2531 6 11.3
SOFTWARE AND 
SERVICES
2169 13.7 TATI 14.2 163
ENGINEERING
SERVICES
1065 4 1086 2 23
OTHERS 1473 0.6 1462 (0.7) L2
TOTAL IT INDUSTRY 10997 4 3 11509 4.6 S3
GDP AT CURRENT PRICES 381664 412450
TT AS % OF GDP 23% 23%
IDC Australia Pty. Ltd.
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C h a r t  4 ; AITA Su r v e y  o f  Me m b e r  C o m p a n ie s , 1990
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TOTAL IT MARKET $11.5B
HARDWARE S3.9B
SOFTWARE & SERVICES $2.5B
— SOFTWARE PRODUCTS AND APPLICATIONS S1.175B
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In Australia, the government is the nation’s largest individual purchaser of IT services (making 
up 40% of industry purchases). However there was a 25% decrease in government expenditure 
over the last year (Zampetakis, E, .9 1 ) .
Systems integration is forecast to be a lucrative growth area. It is valued at about $US 5.8 
billion world-wide and tipped to grow to about $US 17.1 billion in the next five years. Market 
research based on skills intensive ventures would represent 40% of IT spending by 1995 and 
50% by year 2000.
Improving the rate and quality of utilisation of IT among Australian industry also represents a 
fundamental goal which must be achieved if Australia is to improve its position in the world 
market.
Too often, the case for increasing the rate of IT utilisation in industry, is undermined by unin­
formed concerns about the balance of trade implications which this may have.
This represents a short-sighted approach. It is important to recognise that utilisation 
of IT can markedly assist in improving the productivity and output quality o f many 
industries.The additional output generated and the premium payable for quality (or 
reduction of re-work costs) should more than offset the IT acquisition balance of trade 
concerns.
The benefits o f increased utilisation of IT extend well beyond the manufacturing 
sector examined in the PCEK Report. Case studies of Canadian firms in a Report by 
the Information Technology Association of Canada (ITAC )  demonstrate that 
increased use of IT yields efficiency and quality benefits across all sectors of the
economy.
The ITAC report report demonstrates that the benefits of increased utilisation of IT 
extend well beyond just the first round productivity benefits (identified by ITAC as 
cost reduction or doing the same with less). Three other phases of benefit 
(enablement) were identified:
-Quality enrichment ( ‘doing better with less’);
-Introduction of new IT dependent products and services;
-Implementation of new concepts of strategic management;
Comparative data demonstrates that Australia’s IT utilisation rate is less than that of 
a number of similar nations.
Measures of IT utilisation are obtained by comparing national IT expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP and on a per capita basis. Australia’s ranking, using these 
measures is illustrated in the following charts(Chart 1 & 2)
The PCEK Report notes that Australia has been relatively slow in adopting new 
design and production techniques such as a computer aided design, computer­
controlled machine tools, robotics and flexiblle manufacturing systems.
In a survey comparing Australian and US manufacturing firms cited in the PCEK 
Report, only 34% of Australian companies had full or partial implementation of 
computer aided design systems compared with 66% in the US (Ibid, p69). More 
recently, the Australian Financial Review observed that Australian companies spend 
just over 1% of their revenues on IT whereas 2-3% would be required to be 
truly internationally competitive (Australian Financial Review, 8 January 1991, p8).
The economic gains which flow from this process of enablement can be measured in 
terms of relative competitiveness enhancement; absolute wealth creation and 
quality o f life improvements.
131
Chart 1 Expenditure on n a s  a Proportion of GDP
In term s of expenditure 
on IT as a proportion of 
GDP, A ustralia spends 
2.1% and ranks 8th.
This compares w\th 
Sweden’s expenditure of 
3%, UK expenditure of 
2.4% and N etherlands 
expenditure of 2.3%.
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Chart 2 Per Capita Expenditure on n  ($US)
In term s of per capita 
IT expenditure, 
A ustralia  ranks 10th. 
But our level of 
spending is almost half 
th a t of the leader, 
Sweden and is 
substantially  lower than 
comparable countries 
such as Norway, 
D enm ark. Finland, 





































Source: I DC, 1990 using World Bank mid-1988 population data.
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IN FO R M A TIO N  TECH N O LO G Y  INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
The following provides a brief description and analysis of the structure of the Australian 
information technology industry.
Data Processing / office automation equipment ,
This segment comprises:
(i) design and manufacture of computer hardware systems 
and electronic machinery not elsewhere classified.
(ii) electrical and electronic office equipment;
All other related goods, e.g. electronic components, precision instruments and 
telecommunications equipment are defined as separate segments.
Hardware is heavily dominated by MNCs. Twenty-eight USA, nine European and about 
sixteen Japanese hardware vendors are directly represented in Australia.The 1984 
W.D.Scott/ A.D.Little Report used ’establishments or economic units' as a measure of 
the number of firms in what was termed the 'IT manufacturing industry' (i.e. the non­
software segment). The report identified 398 hardware establishments. Of the Australian- 
owned companies in this 'industry', 80% had turnover of less than $ 5M per annum and 
83 % employed less than 80 people. The report estimated an overall growth rate of 20 % 
per annum for Australian hardware companies. The growth rate for multinational 
hardware firms was slightly higher. More recent data estimates about 50 small, local 
manufacturers with total sales in the order of $100M per annum. This data also tends to 
confirm that the absolute position o f local firms has been improving (Australia's 
information industries, DITAC 1987). states that output and employment doubled 
between 1982 and 1986. About 50% o f local output was exported. Undoubtedly there is 
some degree of double counting involved since some firms ( e.g.AW A) are engaged in 
both computer hardware and telecommunications. DITAC valued the total market in 
1986-7 at $2.9B while IDC figures for 1987 alone place revenue closer to $4B - 90 % of 
the DITAC figure was supplied by imports. IDC projects a doubling in size of the 
Australian maiket to ~ $8.3B in revenue by 1993.
DITAC estimates total employment at 11,000 ( DITAC, 1987). This presumably includes 
both MNCs and indigenous firms since the Economic Planning Advisory Council , 
(E PA C ), (who used DITAC and unpublished industry estimates) states that employment 
for the 50 local firms is around 1000. Like all segments o f IT, hardware employs an 
average o f 0.25 % of local civilian employment EPAC,1987).
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Communications Equipment (AUSTRADE , 1987)
This segment comprises the development and manufacture of :
1) telephone/telegraph network equipment e.g. switching and transmission gear, cable 
and wire;
2) telephone/telegraph terminal equipment e.g. telephones, PABXs, fax machines, data 
terminals, modems and multiplexors; and
3) transmitting and broadcast equipment e.g. radio broadcast and TV transmission 
equipment, radio navigational devices and remote control apparatus.
The manufacture of communications equipment in Australia is dominated by eight firms; 
all but two o f which (AWA Ltd and Datacraft (Australia) Pty Ltd) are subsidiaries of 
MNCs. The largest purchasers of communications equipment are Federal, State and local 
government departments (73% of sales).
In addition, there are about 250 firms supplying attachment and peripheral equipment for 
the Australian telecommunication network, producing broadcast equipment or performing 
specialised contract work for the larger companies.
Telecom's influence on the industry's structure is critical. Most of Telecom's business for 
communications equipment is handled by the subsidiaries of the MNCs. In a ranking (by 
value o f yearly sales) of suppliers to Telecom, only two firms with an element of 
Australian control were present (AWA - #4 and Olex Cables - #8). However, 90% of 
Telecom's $850M in purchases in 1984-85 were locally produced.
Concrete data on sales is difficult to obtain - AUSTRADE estimates the figures at $1.4B 
per year. IDC data for 1986 is broadly similar.
Australian-produced exports in 1985-86 were $29.7M, down from a peak of $45M in 
1982-3. While re-exports to South East Asia have surged, the overall rate of increase has 
failed to keep pace with the level of imports which totalled $865M in 1985-86. In 1985­
86, the three m ajor destinations (by percentage share o f produce) o f Australian 
communications exports were South pacific, Western Europe and Asia.
Current employm ent in the industry is estimated at around 10-12,000: these arc 
predominantly female production workers. Four firms (AWA, Philips, Alcatel-STC and 
Ericsson) employ three-quarters of the total workforce.
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SOFTWARE
As in the other segments there are two distinct categories of organisations making up 
software. For the first category of organisations, software is the primary activity and for 
the second, it is n o t Australian-owned firms predominate in the former while MNC 
hardware vendors make up the most important element of the latter category.
In the first category, known as the independent software houses category, two distinct 
sub-categories exist The first sub-category consists of some 100 relatively large firms 
with 20 or more full time employees. These publish and import software and provide 
support in a broad range of business areas. Many of these firms have significant levels of 
foreign ownership. Eleven firms in this sub-category account for almost half ( $ 336M ) 
of the total aggregate sales of the whole independent firm category.
The second sub-category of independent software houses, comprises about 1100 small, 
mainly Australian-owned enterprises which specialise in vertical markets and adapt 
imported software to Australian conditions. The average size of these firms is seven 
persons. About 65 %  of them are located in two states - NSW and Victoria.
In summary, the independent software houses category comprised 1200 firms producing 
software for commercial sale. In 1986, total employment was about 16,500 persons with 
aggregate annual sales of around $700M.
The second category o f organisations making up the software segment is where the 
predominant business activity of the organisation is not the publishing of commercial 
software. This category also comprises two sub-categories - the MNC hardware vendors 
and those organisations who are not ostensibly in the software industry but who have 
significant in-house capability e.g. banks, insurance companies etc.
Information and communications services
Information and communications services ( ICS ) is the least analytically discrete segment 
of IT. Until recently most services were usually grouped together with software in one 
highly aggregated category. For this reason, it is the segment with the least amount of 
detailed ( let alone consistent ) data. Despite these caveats, collectively it does constitute 
the largest and fastest growing segment of the Australian IT industry.
ICS has recently become more important for four reasons : first, development of new
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networking and messaging technology and greater scope for their integration; second, 
regulatory change especially to the monopoly position of national earners; third, customer 
demand through heightened corporate awareness of the strategic importance potential of 
the first two changes; fourth - growth in ICS is being propelled by a widening gap in 
profit margins between hardware and software/ services. Margins on services (as with 
software) have been traditionally higher ( on average 15-25 % ) than those on hardware ( 
usually < 10 %  ).
Following the definition currently employed in the DITAC/Austrade study (1987), ICS 
comprises:
(i) Professional services e.g. custom design and development of applications solutions, 
technical consultancy ( data management), specialised consulting (networking, decision 
support), strategic information technology consulting;
(ii) information processing services e.g. electronic information services, transactions 
processing services, Value Added Network (VAN) and information manipulation 
services;
(iii) communication services e.g. consultancy services, electronic messaging, switching 
etc.
This IDC definition excludes common carriage (i.e. Telecom and OTC); recruitment, legal 
and general management consulting and public broadcast. However, public 
communication networks are usually included as will be noted below.
DITAC (1987) values the combined ICS market at $6.5B employing some 110,000 
people. Obviously this includes Telecom, OTC and AUSSAT employees. On DITAC 
figures the segment has the most favourable import /  export ratio of any IT segment, 
averaging 8 % of total market value in imports versus about 4 % in exports. However, 
there are hidden factors in these figures ( e.g. capital cost of Telecom network which is 
largely imported ) which would increase the import side. IDC(1988) valued the 
professional services segment alone at $305M in 1988. The projected growth rate to 1992 
is 22.5 %  per annum. This increase is in line with Europe but higher than the USA over 
the same period.
As would be expected, the major (and some m inor) MNC hardware vendors and most of 
the big players in software make up the major revenue earners in ICS in 1987. For 
example, IBM, DEC, UNISYS and also WANG and ICL; the major Australian firms are
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Mayne Nickless, CSA, Paxus and Computer Power.
E L E C T R O N IC  CO M PO N EN TS :
According to the definition adopted in the recent BIS Shrapnel Report(1987) to the 
Communications Industry Strategy co - ordinating Committee, the electronic components 
industry com prises:
(i) discrete semiconductors e.g. diodes, transistors, FETs;
(ii) integrated circuits e.g. microprocessors, custom ICs;
(iii) optoelectronics e.g. LEDs, photovoltaics;
(iv) alternative /  new materials e.g. G aA s;
(v) other components e.g. microwave components, filters, PCBs, resistors.
In 1986, Australian merchant production of electronics components was estimated at 
$140 M, the majority o f which was in passive components principally PCBs, connectors 
and inductors. Only about $12 M worth of discrete semiconductors and ICs were 
manufactured; this was around 0.04 %  o f world production.
There are only two IC manufacturers in Australia - Philips and AWA and about 20 
principal component manufacturers.
The value o f exported components is 10 - 20 %  o f total production.Recent employment 
data are unavailable but employment was known to decline from 7000 in 1974 to 1400 in 
1979.
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PARTNERSHIPS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (PDP)
Partnerships for Development is a Commonwealth, State and Territory Government initiative. It 
is a major element of the Australian Government’s innovative Information Industries Strategy. 
The Partnership Agreements are reached between Transnational IT vendors and the Federal 
Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce (DITAC).
It is a fact that Transnational Corporations dominate both the World and Australian markets in 
most of the Information Industries.
The Partnerships Program aims to harness the resources of these corporations to make a substan­
tial contribution to achieving the goals of the Information Industries Strategy. It aims to provide 
a solid basis for the growth of these industries and contribute substantially for their 
internationalisation (Senator John N. Button; 1988, pp6).
The thrust of the Partnerships Program is to encourage transnationals to deepen their roots in 
Australia; that is, for their Australian activities to become an integral and important part of 
corporate global operations and growth strategy. The PDP attempts to encourage the 
transnational companies to develop, on sound commercial grounds, Australian actvities that play 
a significant role in its global R&D program and contribute new and innovative products 
suitable for global marketing. These activities may be owned by the Partner, or be a joint-venture 
with Australian- owned companies or organisations.
Under the Program, transnational corporations are encouraged to explore the opportunities 
available in this country and to actively seek out and work with Australian firms in the Informa­
tion Industries. The demand of Partners for local R&D and a wide range of exportable prod­
ucts, from components to finished goods and services, will stimulate industry infra-structure 
development and open new opportunities for Australian firms (Senator Button; PP6).
The main objectives of the Program are by the harnessing the resources of the multinationals 
and fostering strategic alliances with local firms to :
- step up the level of product research and development in Australia.
- speed up internationalisation of the domestic industry.
encourage exports, especially, to help the large IT element in Australia’s balance of 
trade deficit.
- build a supportive industry infra-structure through greater educational skills develop 
ment and a healthy business environment.
- help Australian companies to establish or expand their markets overseas
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through proven marketing and support networks and get immediate cost- effective access to :
* new technology
* innovative product development
* management techniques
* marketing skills
* improved economies of scale.
A major aim of the PDP is to help internationalise the Australian economy and increase interna­
tional competitiveness for all (PDP Brochure, DITAC 1991).
These objectives are inherent in the Australian Civil Offsets Program also, from which the PDP 
evolved.
The IT industry strategy evolved from the Offsets Program over recent years from a simple 
contract by contract approach to the Pre-Qualified Offsets Supplier arrangements allow the 
overseas supplier the flexibility to adopt a medium to long term approach to individual Offset 
arrangements against each sale to Commonwealth or State purchasing authorities. It became 
clear, however, that a more strategic approach would be more effective in seeking to achieve the 
specific objectives of the Information Industries Strategy and this rational gave rise to the PDP.
The development of the Information Industries in Australia was seen to be dependent on both 
building up healthy indigenous firms and on working with transnationals to form product devel­
opment and marketing links into world markets. While the Offsets Program was consistent with 
the thrust of the Information Industries Strategy, and industry policy generally, it did not enable 
Australia to establish broader relationships with tran snationals in the Information Industries 
regarding their overall investment plans.
Transnationals typically see Offsets as obligations imposed upon them in order for them to 
participate in the Government market. The PDP, on the other hand seeks to establish an environ­
ment which encourages the transnationals to realise that there are worthwhile opportunities to be 
found in Australia, and more sensibly and strategically plan to achieve the target set by the 
industry itself.
The Partnership agreement focuses on the three key areas of product development, 
internationalisation and export and industry infra-structure development.
A transnational corporation signing a Partnership Agreement commits to achieve, within seven 
years:
- expenditure on R&D activities in Australia equivalent to 5 % of its local turnover 
annually
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- annual exports of goods or services equivalent to 50% of the Partner’s 
imports into Australia
- an average across all exports by the 7th year, of 70% local 
value-added content.
For software companies, and in other situations where appropriate, the 50% export/import ratio 
is replaced by a commitment to achieve exports equivalent to 20% of the corporation’s Austra­
lian turnover. Again the 70% local value-added criterion applies (Memorandum of Understand­
ing - Partnership for Development agreement; Schedule 1- Corporate undertakings). The Com­
monwealth Government, in conjunction with the States, undertakes to exempt Partners from the 
requirements of the Australian Civil Offsets Program and to develop and maintain a supportive 
economic environment and industry infra-structure.
When multinationals attain the targets at the end of the agreements and continue to operate in a 
manner consistent with the broad principles of the Partnerships Program, they will gain perma­
nent exemption from the Offsets Program.
As long as they remain on track in performance achievement, during the life of the agreement, 
then they will continue to be exempted but return to Standard Offsets arrangements if commit­
ments are breached.
The work undertaken by the Partner in Australia is expected to be based on long term viable 
activities which make commercial sense for the transnational to undertake in Australia as part of 
its overall R&D, production and marketing strategies. To ensure the effective integration of 
Australian activities into the transnational’s global operations, the Partnership agreement is 
signed, not with the Australian subsidiary, but with the overseas corporate head office.
Upto June 1991, twenty-one transnational corporations have signed Partnerships for Develop­
ment Agreements , namely: Bull HN, Hewlett Packard, Wang, Cincom, DEC, IBM, Apple, 
Unisys, Sun, Siemens, Nixdorf, ICL, Pyramid, GPT, NEC, Microsoft, NorTel, Ericsson, Tan­
dem, Amdahl, Oracle and Fujitsu.
To ensures that satisfactory progress is being made towards achieving the R&D and export 
commitments, a review is undertaken with each of the Partners every year. The review, audits 
their performance in meeting the current year R&D and export targets and examines and sets in 
more detail the anticipated future project schedule activities.
The agreements require that Partners maintain sufficient records of R&D, export and import 
activities to permit the annual auditing of such activities by representatives of the Common­
wealth, nominated for this purpose. Sales to Government also need to be recorded by the
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Partner to enable the Offsets position of the transnational to be established, should the agreement 
be terminated.. The intention is that the nominated representatives of the Commonwealth be the 
usual independent company auditors of each of the Partners.
Also the relationship of turnover to R&D, and imports to exports is expected to serve as a deter­
rent and the Commonwealth also proposes to undertake on a random basis and where circum­
stances indicate it would be desirable to do so, its own independent verification of activities 
particularly in the area of collaborative agreements with third parties.
If the Annual Review reveals that the Partner has not met its foreshadowed annual target, and the 
shortfall cannot be adequately justified, provision exists for the Commonwealth to allow the 
Partner a specified period to rectify the situation prior to any move to terminate the agreement.
However, the Government also undertakes to address issues which are particularly important to 
individual transnationals. The undertakings tend to cover:
-publicising the Partnership Program and its participants 
-encouraging an adequate supply of skilled labour and 
professionals
-establishing uniform Offsets arrangements between the Commonwealth and 
the States through the Australian Civil Offsets Agreement *
-taking steps to improve the performance and capabilities of local industry
supplying components and products to international standards
-continuing the 150% R&D taxation concession scheme until 1991 and the GIRD
scheme to atleast 1990 (Memorandum of Understanding, Schedule 2 - Commonwealth
Undertakings)
-just as the Partner’s performance is reviewed annually, so too is that of the 
Commonwealth in meeting its obligations (Senator Button -1988)
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REVIEW  OF PDF ACTIVITIES
The Australian Civil Offsets Program, Annual Report 1988-89 outlines achievements of PDP.
Nine of the partners were reviewed in the first full year of the program (1988-89).while indi­
vidual performances were reviewed, Digital Equipment Corporation, Heweltt Packard, Wang 
Australia, Cincom Systems, Bull HN, Apollo Domain, Apple, IBM, Unisys, in aggregate, 
exceeded their combined first year export taregets by 4% and their R&D estimates by 36 % . 
However a number of partners did not reach their targets, according to the MOU of the 
program.Collectively they achieved an increase of over 390% and 260 % for exports and R&D 
respectively ,when compared with their pre performance levels.
The final targets for export and R&D in absolute terms will be dependent on the firms 
performance in the market over the 7 years. It will vary according to the overall size of the 
market and the particular firm’s market share. It is for this reason that the obligations under 
market are expressed in percentage rather than absolute terms. Third parties, principally Australian 
owned firms and institutions, accounted for $18.7 million or 11% of the total exports and $20.8 
million, or over 30% of the total R&D.
Compared with pre - Partnership performance, exports by these 9 Partners increased from $128 
million to $169M and their R&D expenditure from $29M to $60M. The 169M in exports 
comprised about $66M in hardware and components, $48 M in software and $55M in services.
There are over 90 local companies and institutions engaged in the local activities of the MNCs. 
According to the DITAC Annual Report 1989-90, Partners had a commitment of $400M for 
exports and over $1.6M for R&D to the end of 1996.
Next ,we look at the achievements of the 12 firms during year 1989-90 (Australian Civil Offsets 
Annual report 1989-90). Exports of all partnership firms, effectively the exports of the 12 
reviewed, increased from $169M for the financial year to 30 June 1989 to $259M for the 
financial year to June 30,1990 and their R&D expenditure from $105M for the same period.
Third parties principally Australian owned firms and institutions, accounted for $26M or 10 % of
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total exports. 14 MNC’s are contracting out software and hardware development; 12 Partnership 
firms are facilitating exports of 54 local firms.
7 partnership firms are manufacturing in Australia and some companies have contracted Austra­
lian firms to supply for their manufacturing operations.8 companies had entered into joint 
ventures with local firms encompassing product development, manufacturing, provision of ser­
vices and marketing of products overseas.some firms have sponsored or established educational 
and industry support programs.
The 12 firms reviewed in 1989-90 (9 of these had second review) exceeded their export pro­
grams by 5 %  and their R&D estimates by 38%.MNC partners provide projections of their 
expected export and R&D performance over the seven year life of the agreement. In combina­
tion, partners are expected to reach exports of $1.7 billion per annum by 1977.These estimates 
are necessarily subject to the uncertainties of any projections and the vagaries of anticipated 
market growth and the individual competitive performance of companies (Australian Civil Off­
sets Annual Report 1989-90)
The revised partnership company achievement projections under the PDP is presented in the 
following tab le .
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PRESENTATION OF KEY FINDINGS FROM QUESTIONNAIRES ADDRESSED 
TO MULTINATIONAL PARTNERS
As mentioned before 21 questionnaires were sent out to MNCs but only 9 MNCs responded. 
The following is a presentation of key findings. Information provided by companies (both in the 
questionnaire and interviews) on their export and R&D commitments and achievements are the 
same as those provided by DITAC ( because of the confidentiality element of the PDP and the 
separate commitments under the PDP ), and since they are presented earlier are not repeated 
now. Again, it is to be noted that partners entered the PDP at different dates accounting for 
differences in performances.
By the term ‘Commencement’ we mean the dates on which individual Partners entered the PDP. 
Company Details:
a) No. of Employees:( No.of responses =6)
Total no. of employees : 7760
% increase after Commencement
till date : 21.63
% increase expected
5 years from now : 29.12
b) R&D staff:( No. of responses =6)
No. of R & D Engg. staff : 1553
% increase after Commencement
till date : 37.5%
t )  %  increase in investment in plant, equipment & software capacity: ( No. of responses :7)
% increase in investment 
after Commencement 187
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d) local componentary of production:
7 firms responded & the respondents included software & services.
1 firm was a software developer and did not find it applicable.
Average local components of
production of 7 firms : 52.5%
This figure should be read in the light that individual partners are expected to reach a level of 
70% by 7 years from the date of their respective involvement in the PDP.
% increase in local componentry after involvement in the 
program of 7 firms : 39%
e) % value added on imports:( no of responses = 4)
average % increase : 20%
f) Productivity:
only 1 firm responded indicating a 70 % increase. All others did not attribute any change to the 
PDP.
2) Are the above changes a consequence of the respective companies involvement in the PDP ? 
No. of responses = 8'
3 firms : ‘no change’
3 firms : less than 10% increase in R&D expenditure
(or resources towards it) and exports.
1 firm attributed an increase of involvement in R&D of less than 5%.
Only 1 firm attributed a 50% increase in involvement.
More light on the matter is thrown if information gathered through interviews is taken into 
account and the following picture emerges for 19 firms.
% of firms * change attributed to involvement in PDP





Parent company details :(No. of responses : 9 companies) 




growth in R&D expenditure :11%
Avg. no. of employees :20000
R&D expenditure :288
Strategic importance attached by parent company :
(Proportion of firms 
weighing in % terms 
according to relative 
importance)
high medium low
Growth area by itself 4 1 4
Mature and a source - 5 4
of cash
Launching pad for 1 2 6
exports
Any other importance - - -
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% increase in investment after entering the PDP -187
d) local component of products :
7 firms responded and the answers included software and services.
1 firm was a software developer and did not find it applicable.
average local component of production of 7 firms : 52.5%
This figure should be read in the light that individual partners are expected to reach a level of 
70% by 7 years from the date of their respective involvement in the PDP.
% increase in level componentry after involvement in the program of 7 firms : 39%
e) % value added on imports : (No. of responses = 4 ) 
average increase - 20%
f) productivity :only 1 firm responded a 70% increase. All others did not attribute any chances to 
the PDP
2) Are the above changes a consequence of the respective companies’ involvement in the PDP ? 
3 out of 8 firms : emphasised no change
3 out of 8 firms : less than 10% increase in R&D expenditure ( or
resources towards i t ) and exports.
1 firm attributed an increase of involvement in turns of R&D of less than 5%.
Only 1 firm attributed a 50% increase .
More light on the matter is thrown if information gathered through interviews is taken into
account.
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The following picture emerges from data provided by 19 firms.
% of firms changes attributed to involvement in PDP
63
increase no change 
yes
decrease
16 10% - -
16 5% - -
5 50%
Parent company details :(No. of responses = 9 )
Average of all 7 firms : 19.5 %
Priority placed on this unit in terms of sales among other units, by the parent :
(No of responses = 8 )
Average ranking : 4
This question should be seen in the light of the strategic management of the units themselves 
which is analysed later.
PDP details:
Number of local firms involved in collaborative activities with the MNC.
(This includes figures obtained in the course of interviews with the 19 MNCs) : 116
Average duration : 9 1\2 months
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Competitive strategy:
( % of firms expressing relative importance to different strategies )
% of firms commencement now 5 years later
a) first to market 
new product
20 35 45




c) early followers in 
fast growing markets
60 60 75
d) customer driven: 
designing product 
chanages to meet 
customer needs
70 70 90
%  of production (in value terms) as a result of products /  processes developed after involvement 
in the PDP :( no. of responses = 9)
Average • 4.8%
%  of production that is import substitution (no. of responses = 4)
Average * 40%
However in the areas of software and services firms found it hard to quantify their contributions .
Average increase in contribution after ‘commencement : 12.5%
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Key determinants of quality assurance :




Now 5 Years 
later
Internal standards 30 35 40
International standards 35 40 45
Industry standards 20 25 25
Mutually agreed standards 
between the company and 
local partners
- - -
Australian standards 45 40 60
American standards 25 20 20
Contribution to local partners R&D in terms of : (No. of responses = 6)
now 5 years later
(expected)
average R&D expenditure 4.6 M 8.42 M
no of researchers 5 7
Training and education - -
(This could not be quantified by any of the firms but notable contributions are presented later in 
the analysis section )
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No. of firms extending to local partners :
Now 5 Years Later
Financial assistance 1 -
Planning and management 2 -
MNCs present product /  market focus:(no of responses =4) 





30.00 % 12.50 %




(When totalled percentage would not total hundred because the responses was proportion (% ) of 
company sales in each combination).
Primary market goals :(No. of responses = 8)
Importance in terms of priority (no. of firms in terms of relative importance)
HIGH MEDIUM LOW
Increasing market share in 4 2 2
Australia
Increasing market share in 4 2 2
International markets
Entry of new Australian 2 4 2
markets
Any other 4 - 2
However the picture deduced form interviews was not in accordance with the above and is 
analysed later.
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What steps if necessary should the government take in the areas of:
a) Quality assurance :( No. of responses = 5)
b) Increasing R&D expenditure of local partners’: ( No. of responses = 7)
c) Improving interaction between industry and government funded research :
( No. of responses = 1)
What sort of incentives or programs from the government could enhance MNCs investment in 
Australia: (No. of responses = 6)
The views of the companies on the above issues are summarised and presented later.
Are there any contractual agreement that limit alternatives in operation? :
( No. of responses = 9)
All responses were in the negative. The same trend was observed in the course of interviews 
with other partners and could probably be attributed to the MNC and DITAC striking out indi­
vidual agreements in accordance with their operations.
Chief Governmental Impediments : (No. of responses = 71)
( in relative %  of firms according High, Low and Medium ratings.)
High Medium Low
Tariff and duties 42.8 - 28.56




Government insistence - - ' 85.71
on high quality local 
products
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Does the program focus well enough on all parts of the computer industry?
( No. of responses = 9 )
YES : 7 firms
NO : 1 firm
1 firm surprisingly answered in the negative if any changes or modifications need to be made to 
the PDP, later on in the questionnaire.
How could internationalisation of the local IT industry be accelerated? 
( No. of responses = 8 )
Are any changes or modifications necessary?
a) to PDP:
(No.of responses = 7)
YES : 5 firms
NO : 8 firms
b) technology policy as a whole:
(No. of respondents = 8 )
YES : 5 firms
NO : 8 firms
Suggestions were given by all of them ; they are in addition/to that given by all the MNCs 
international are incorporated in the analysis of the study.
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Key findings of questionnaires addressed to the local companies
Only 11 companies responded to questionnaires. Their responses are summarised below.
“By the term commencement” we mean the period before these local companies engaged in any 
activities with MNC partners as part of PDP .
Most of the companies were small to medium with average no. of employees = 117.5. However 
the range was from 2 to 1000.
There was a 19.9% rise in their number after their involvement in the PDP. They expect a 
24.39% increase in employment over the next 5 years.
Turnover:
Their combined turnover was 163.65M averaging $14.87M, 
ranging from $0.4M to $10 M.
There was an increase of 63% in turnover after commencement. However only 16.3% of the 
increase was attributed to PDP activities.
Average R&D expenditure = 0.46M
ranging from $1,00,000 to 2.3 M representing on an average 3.8% of turnover; 
an increase of 47% after commencement.
They expect an increase of 66.7% in their R&D expenditure over the next 5 years
Total exports:
$37.5 M representing a 37% increase in exports after commencement.
Investment in plant and software capacity :
A total of $36M representing a 54% increase after commencement.
Local component of production:
(No of respondents = 4).




Sales: Tthe mean increase in sales expected by 11 responding firms is 269% over the next 5 years 
from their present levels outlined above.
Profitability:
( No. of respondents = 8).
On an average firms expect a 35% increase in net income over the next 5 years. Presently their 
average profitability is 23.33% .
Most important mechanism for achieving growth:(no.of respondents = 11)
% of firms assigning relative importance to each
Last 5 years Next 5 years
a) internal growth
b) alliances with 
multinational 
partners
c) formation of 





d) Any other (exports)
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Firms placed an 88% reliance on internal growth as a growth mechanism over the last 5 years, 
however over the next 5 years, the importance placed is reduced by nearly half and there is a 
300%, 450% and 1600% increase in expectations from growth through alliances with multina­
tional partners, formation of new businesses via joint ventures etc, and any other mechanism. 
(Only exports mentioned by respondents) respectively. This trend reflects the increasing desir­
ability and emphasis placed on alliances and favourable outcomes from the PDP.
Average number of years of involvement with the MNC partners after the Commencement 
was 3.28.
Reasons for the MNC partner choosing the particular local firm (in the opinion of the local 
partners) : (no. of respondents = 9)
Proportion of firms 
indicating a high 
relative weightage (%)




c) efficient service 20.2
d) cost effectiveness 33.3
e) any other specific reason 9
(because Parent 
company asked the 
MNC subsidiary to do so)
Main types of market served: (no. of responses=ll)





Others (consulting firms &
universities) 15.19
Key areas of success (after commencement): 
(no. of responses=10)
Proportion of firms 
indicating high relative 
importance (% )
New product 40
Increased market share 50
nnovative marketing Techniques 70
Specified products 20
New processes of manufacture 10
Any other 20 (obtaining universal
approval)
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Competitive strategy: (no. of responses=ll)
(Proportion of firms indicating a 
relatively high rating for 
different strategies %)
At commen - Now Five
ment years
later
Product leader 36.36 45.45 63.64
Early follower 18.50 20.00 21.25
Proven Technology
in established
markets 33.33 54.54 54.54
Customer driven 81.82 86.36 90.90
The variations in competitive strategy are brought out above. It can be seen clearly that an offen
sive strategy ( a combination of product leader and early follower strategies) is not very highly 
rated at commencement; however there is nearly a 35% increase in reliance on it over the next 5
years against a defensive strategy (a combination of proven technology in established markets 
and customer driven strategies)
Market Objectives:
(Proportion of firms 
indicating high 
importance %)
Market Strategy: Domestic International
Increased Market Share 24 28
Entry to new markets 20 28
160
It could be seen that firms favour increased market shares in both domestic and international 
markets but there is an increase by about 16.77 %of the latter over the former. Similarly in the 
case of entry to new markets international markets enjoy a preference by about 40% over their 
present focus which is presented below.
Present product /  market focus:(no. of respondents=8)
(Proportion of firms indicating 
a high relative weighting %)
International National
markets markets
New innovative products 45 25
Improved products 20 22
Relatively mature products 19 7
The firms commited to international sales obtained a greater portition of their sales from innova­
tive products indicating a clear link between product innovation and market development.
Mechanism to enter new International markets: (no. of respondents=10)
(Proportion of firms indicating





Overseas marketing facility 90
Marketing Agreement with
independent overseas firm 50 (includes sales to
firms affiliated with 
domestic clients)
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Overseas Markets:(no. of respondents = 11)
(Proportion of firms having 
products accredited to 







Mean (no.of responses=ll) % of manufacture supplied to MNC partner = 7.5
Mean (no.of responses=7) % of company’s sales as the result of products or processes developed 
as a consequence of PDP activities = 5.6%
Mean ( no.of responses=8) % increase in investment in plant and capacity as a result of the PDP 
activities = 8.5%
(This figure should be read in light of the fact that software firms are unable to assess their in­
crease in involvement in monetary terms).
MNC’S involvement in R&D:
Of the 29 firms whose responses were secured by questionnaires and interviews only 5 firms 
attributed an increase in R&D expenditure (mean average 4.3%) as a result of PDP activities. 
Against this background, it is worthy to point out that none of the firms received any direct R&D 
assistance; however 4 firms received subsidised equipment (value unknown).
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9 firms had people trained by MNCs in their premises and 5 firms claimed they paid for their own 
training.
Again, 7 firms claimed to have received Technical Advice of value but out of 7 firms only 3 said 
they directly diffused technology acquired from MNCs.
Key sources of Competitiveness over the next 3 years.(no. of responses=8)
( Proportion of firms 
indicating a high 
relative weighting % )
National International
Cost efficiency - 10
Product quality and innovation 40 45
Customer Service 75 90
Marketing or distribution 80 90
The above tabulation shows that local firms tend to attach an increased importance to the above 
customer service and marketing or distribution as key in sources of competitiveness more so in 
international than in national markets.
Impact of Technology acquired:
Of the 29 firms only 16 firms were engaged in production or software development activities. 
The others had either marketing tie-ups or were just supplying services to the MNC’s.
No impact 9 firms
Positive impact 7 firms
(This included product management techniques, quality control, and other areas of technical
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support which cannot be quantified here for obvious reasons)
The reaction of firms engaged in sales or marketing activities with MNCs partners, was mixed.
4 firms improved access to domestic markets
5 firms improved access to international markets
9 firms approached MNCs for export assistance but no
breakthrough came around
7 firms MNC just includes us in their product
catalogue
8 firms MNC takes undue credit for work done
Of the 11 firms 9 suggested improvement to the functioning of the PDP and the technology 
policy of IT industry as a whole. Their criticisms and suggestions along with those interviewed are 
presented later when appropriate issues are discussed in detail.
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Analysis and Suggestions
The achievements of Multinational partners under the PDP in terms of export growth & R & D 
expenditure have been highlighted in “The review of the PDP achievements”. The latest figures 
released by the ABS (Helene Zampetakis; AFR; Sep 9, 1991) show that Australia showed a 
surplus in computer and information services and for the first time, in 1989-90 the overall 
deficit dropped from $4. IB to 3.4B in the industry. The DITAC attributed this largely to 
progress through PDP. However transactions in computer merchandise deteriorated between 
1987-1988 & 1988-1989- exports rose by 24% against a 41% rise in imports & a nett increase of 
7% in computer services & royalties. It is against this background, that the results of the 2 
questionnaires & telephone interviews are presented.
The key question to be answered is to what extent the achievements attributed to the PDP is 
rightly deserved. Given the increase in investment, number of employees, R&D and other 
resources, the most important finding is that about 63% of the firms did not attribute it to the 
PDP (16% of firms attributed PDP to less than 10% increase and another 16% to less than 5% 
increase to PDP). Only 1 firm attributed a 50% change to the PDP whose commitment to the 
program is $44M or 9M per year by 1997.
The parent companies of the MNCS accounted, the highest importance to, the subsidiary as a 
growth area by itself as against a launching pad for exports (which is one of the main aim of the 
PDP) as is evidenced by questionnaires responses. Whether these companies take on the role of 
Strategic leaders is a question crucial to improving national & industry competetiveness. While 
the MNCS rank themselves at an average of 4 in terms of importance among all other 
subsidiaries in the eyes of their parents; however the reality is that the Australian MNCS 
represent less than 5% of their turnover & less than 2% of their R & D  expenditure. Again their 
profitability, revenue and R & D  expenditure growths are correspondingly slower as presented 
earlier.
Again from the competitive strategies followed by these firms here , it is evident their roles as 
innovative product launchers is very low and that this role would enjoy only half the preference 
allotted to more defensive strategies. The questionnaire results again reveals that the value of 
production as a result of products or processes developed after the commencement of PDP is less 
than 4.8%. Again the % of production that is import substitution after involvement in the 
scheme is very low. The local component content of the firms surveyed had increased by 39% 
after their PDP involvement but way off the 70% mark to be achieved by the 7th year of their 
operations. It is pertinent to point out here that there is no requirement (under the PDP) placed, 
on the firms to reach any particular benchmark on an annual basis making judgement of perfor­
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mances of individual firms on any of the defined parameters difficult. The confidentiality clause 
of the program again, leaves much room for doubt about the figures presented. Given the fact 
that MNC partners claim that they would have undertaken production, subcontracting, marketing 
and other service activities with local firms as long as it made “commercial sense” and that the 
PDP only speeded up the process, we are forced to look more at off-shoots an incidental benefits 
to local firms in the industry as a result of the PDP. While the contribution of the MNC partners 
in the areas of facilitated Exports, subcontracting of Production and R&D to local companies 
has already been dealt with in section on “Review of PDP activities”, their greatest contribution 
to the country’s is competetiveness comes from the following contributions.
Manufacturing:
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, of the 4 models of foriegn-owned businesses that contribute 
to a country’s competetiveness (importers, assemblers, plant complexes and fully integrate 
business), only firms who operate in Australia as fully integrated businesses, can confer benefits 
to the Australian IT industry. But the fact is that production activities of MNCs in Australia were 
usually not an integral element of the overseas firm’s international activities as it was often not 
commercially viable let alone internationally competitive. It is in this light that the manufactur­
ing operations of these firms gains importance.
Seven partnership firms are manufacturing in Australia. IBM and Wang are producing personal 
computers and Ericsson makes telecommunications equipment. DEC is manufacturing and ex­
porting six networking products from its Australian Technology Centre and this will increase to 
11 products over the next two years. The products have been designed in Australia for world­
wide exports. The other firms manufacturing are Bull HN, NEC and Unisys.
Some companies have contracted Australian firms to specially manufacture components and 
products for them or supply products for their manufacturing operations. Products supplied 
include printed circuit boards(PCBs), components, cables, services, metal work and packaging . 
For example DEC has contracted General Power Control Pty Ltd to assemble circuit boards and 
Nu-Tech Circuits Pty Ltd to supply PCBs. DEC has been assisting these firms meet international 
standards of production. Unisys has contracted MM Data Networks to supply communications 
equipment and Wang has contracted Morris Productions to supply printed circuit boards. 
(Australian Civil offsets, Report 1989-90; AGPS Canberra; p.46)
Joint Ventures:
Bull, DEC, IBM, Nixdorf, Wang, Apple, ICL and Sun Micro systems have entered into joint 
ventures with local firms. The joint venture encompass product development, manufacturing, 
provision of service and marketing of products overseas. Some examples are :
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Bull has entered into an agreement with Australian Research and Design Corporation to manu­
facture and market its “Intelligent Work Centre’ terminal.
IBM has established in conjunction with NSW TAFE the Computer Industry Training and 
Technology Centre to train programmers and operators for the IBM Mainframe and mid-range 
products.
Sun Micro systems has signed an agreement with Cadcom Pty Ltd to assist in the development 
and promotion of Cadcam’s new products.
Several firms, including Amdahl, LM Ericsson and DEC, have sponsored or established educa­
tional and industry support programs in addition to their commitments.
The above activities and alliances should be viewed in the light of the fact that they were 
undertaken only when it made sense in commercial terms. It is beyond the scope of this re­
searcher to identify to what extent these manufacturing activities promote industry innovativeness 
and/ or specialisation and to what extent these business operate in the roles of importers or 
assemblers or plant complexes or fully integrated businesses. As mentioned earlier the role of 
these subsidiaries in a small or strategically unimportant market like Australia is usually that of 
an implementer or blackhole. However there are certain firms who act as contributors to their 
parents. A fine example is L.M.Ericsson Australia which played a crucial part in developing the 
parent’s successful digital communications switch.
An important contribution /  potential contribution to the industry can be the links forged between 
these firms and Public Sector Research and Universities, the training or education provided by 
some of the centres established & developed as a consequence of the PDP, some of which are 
elaborated below.
Fujitsu has undertaken a major longterm project with Australian National University and ANSTO, 
invested over $5M with Telecom in Information Switching Technology Pty Limited and has 
created the Fujitsu Australian Software Technology Private Ltd (FAST) which plans to grow at 
$12M per annum within 2-3 years) and the Information Technology services (ITS) function 
(Exports- over $13M last year).
Microsoft has started the Institute of Advanced Software Technology in Melbourne & Sydney - a 
non profit organisation providing training programmes in the Asia Pacific region and only one 
of its kind outside the U.S.
Amdahl has set up “Amdahl Airline Support Centre” to support its Pacific Basin operations.
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Nortel has set-up ‘The Nortel Technology centre” in the Illawara Technology Corporation in 
association with the University of Wollongong to provide input to customer premises & develop 
standards & specifications.
The PATC (Pacific Area Training Centre), Australian centre for Unisys Software (ACVS), 
PACE (Pacific Centre for Excellence) and links forged with Macquarie & Universities of NSW 
and Sydney are contributions by Unisys Australian Ltd.
Though evidence from the questionnaires too suggests that some MNC focused activity towards 
export, R&D and fostering growth of indigenous firms and infrastructure has taken place, the 
cmcial question is whether this has taken place because of the scheme. In other words, would it 
have been done in the normal course of the MNCs business? It is disturbing to note that though 
all the MNC Partners felt that the PDP focussed their Offset activities better and helped industry 
and indigenous firms’ growth, when it was suggested to them that they could have achieved 
their goals through the Offsets Program, they were of the view that the PDP simplified greatly 
their administrative workload - eliminated the need for keeping innumerable records and trans­
actions and negotiations of their Offsets liabilities and work towards that end with the concerned 
authorities. Again, all those interviewed described their entry into the PDP as a Hobson’s choice 
when coming to Government procurement (According to the March 12th Industry Statement, 
however all companies selling over $40M to the Government would come under cover of the 
scheme). It is a significant fact that some of the MNCs interviewed expressed a risk of losing 
vital Government contracts for non-compliance with the scheme. The fear of losing Government 
contracts can also be deduced from the fact that MNCs place emphasis on an increased Austra­
lian market share, followed by an increased market share in international market as their 
primary market goal - a wee bit far from Australia - the springboard to the Pacific Basin' notion 
that the Government attempring to impress as a locational advantage. A similar trend was noted 
in a report published by the BIE (Report No.30; 1990,pp83). Some companies who had not 
entered the Scheme as yet, pointed out that they did not have any significant Government 
contracts to win.
Australia is not alone where an implicit expectation exists in the minds of the MNCs; Charles
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Ferguson (July-Aug,HBR, p65) points out that IBM during the late 1950's was at the mercy of 
MITI beauracrats. However, it is worthwhile to point out that, MITI pressured IBM to give 
permission to produce in Japan. Yet, IBM was then one of Japan's largest foreign exchange 
earners (E.J. Kaplan, Japan; The Government-Business relationship; Washington D.C., Dept, of 
Commerce, Feb, 1972; p 46).
It would be worthwhile to evaluate the success of the scheme bearing in mind more revelations 
from the questionnaires and interviews. Multinational Partners place * Quality’ as the number one 
issue for Australian firms in response to opportunities placed before them, followed by ‘Cost- 
effectiveness’. This is also borne out by the questionnaire responses of local Partners, who 
assign ‘Superior product quality’ as the chief reason for being chosen by the MNC, followed by 
‘Technologically advanced product’( MNCs expressed the need for greater Quality Assurance 
measures by the Government ‘ as much as possible’), better Training for medium and small 
suppliers were some of the measures suggested by the MNCS. In fact, one MNC pointed out that 
‘it clearly ran out of projects’ and on that count had to opt for other forms of PDP activities in 
order to keep itself commercially viable. It is against this background, that the R&D expendi­
tures of local firms, which has not increased significantly as a result of PDP activities and the 
impact of technologies acquired from MNCs (which include Project Management Techniques, 
Quality Control and other areas of Technical support), has to be considered for evaluating the 
achievements of the Program towards its objective of Cost-effective, immediate access to Tech­
nology and Quality’. All the MNCs were of the opinion that, the Vendor Qualification 
Scheme(VQS) was a step in the right direction and an embryo of larger R&D and Software 
development, but sought more focus on the PDP and the sort of companies that they (MNCs 
would like to work with. As a means of increasing R&D expenditure of the local companies , 
MNCs suggested reinstating the 150% Taxation Allowance under Sec.73B, on its expiry and 
emphasized the need for more support and grants. In fact one MNC pointed out that local Part­
ners frequently complained about too much paper-work involved in obtaining grants and the 
inadequacy of small grants(below 50K). For improving interaction between industry and Gov­
ernment, MNCs suggested increased investment in R&D and development of Technology and 
Software Parks.
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Varied opinions were gathered on the question of what sort of incentives would increase the 
level of MNCs Investments/Operations in Australia. Accelerated Depreciation and Investment 
Allowances for plant and machinery, reduced level of Company Taxation (MNCs pointed out the 
Tax holidays offered by Malaysia and Singapore), reduced inflation, reduced Tariff rates (this 
was ranked in the questionnaires as the number two Governmental impediment alongwith Quo­
tas, next only to Preferential Procurement from local industries; one company referred to the 
high tariff rates as a Joke - presently it is between 16-20%, to be reduced progressively to 15% in 
1996) and better infta-structural facilities - examples of Ireland and California were cited, where 
nearly 99% employment and components could be secured locally.
MNC Partners interviewed regarded high tariff rates as a big hurdle in the faster 
internationalisation of the Australian IT industry and advocated free-trade. However, indigenous 
firms did not concur and in fact nearly 70% of them did view the lowering of the Computer 
Bounties as a positive step. This is in line with the BIE Report (The Computer Bounty Scheme, 
1990 ) which saw the Bounty- assissted sector to be a strong performer with annual growth 
averaging 25%, exports 40% of sales and R&D expenditure nearly 9% of turnover. However it is 
beyond the scope of this study to judge the efficacy of the given level of tariffs and its impact on 
greater competitiveness.
The Government plays a vital role in the industry through its procurement (about 40% of indus­
try sales). However the Government does not distinguish between Australian and foriegn-owned 
companies when it refers to ‘local industry’, but as Telecom phrases i t , ‘ the adequacy of re­
source, the quality of equipment and technical manpower available to the company as the main 
criteria in awarding contracts. Evidence presented elsewhere in the report however, shows that 
Governments in countries like Japan and the U.S. played a vital role through their procurement 
policies early in the industry development stages. This is despite the fact that MNCs play their 
cards rather heavily. MNCs in Australia are very vary of losing Government contracts and 
according to them is one of the principal reasons for their continued involvement in the Scheme.
Preferential procurement accorded to MNCs is one of the chief grouses of the local industry 
( nearly 95% of the local firms interviewed placed this factor alongwith ‘ the ugly process of 
red-tapism’ as the number one impediment). The BIE Report also notes that many local Partners 
asked for just orders, not aid from the Government.
Given Australia’s poor IT utilisation rates there has been a continuing tail-off in user spending 
on IT in Australia. According to IDC Australia’s Len Rost ‘in the 1990s users have down-sized 
their computer installations and that has been mimicked by vendors’. While conventional wis­
dom states that a company need to spend 2-2.5% of revenues on computer systems to be more 
competitive, the Australian expenditure has been less than 1.5% for five years straight, In 1990 
the rate has fallen to 1.39%. Last year Hardware sales fell by 0.8%. A survey of about 300 users 
carried out by IDC also shows that in 1991 Data processing budgets are expected to rise by only 
0.8%. Since IT industry revenues are expected to rise by 4.6%, it appears that users will be 
spending less on Software and Services ( Beverly Hills, AFR, May 27,1991).
There is an opportunity for NIES and other advisory services to promote and publicise the 
‘enabling effect’ of IT, in the way other countries do ( the examples of U.K. and Singapore are 
mentioned earlier in the report); this issue has been emphasised by the Australian IT industry’s 
varied bodies. The Government, should develop clear IT strategies to guide their utilisation and 
procurement practices and innovative users of IT. As mentioned earlier in this report, only a 
strong domestic market can strengthen a country’s industry; only countries which have a flour­
ishing market have developed other sectors of their economies and hence the need for a greater 
Governmental role in Australia in encouraging increased utilisation in its departments and the 
economy as a whole.
Discussions with MNCs also threw beacon lights on how the internationalisation of the Austra­
lian IT industry could be accelerated. MNC Partners were of the opinion that Australia could 
never be competitive in Hardware in the near future and should concentrate on Value-added 
niche Software development and Networking and Communications development.MNCs advo­
cated a more active industry-Govemment dialogue on exports and imports-replacement, attitudi- 
nal change of the local industry towards a more visionary and challenging one, a freer play of 
market forces ( mainly through reduction of tariffs), a greater thrust in investment for
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commercialisation of research, assistance to local industry with the qualification process and 
speeding up of financial assistance to local firms. Some MNCs that modifications to the PDP are 
necessary, though the current Program is best to date and is much better than the Civil Offsets 
Program. Some modifications suggested are reducing heavy import duties and corporate tax- 
rates and convening conferences and seminars to raise the visibility of Software development. 
One company even suggested a higher threshold limit for MNC partners for their R&D as the 
targets were easily achievable and some companies had already done so.
The views of MNC Partners on the PDP and its effectiveness as such were again wide and 
varied. Most of the companies saw PDP as conferring more flexibility in their operations when 
compared to the Offsets and as speeding up the process of discharging its commitments. All but 
one company attributed, as mentioned earlier, their growth not to PDP but merely to incremental 
growth. They implicitly perceive involvement in the PDP ( as does the Government) as a right to 
securing Government business. However all the companies expressed active involvement in the 
PDP. MNCs called for ‘ active’ involvement of local companies and opined that the real help 
through the PDP was good relationships with the local companies. However atleast 8 companies 
clearly felt that they were driven to look for local Partners because of the scheme, which was 
arduous task very often.
Other companies felt that they would have formed alliances with local companies as long as it 
made business-sense and dealing with local Partners was a Catch 22 situation and emphasised 
that local companies had to come up with their own efforts.
Modifications were suggested to the ‘technology policy as a whole too’- a better understanding 
of the government, in particular politicians of different parts of the industry. One company said; 
‘There is no Government technology policy; this is an enormous problem’. Greater R&D invest­
ment by the Government and encouragement to local companies were also emphasized. Co­
operative research grants and strategic consultations between Universities and Public Sector 
research ( on the lines of the Stanford Institute and the local industry in the U.S.) were also 
emphasized. Some MNCs felt that the PDP did not have an accurate focus - in that the PDP does 
not understand the Software market or the value of Software over Hardware and that constant
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education to DITAC is required on the value of Software to Australia. One company, strongly 
pointed out that the lack of a policy in place by DITAC, for its assistance to PDP companies, 
which does not seem to be misplaced and atleast two leading companies felt that Export % 
targets need to be re-evaluated and more assistance should be secured from MNCs to help iden­
tify international markets.
As mentioned earlier, it has been argued that a major benefit of the PDP may come from inci­
dental benefits to the local companies like marketing assistance, technology sharing, the benefits 
of the On-the-job training and development of R&D and related skills. However as evidenced 
from questionnaire responses, the impact of technology acquired has not been very high, as has 
been the contributions by MNCs to local Partners in terms of R&D. MNCs, as pointed out earlier 
have devised a number of training education programmes which though highly beneficial cannot 
be momentarily assessed immediately.
Apart from Joint-ventures, local firms have benefited negligibly in terms of financial aid. The 
MNCs however, view that they are not here to give alms. However, 21 of the 29 local companies 
interviewed, considered financial constraints as the major stumbling block to greater 
internationalisation. These companies consider themselves technologically sound but lacking 
frequently in capital which is vital to finance their global forays. The withdrawal of the MIC 
scheme leaves a wider yawning gap (Peter Roberts, AFR, July 30,1991) in an already poor 
venture capital market. This problem is further compounded when the indigenous local enter­
prises attempt to establish in major Triad markets. The pre-global enterprises often lack reputa­
tion in the capital market and find it very hard to get the requisite funds. The problem of mar­
keting overseas comes a close second, though the establishment of an overseas marketing facility 
has been the most preferred mechanism to enter new international markets. Given the increasing 
focus of internationalisation and the gap in Governmental marketing assistance, the role played 
by the PDP comes into focus. Though some local companies have enjoyed improved access to 
international markets, nearly three-fourths of the firms interviewed did not achieve any major 
breakthrough in international markets. In fact one-fourths of the firms opined that the MNCs 
took undue credit and it is in this area of export market assistance that the PGEs feel disadvan­
taged. Governmental assistance in this direction is highly desirable; this trend is noticeable in 
other surveys too - for instance a survey by Brett Scarlet of the Graduate School of Management 
at RMIT ( Helene Zampetikis; AFR, July 15,1991). The above survey points out that only one- 
third of Australian Software companies recently canvassed have been successful in exporting to 
the Asia-Pacific region and informed that companies should consider not only their own finan­
cial requirements but also the adequacy of the financial strengths of any alliance Partners or 
distributors. The EMDIG scheme has been found to be inadequate and agencies like 
AUSTRADE cannot be relied upon too much according to the survey interviews, in spite of the 
fact that by 1994 ( IDC Australia,1991) the world IT market is expected to open up to $570B, 
with over half devoted to Software and Services, though Australia’s Services show an overall 
deficit in 1989-90 ( Helene Zampetakis, AFR Sep.5,1991). Senator Bishop aptly pointed out in 
Parliament (Weekly Senate Hansard Feb. 14,1991) quoting the Mckinsey Report on Austrade that 
one-third of AUSTRADE staff overseas are in the U.S. and therte are more resources there than 
are employed in Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and India collectively, which are faster 
growing markets with great potential for Australia.
The local firms gave valuable insights into the PDP. Most companies felt that unless the MNC 
Partner found it worth while to deal with them, the MNC would not have had anything to do 
with them. Putting it otherwise, this meant that MNCs would have normally entered into busi­
ness relations if they found the local companies good enough but now the local companies felt 
that the MNCs are forced to be with them in order to fulfil their PDP commitments, making 
them feel uneasy and obliged towards the MNCs. Interviews with executivites of indigenous 
NGEs and PGEs revealed that these companies would rather venture out on their own with 
Government assistance when they were not large enough to meet the requirements of the MNCs.
The smaller of the local firms felt further disadvantaged because of their size leaving them with 
the impression ‘The MNC Partner is not interested in a small company like us’. They again, 
complain about the high staff turnover in MNCs making establishment of relation a cumber­
some process.
Another highly relevant suggestion was rationalisation of the participants of the program into
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larger producing units - both of the MNC Partners and the local Partners - by the Government or 
among themselves to reap the advantages of the economies of scale and specialisation and 
improve networking with the ultimate customers. Almost all the local companies concurred on 
the need for greater marketing, R&D and advisory assistants for accelerating 
internationalisation. On the question of strategic managerial assistance, there was no doubt that 
the local companies had benefited, though as mentioned earlier, the scale of benefit as perceived 
by different participants in the program differed. However MNCs invariably insisted on the 
need for greater professionalism and dynamis. Atleast 8 local Partners felt that MNCs need 
greater encouragement to involve more actively with local Partners. Local companies also 
stressed the need for an increased Governmental role as a disseminator of information on the 
capabilities of the local companies by organising more meetings and conferences with MNCs to 
exhibit their capabilities.
The PDP does effectively address two problems which are critical to the emergence of a com­
petitive Australian IT industry. The first is the apparent breakdown in information in which, 
Australia is not senn as a desirable global platform. Australia’s positive location, advantages like 
the existence of a fairly sophisticated market, apt as a test market, with a high understanding of 
technology and an early adopton of IT, an amazingly adaptive English-speaking population, a 
disciplined and technologically skilled work-force, a well developed Telecommunications and 
transportation infra-structure and a stable political system sympathetic to the growth objectives 
of TNC subsidiaries. In other words the PDP can be interpreted as correcting an information 
deficiency (market imperfection ) in the Global IT market.
Second in attracting greater MNC operations, the PDP may be responsible for initiating a process 
culminating in the establishment of Australia as a global platform for MNCs in the Asia-Pacific 
region due to the resultant benefits of agglomeration. The PDP arose from the fact that other 
countries are offering incentive packages. Bearing in mind that representatives of foreign MNCs 
say that they are investing to their best in Australia presently, probably incentives offered else­
where are cancelling the stimulatory effects of the PDP and further incentives may be necessary. 
However, it is worthy to forewarn that the PDP may be equally self-perpectuating, leading
ultimately to the Irish solution i.e. an IT sector populative by heavily subsidised subsidiaries of 
foreign TNCs with a small fragmented indigenous sector.
The Silicon Valley model is appealed to here, in the proposition that specialist and highly skilled 
employes would migrate from foreign MNCs either to indigenous TNCs or establish new indig­
enous forms resulting in spin-offs of new products/markets. However, according to many 
industry commentator and sources within the industry itself, the exodus under the PDp is in the 
opposite direction (BIE Research Report No.30,1989, p86). This is attributed to the demands 
of the PDP to set up or expand australian based operation-bidding up of salaries and emoluments 
as in the case of Singapore.
The question of intellectual property also arises. The MNCs can setup shop and manufacturing 
operations anywhere in the world (called 'breaking up of the Dinosaurs) though technological 
breakthroughs occur here as a result of R&D which may have been funded through tax conces­
sions. In this sense Australia's balance of trade may be influence very little as a result of R&D 
breakthroughs carried out here. Again, the accompanying problem of willingness of MNCs to 
allow local companies to harness hardeamed leading-edge research arises. Australia cannot 
afford to be naive enough to believe that unless voluntary strategic alliances on a larger scale are 
established, any substantial technology transfer or sharing could arise.
"The cluster effect", as one MNC put it, like the sun on the planets cannot come about through 
schemes like the PDP without accompanying location advantages for reasons aforesaid. The PDP 
is already being viewed as intervening in the market place and the U.S played no minor role in 
the blowing up the issue under the GA IT Codes in Geneva recently. Following negotiations, a 
transitional arrangement has taken place that would allow members to play out the remainder of 
their programs within the next five years. The PDP has specific export targets and one could 
argue loosely some kind of subsidy (Partners are relieved of Offsets obligations). However, since 
no comparable programs have existed anywhere else in the world its impossible to draw mean­
ingful comparisions in assessing its effectiveness in generating a nation's IT industy competitive­
ness. Again given the secrecy involved in the program the Government however does not fail to
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give information it feels appropriate (Senator Bishop) and its short existence (again different 
MNCs have entered it at different times) and the fact that targets are set for the end of a seven- 
year period, no precise evaluations can be made.
As mentioned before, it is difficult to assess whether growth has been incremental or due to the 
PDP and the researcher would have to confine herself to suggesting measures to improve the 
competitiveness of Australian IT industry. However, the government's commitment to improve 
the infrastructure leaves much to desired and should be warned against attitudes of MNCs having 
entered the PDP, a contribution by itself (Senator Bishop) and bear in mind that an MNC partner 
can always renege on an agreement because of "the may, shall' clauses in the contract placing a 
premium on the Government's obligations, if they have already not used it as a weapon in negoti­
ating commitments (which are not made public). There have been cases of renegotiations of 
agreements. Difficulties have been faced by Rambos of the industry too. A major Japanese MNC 
which tied itself into the PDP on the basis of projected turnover of $500M by 1993, has found its 
commitments obsolete under current market conditions, which forced it to revise its turnover to 
$300M - 'you can't account for unknown factors like the economy' an industry source said (AFR 
Survey, AFR Sep. 16,1991). In another example, Hewlett Packard experienced a dispute with 
the government over its commitment and came back with a revised strategy. However analysts 
point out that problems with commitments have had more to do with the way industry is restruc­
turing than individual coporate performances. Companies have had to re-position themselves to 
survive, like Wang Australia, which is now getting out of hardware manufacture. For companies 
that are more narrowly based and are platform providers such as Apple and Compaq, fitting in 
with the program has been even more difficult, whereas broader based companies such as IBM, 
Bull and Unisys are benefiting more from the PDP (AFR Survey, AFR Sep. 16,1991)
A study on the technology strategies of communications industries by, The Centre for Technol­
ogy and Social Change in the University of Wollongong found that only 40% of firms reported 
(over 85% were Australian owned) had a formal Technology strategy (Technology strategies in 
Australian Industries, pp37 ,1990). That none of the firms regarded research organisations such 
as CSIRO or Universities as important sources of technology would appear to be evidence of the
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gap between CSIRO or Universities and the industry and a need for fostering the same by the 
government. As pointed out earlier, the investment in research by the Australian government in 
Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences is very low when compared to the developed 
countries. The crucial role of govemements when new technologies are being developed need 
not be over-emphasized and the government here should go about setting in motion stronger 
mechanisms towards the same.
To summarize, while the PDP has not conferred windfall gains to the indigenous PGEs and 
NGEs it has more years than the Civil offsets program.
Firstly it provides leg - up for local companies to get sub-contract orders. It is a logical outcome 
of the model presented earlier, that TNCs would tend to internalise any competitive advantage 
that they derive from an alliance with indigenous firms. But as a sub-contractor to MNCs, the 
fortunes of these companies tend to be clearly linked to the MNCs. In fact the indigenous NGEs 
cropping through the PDP are unlikely to form the basis for indigenous TNCs and may find their 
own survival at stake when the MNCs source elsewhere. The Canadian Premiers Council (1988, 
ppl28-9), though perceiving a need for a similar program ,acknowledges this issue and points 
out th a t:
Canadian manufacturers in particular, are cautious about entering into marketing and distribution 
agreement with foreign TNCs.
This may in fact be the chief impediment to internalisation of the Australian IT Industry and the 
PDP fails most on that count though it may provide a temporary economic stimulus.
Again, though the training and education facilities provided by the MNCs are substantial in 
terms of export income especially when new ideas are brought in by visitors and Australia 
becomes a source of skilled labour, consultants and provider of services to the global market. 
But, as Porter says, no nation can be truly competitive if it does not create and develop a skilled 
and perennial labour force.
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The Information Industry Education and Training foundation (IIETF) is doing pioneering work 
in the direction of identifying specific skill shortages and facilitating the development of short 
courses and inhouse training to address identified needs. However, given the ever-increasing 
skills and training shortages of the industry,the government should rationalise and upgrade 
information education, increase intakes in tertiary education, fast-track immigration policies and 
establish priorities for the expenditure of public funds of high technology education and training. 
This is because of the fact that no nation industry can sustain its competitiveness unless it 
continuously provides an abundant and skilled labour force to the industry and acts as an agent 
for entrepreneurial excellence. But more incentives should be given to industries engaged in 
training, as in countries like Japan, where it is an accepted fact that the only possible place to 
train technical people on-the job (for e.g. the Toyota Institute of Technology, where the staff are 
paid 20% above industry salaries, providing a whole range of research opportunities that tradi­
tional Japanese Universities do not provide because they do not have access to Toyota Technol­
ogy (Technology Assessment in Australia, 1987, pl4,1987). This is despite the fact that some 
on-the job training is provided and Software Development Training Centres and even Institutes 
of Technology have been set up by some multinationals.
We see the evolution of a new competitive landscape in the IT industry, the growing 
commoditization of hardware, leading to a components - dominated hardware value- chain and 
the movement of balance of power away from large established companies towards nimble start 
ups, focussed relentlessly on innovation, given the movement away from proprietary standards 
controlled by a handful of giant companies (IBM, DEC, Intel) towards Open Systems that sets 
rules for technological competition by which hundreds of companies can play. To repeat a point 
mentioned earlier, no country can be truly competitive in the IT industry, if it has no sound 
manufacturing base which is characterised by high R&D costs and capital intensive, high fixed 
costs, high volume and flexibility in automated production aimed at lowering costs. Putting it 
another way, the combination of Microelectronics and software, as well as the ability to inte­
grate them in new applications, will determine competitiveness in this decade. The successful IT 
company will focus on :
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* Software and services, the new growth markets
* Widespread standardisation and economies of scale
* The emergence of new product categories
* The functional integration of products
* The timely marketing and cost effective manufacture of IT products using mainstream 
technologies and
* Political consensus with national and supranational authorities.
Anton Peisl, member of the Board, Sciences AG, Munich, W. Germany (HBR, Sep-Oct 90, 
pp.180) aptly points o u t:
To be sure, semiconductors are not your garden-variety commodity, like Kiwis or Bananas, they 
are more like strategic weapons. The Nation or Continent that aspires to be internationally 
independent and/or competitive in the IT sector must command the entire electronic “food 
chain” from semiconductors to end products not withstanding the fact that software customer 
services and systems integration will account for a rapidly rising share of market growth.
Australia should strive for vertical and horizontal integration of its IT industry and it is here that 
Government should take on a greater role. From the legendary highly interventionist role of 
MITI in Japan and the equally centralised role of France, to the comparatively decentralised and 
less sectorally interventionist roles of Germany and U.S., most of the other leading players in 
the IT industry have gone about building their core IT industry . Looked from this angle, the 
PDP though highly publicised looks like a cosmetic manoeuvre by turning the arms of MNCs to 
integrate and operate on a larger scale rather than develop a sound domestic industry . In most of 
the countries where foreign MNCs have flourished, it was usually in its infancy and have been 
invariably accompanied by highly protectionist trade policies (or at the least protectionist postures) 
in exchange for strategic technology. Such MNCs have always been under close scrutiny.
However, Australia is very strong in certain niche Software and Communication products and
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services and as Gilder invokes a clever analogy (George Gilder, 1989, p .88):
To say that foreign conglomerates will dominate the world IT industry because they have the 
most efficient chip factories or the purest silicon is like saying the Canadians will dominate the 
world literature because they have the tallest trees.
Australia’s strengths in the world Software industry and Services and other sectors where cre­
ativity and innovation are at a premium should be nurtured. Various governments roles through­
out the world in creating and sustaining competitiveness need not be over emphasized - the 
French Government for e.g. under its plan Calcul supported R&D and also through its various 
industrial policies, it spent $6 B during a 5 year course alone, beginning 1981, in six key sectors, 
the West German Government through the Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT) and 
the Ministry of Economics has likewise assisted financially and set up a number of pilot projects 
to help both large and smaller firms. Japan , like the above two nations has not only heavily 
subsidised research (though the sums were small, surprisingly whether measured in aggregate, 
averaged on annual basis or calculated as a proportion of total R&D in the Information industry 
when compared to U.S. Unlike commonly supposed) ( Okimoto, pp.61-63) but has also contrib­
uted through its public and government labs (from the stand point of microelectronic research 
this has probably done more to raise Japan’s technological capabilities than any national project 
completed as of 1985) and even more importantly through its national research projects Japan 
spent over Yenl66 B spread over more than a 10 year period, which does not include the cost 
for the second half of the fifth generation computer project nor does it include MITI’s internal 
funds that require no special Ministry of Finance such as revenues from bicycle racing and 
special energy tax revenues.
MITI’s capacity to persuade private companies (sometimes unwilling ones too) to take a long 
term view of their collective interests is almost like a fairy tale. Though none of the R&D 
projects so far have led to momentous breakthrough in the state of the art technology (including 
the VLSI project) nearly all have been designed simply to close the gap with U.S. leaders . 
MITI appears to have made the following noteworthy contributions, worth mentioning for Aus­
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tralian to emulate:
1) Extensive generation and exchange of information involving industry, government and the 
financial community.
2) Reinforcement of a close relations between the government and industry.
3) Consensus- building concerning development of seminal technologies.
4) Mobilisation of resources.
5) Pooling of national R&D strength, eliminating duplications.
6) Greater budgetary allocations for high tech industries.
7) ‘Seed money to reduce perceived risk and motivate risk-averse private corporations.
8) Diffusion of advanced technology throughout an economy over its lifetime.
9) A means of overcoming the shortcoming of University-based research and lack of military 
justifications for R&D spending.
10) Levelling technological capabilities among leading firms, thus intensifying competition.
However, MITIs effort both in fostering national research projects and promoting collaborative 
activities with foreign companies have not always succeeded or have been consistently well 
received by the business community . Several companies had to be coaxed and like their Ameri­
can counterparts have the same reservations about ‘itakuhi’ (as it is called) (Foreign industrial 
policies, p.192).
The role of the US Government in the research and commercialisation stages has already been 
described. The Australian government’s role in interfacing between Public Sector University and 
industry Research has also not been as high as in other countries and has to be more active.
As pointed out before, Australia does have a number of Pre-Global Enterprises operating in the 
Triad countries, which are attempting to make enormous strides but are severely limited by 
finance, unlike the MNC competitors who are capable of cross- subsidising from market to 
market. Countries which are major IT forces have invariably used financial tools to lever their 
industry. The importance of lending institutions in shaping industrial policy (subsidised loans,
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target sector loans, government influence over public and private banks) is a notable similarity 
among Japan, France and West Germany. In the French case, the government’s influence over 
banks and other lenders appears to be considerably stronger than in West Germany and at least 
comparable to that in Japan (US Industrial Competitiveness, ~pl98).
The reason why issues like R&D investment, adequacy of seed and working capital and other 
related issues have been reviewed at length, is to highlight not only the drawbacks in the 
infrastructure in Australia, but also to point out agglomeration of specialisation advantages that 
MNCs are seeking. The locking of indigenous firms into global networks is the major objective 
of the PDP. In this way Australia can become a global platform or the Pacific - hub for the world 
IT industry. But given the better locational advantages offered by many of Australian 
neighbourhoods, for MNCs to perceive and effect agglomeration advantages and strengthen 
Australia’s international competitiveness, much more than the PDP has to be done - indigenous 
PGEs and NGEs have to be developed. As suggested by the companies themselves, not only has 
micro economic reforms to be made but also industrial and infrastructural rationalisation. 
Government’s action in this regard is imperative as is its role as the coordinator of various 
resources and functional mechanisms. The reason why industrial policy has worked better in 
Japan then practically anywhere else is its long tradition of competent bureaucratic administra­
tion and MITI has been one of the most influential Ministries in the country (Johnson, 1982) and 
the unusual scope of its jurisdictional authority. Japan is greatly facilitated by the vast and 
amorphous network of formal organisations like NTT, ITPA, JECC, informal organisations and 
those not requiring special legal dispensation which includes industrial associations, business 
foundations, MITI advisory councils, DIET members consensus and countless study groups, 
linking MITI officials with leaders from industry, banking, the legislative branch, the mass 
media, labour and academics - the core centres of power in Japan (Okimoto, p 41).
Government does not play the role in Silicon Valley that it does in either Japan or Italy. Indeed 
Silicon Valley entrepreneurs are the most anti-Govemment people around and yet, a recent issue 
of the California Management Review emphasises the importance of regional institutions- Stanford 
University, trade associations, local business organisations and specialised consulting market
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research, PR and Venture capital firms- to the small semi-conductor companies’ success. These 
institutions are the glue that holds Valley networks together, providing a variety of services that 
allow companies to focus on their distinctive competence.
It should be pointed out here that 95% of the US companies (greater than 16000) in this industry 
have assets of less than $10 M. Silicon Valley’s high-tech startups were the prime symptoms of 
small business dynamism. By focussing on short runs of performance, components and custom 
products targeted at niche markets, these companies are consistently able to stay at the forefront 
of innovation process and introduce new products far more quickly than traditional semi-conduc­
tor companies. They do so by establishing strong horizontal ties to each other- much like 
republics. Since 1979. For example, new semiconductor startups have forged more than 350 
alliances with each other and with other companies. Most involve technology-sharing, subcon­
tracting of chip fabrication or joint product development. Like kingdoms, the ties between these 
companies also extend to large corporations both first generation semiconductor manufacturers 
and computer system makers. But in no sense do these companies dominate the network. Indeed, 
in many respects, exactly the opposite is the case (Can small business compete? Robert Howard, 
HBR, Nov-Dec 1990, plOO). It would seem that in this hyper competitive environment and 
given the acceleration of technological change, Australian companies cannot afford to be slow to 
reorganise themselves and resist co-operation. As Porter points out, a country’s capacity to build 
strong production networks can only sustain competitiveness.
The example of Silicon Valley’s network of companies is heightened to point out that the real 
issue is not size , it is industrial organisation. Sydney's Silicon Valley in the Sydney suburbs of 
North Ryde is home for a cluster of high technology firms producing Hardware and computer 
Software as well as Macquarie University and CSIRO research facilities ( Asian Herald , Dec 
1990, pp26-27) but whether it is a match for San Jose, U.S.. in terms of vertical and horizontal 
alliances and co-operative relationships or Japan's supplier group systems or Europe's industrial 
districts where networks of highly specialised small companies combine state-of-the-art tech­
nologies and skilled labour to produce high value-added products is a question. Such networks 
make possible continual innovation through a delicate balance of competition and co-operation
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demand and support (C.Richard Hatch* Flexible Manufacturing Networks: Co-operation for 
competitiveness in a global economy, 1988, pp21-25). In contrast apart from the diversified 
integrated corporate complexes in Japan, industrial structures are dominated by “Keiretsu” , 
which are societies of business- either bank centered Keiretsus (which are massive industrial 
combines of 20 to 45 core companies to share risk and providing a mechanism for allocating 
investment to strategic industries) or supply Keiretsu which are groups of companies integrated 
along with supplier chain dominated by a major manufacturer. The Keiretsu system in other 
words contributes horizontal scale, diversified production of related systems, vertical technical 
co-ordination and market discipline. Each sector, particularly critical components and capital 
equipment is concentrated but not monopolistic, thus guaranteeing stability and scale while 
preserving internal rivalry. Each company’s production is partly but not wholly captive. Because 
products are dependent on the market they are also disciplined but it is unlike wholly captive 
operations in the U.S. (Charles H.Ferguson; HBR July-Aug 1990; 60-69). Such networks are 
missing in the Australian IT industry which makes it very hard to compete globally on a 
competitive manner.
The proposed Multifunction - Polis is a step in the right direction wherein Japan and Australi 
can co-operate, which is expected to lead to the development and manufacture of highly com­
petitive software packages made in Australia by fusing such results with Japans advanced mass 
production technology. However as the MOT document states, other Pacific nations must be 
involved for the MFP to make meaningful contributions ( Inkster, 1991,The Clever City Japan, 
Australia and the MFP , Sydney University Press pp 29-31). Again, it is surprising to note that 
the Federal Government proposes to spend only $ 1 M on the MFP whereas the rest has to be 
spent by South Australia (FP Robert Garran, pp5, AFR , July 30, 1991). But Australia should 
adopt a firm national strategy which increases the bargaining and monitoring of all Australian 
agents in the process of MFP design, establishment and day-to-day administration (pp 119).
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CONCLUSION
While the PDP has not conferred windfall gains it has focused better the activities of MNC 
partners in the industry. However if strategic partnerships are to be further developed between 
them and the local partners the core competence of the local industry has to be improved.Towards 
this end the government should focus on greater macroeconomic and infrastructural development. 
Short term measures like the PDP cannot confer competitiveness on the industry and better 
locational advantages should be offered to multinationals if they are to be engaged in business 
integration operations in Australia.
Ultimately it is the individual firms who are to compete internationally and though in the short 
run a countries competitiveness derives from the price / performance attributes of current prod­
ucts in the long run, it derives from an ability to build at lower cost and more speedily than 
competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. (C.ICPrahalad and Gary 
Hamel, The Core Competence of the Corporation, Harvard Business Review, May-June 1990, 
pp81,85). Emersons words of “if a man makes a better mouse trap, though he builds his house 
in the woods, the world will make a beaten path to his door” is apt in the current situation and 
calls for the local industry to manage for uniqueness, develop a distinctive competence and 
create a competitive sustainable advantage.
The Government’s role in this regard is quiet substantial and need not be over emphasised. 
More co-operation between the local industries to compete in the world markets on the lines 
mentioned before have to be fostered. Thomas Lewis, the noted biologist argued that the survival 
of the fittest does not mean that nature is red in the tooth and claw - it means that those who 
survive are those who co-operate with other living things.
APPENDIX 1
Q U ESTIO N N A IR E
COMPANY _ _____________________________
PERSON COMPLETING QUESTIONNAIRE _
TITLE __________________________________
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
PHONE DATE
Guidelines to completing the questionnaire
The questionnaire should be filled out by someone with broad, overall knowledge of the 
company’s strategies and activities. PLEASE RETURN to the following address:
Ms. P. Ramakrishnan 
Department of Management 
University of Wollongong 
P.O.Box 1144 
Wollongong, NSW 2500
Follow the directives in parenthesis after each question. Feel free to add information as 
necessary to reflect your experiences. We are seeking overall, approximate infonnation, 
and recognise that precise answers will not be possible. Please give your best estimate in 
each case (including “Don’t know”) rather than leaving the answers blank.
C onfidentiality
The answ ers you provide will be held in the strictest confidence. Any 
published analysis using data from this survey will contain no information 
that can be identified with any individual firm  or respondent to this 
questionna ire .
1
I Com pany details
1. The items below deal with descriptive information about your company. Consider
only Australian operations.
(B y  the term ‘commencement’ , we mean at the time yo u r company started  
functioning under the 4Partnership fo r  Development Program ’ )
At commencement Now 5 Years
from now
a) No. of employees ________  ________  ________
b) Turnover ($ million) ________  ________  ________
c) R & D expenditure ________  ________  ________
(ABS definition)
d) No. of Research & Engineering Staff ________  ________  ________
e) Exports ($ million) ________  ________  ________
f) Investment in:
i) Plant & equipment ________  ________  ________
ii) Software capacity ________  ________  ________
g) Local component of
production (%  terms) ________  ________  ________
h) %  Value added on imports ________  ________  ________
i) Productivity ________  ________  ________
2. Would the above changes have been different if not for your company’s involvement
in the ‘Partnership for Development Program'?
If yes, how? (Please indicate in approximate %  terms)
Increase Decrease
a) No. of employees ------------  ------------
b) Turnover ($ million) -------------- ----------




d) No. of Research & Engineering Staff
e) Exports ($ million)
f) Investment in:
i) Plant & equipment
ii) Software capacity
g) Local component of 
production (%  terms)
h) %  Value added on imports
i) Productivity




d) R & D
c) Local componentry
d) Intangible goals
e) Any other (Please specify)
II Paren t company details
1. What are the overall goals of the parent company?





2. What strategic importance does the parent company attach to your company?
(Please indicate on a scale o f 1 to 5 the degree o f emphasis p laced; 1 being the least 
and 5 the greatest)
Emphasis
a) It is a growth area by itself ________
b) Mature and a source of cash ________
c) A launching pad for exports ________
d) Any other (Please specify) ________
3. What are the current results of the parent company in terms of:
a) Manufacturing and software capacity
b) Sales growth
c) Rate of return
d) No. of employees
e) R & D expenditure
4. Is there a generic strategy that the parent company has applied in a number of
businesses, and has attempted on your company?
If yes, what is the strategy?
5. What priority does the parent company place on this unit in terms of sales among all its 
other units? (Please rank)
4
I l l  P artnersh ip  for Development Program  details
1. What do you believe are significant IT industry trends?
2. How many local partners does your company have and when did the company enter 
into those partnerships?
Name of partner Partnership commencement date
3. Are there going to be any more partnerships in the near future?
If yes, how many and when?
4. Which of the following best describes your company’s competitive strategy?
(Please indicate on a scale o f Ito  5 the extent to which each statement is relevant; 1 
being o f little o r no relevance and 5 being highly relevant)
At commencement Now 5 Years
from now
a) First to market 
new products
b) Early follower in 
fast growing markets
c) Focus on proven
technology in established markets
d) Customer driven; designing 
product changes to meet customer needs
5
e) Any other (Please specify) At commencement Now 5 Years 
from now
5. What percentage of your company’s sales are the result of products or processes 
developed in Australia after your company’s involvement in the “Partnership for 
Development Program”?
{Place an “X ” in the appropriate place on the scale)
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
6. What has been your company’s history in the market place?
Product category Year Value
7. In terms of production what percentage is import substitution?
% of production
a) At commencement ________
b) Now ------------
c) 5 years hence ------------
6
8. What preferences (in %  relative terms) would your company assign to the following as 
key determinants of quality assurance?
(Please note that the total percentage should not exceed 100)





d) Mutually agreed standards 




9. What is your company’s contribution to local partners for R & D in terms of:
Now 5 Years
from now
a) Expenditure ($ million) ________  ________
b) No. of researchers ________  ________
c) Training & education ________  ________
provided
d) Any other form of assistance (Please specify)
10. How much and what sort of financial support does your company extend to the local 
partners?
7
11. W hat kind o f  education and training does your com pany extend to the local partners?
Also please specify in terms of:
a) No. of trainees
b) Value
12. Is there any need to enhance the strategic planning and management skills of your 
company’s local partners?
If yes, how do you influence it?
13. What is your company ‘s present product /  market focus?
(P lease estimate approxim ately the proportion (% ) o f company sales in each 
combination)
PRODUCT MARKET
Broad market Specialised niche markets
1) New innovative products
2) Improved products
3) Relatively mature products
8
14. What are your company's primary market goals?
(Please indicate on a scale o f 1 to 5 the degree o f emphasis your firm  places on an 
objective, 1 being fo r  little o r no emphasis and 5, the greatest emphasis. Please do 
not use a number more than once)
Degree of emphasis
a) Increasing market share in 
Australian markets
b) Increasing market share in 
existing international markets
c) Entry to new Australian markets
d) Entry to new international markets
e) Any other (Please specify)
15. What steps do you suggest the government, if necessary should take in the areas of:
1 ) Quality assurance
2) Increasing R & D expenditure on the part of your company’s local partners
3) Improving the interface between your company and public sector research, and 
university education
9
16. What kind of incentives or programs on the part of the government do you suggest 
would enhance your investment in Australian operations?
17. Are there any contractual agreements that limit alternatives in your operations? If 
yes, what are they?
a) With the government
b) With the local partners
c) With any other licensing authority
18. What are your company’s chief governmental impediments?
(Please indicate on a scale o f lto  5 ; 1 being little or no hindrance and 5 being the 
greatest impediment)
Degree of impediment
a) Tariffs and duties ------------
b) Quotas ------------
c) Preferential procurement from local industry ________
d) Governmental insistence on high quality ------------
locally produced component of products
19. Does the program focus well enough on all parts of the computer and communication 
industry in Australia?
If no, please suggest alternatives.
10
20. In your opinion how could the internationalisation of the local information 
technology industry be accelerated?
21. Do you think any changes or modifications need be made for a more efficient 
functioning of: (If yes, please specify)
a) The Partnership for Development Program
b) The technology policy as a whole
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